This Personal Mission History has been prepared from original 445th Bomb Group records found in the National Archives and Records Agency (NARA) in College Park, Maryland.

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The 445th Bomb group's website can be found at:

http://www.445BG.org




HOW TO READ THE ENCLOSED DOCUMENTS

The Cover is self-explained except for aircraft silhouette. The image is either a photograph (if possible) of the aircraft flown on the first mission, or a color image with the appropriate markings. The approved logo for the 445th Bomb Group (Heavy) and the appropriate squadron patch mark the top of the cover.

Each group within the Second Air Division could be identified by individual group marking on the tail fin/rudder assembly. Originally, the 445th was identified with a large white circle on the upper portion of the fin with the letter 'F' in the middle. Below that was the aircraft's radio call letter. Early in 1944, the designation was changed to a solid black fin with a horizontal white stripe. The radio call letter was placed in the center of the stripe. All aircraft in the 2nd Combat Wing of the 2nd Air Division had black and white markings.

Two large letters on the side of the fuselage and just forward of the tail assembly defined the squadron the aircraft was assigned to. A smaller letter identified the radio call letter for the aircraft. There were four squadrons in the 445th Bomb Group:



Notes of Interest defines how many missions were needed to complete a "tour" and what a 'mission' was. **Credits/Acknowledgements** details why and how this mission history came into being. **Battle Honors** details the various campaigns members of the 445th Bomb Group served in. This history was compiled from official Army Air Force records. They can be used to obtain medals or to verify service. A map of the base showing the layout of the airfield is included.

The 445 Group Mission History details the individual's mission number, date and the group mission number, the city, country and target, type and size of bombs used. It also indicates

the accuracy of bombs dropped, the number of aircraft over the target, number of ships lost (if any) and the approximate total flying time which included getting into formation.

The Personal Mission History defines the individual's combat record by mission number and date flown. The name of the city and a general description of the target is included with each mission. The aircraft flown on that mission has been identified by tail number, radio call letter and name, if any, for the aircraft. The crew manifest for each mission on which the subject took part, indicates the other crew members, their job, and their rank at the time. The crew member for which this document has been prepared is highlighted in bold type.

Integrated into the Personal Mission History is the 8th Air Force Mission Summaries to show the role of the 445th Bomb Group in the air campaign against Ge conducted by the 8th Air Force. This section includes the 8th Air Force Field Order Number, the total number of all aircraft dispatched against the targets in the field order, and what fighter escort was provided. At the end of each day's summary, a table has been added to show the 445th's effort. The table includes the group's mission number, target, number of aircraft launched and the number of aircraft lost on that mission (if any).

Termino	logy	Used:

Rank (low to high):							
		F/O	Flying Officer			Pvt	Private
	S	2 nd Lt	2 nd Lieutenant		Q	Pfc	Private First Class
	ЕR	1 st Lt	1 st Lieutenant		ΤEΙ	Cpl	Corporal
	ΙC	Capt	Captain		I S	Sgt	Sergeant
	ΟFF	Maj	Major		N N	S/Sgt	Staff Sergeant
	0	Lt Col	Lieutenant Colonel		ш	T/Sgt	Technical Sergeant
		Col	Colonel			M/Sgt	Master Sergeant
Crew P	Crew Positions: 1 st Pilot		Fly's the aircraft and is in command in the air, regardless of rank.			n command in the air,	
(Office	rs)		Co-Pilot		A rated pilot who assists the 1 st Pilot in flying the aircraft and scans instruments.		
	Navigator Keeps times.			etaile	d records o	of aircraft position at all	
	Bombardier aircraft				is equ	ipped, oth	Uses Norden bombsight if erwise drops on lead

	Pilotage Navigator	Navigator riding in the nose turret to pick out visual references on the ground; drops bombs when lead aircraft drops.
(Enlisted)	Flight Engineer	Monitors engine controls and fires top turret guns.
	Radio Operator	Controls radio equipment in the aircraft and maintains communication log.
	Nose Turret	Gunner who mans the nose turret; also can act as `togglier' to drop bombs when lead aircraft drops.
	Top Turret	Power turret just aft of the flight deck with twin .50 caliber M-2 heavy machineguns; usually manned by Flight Engineer.
	Waist Gunner	One of two gunner in the waist position firing a single .50 caliber machinegun.
	Ball Turret	Retractable turret located between bomb bay and waist gun positions; has two .50 caliber machineguns.
	Tail Turret	Power turret located in the extreme rear of the aircraft with two .50 caliber machineguns.
	RADAR Counter Measures	Operates electronic jamming equipment to block German RADAR (RA dio D etection A nd R anging). Used to drop chaff or "window" (strips of aluminum foil which would reflect false echoes on RADAR).
Aircraft Models, Blocks and Mfg.:	B-24H/J/M	3 different models of the B-24; H' , J' , and H' flown by the 445 th .
	1 - 165	Various block modification designations
	CO/FO/CF/DT/NT	Manufacturers of the B-24's: CO - Consolidated Aircraft in San Diego FO - Ford in Willow Run, MI CF - Consolidated Aircraft in Ft. Worth, TX DT - Douglas Aircraft in Tulsa, OK NT - North American Aircraft in Dallas, TX
Terms:	Coffin Corner	Most exposed position within the aircraft formation; located on the outside edge with no friendly aircraft further out. This position was usually hit very hard by German fighters.
	H2S/H2X	Airborne RADAR system used for navigation and blind bombing. H2S was a British early design. H2X was the US improved design.

Feather	Position the blades of a propeller into the wind to reduce drag.
Windmill	A propeller that cannot be feathered and is turning due to the aircraft's airspeed, creating drag and reducing airspeed.
Flak	Fl ieger a bwehr k anonen – Anti-aircraft Artillery; later in the war, the Germans developed RADAR controlled guns which were extremely effective against bomber formations. Approximately 5,100 aircraft were shot down in 1944 – 3501 were lost to enemy flak.
Carpet	Designation of an aircraft tasked with providing counter RADAR measures during a mission.
Carpetbagger Mission	Special unit that flew resupply missions to resistant forces behind enemy lines. Aircraft were painted all black as all missions were carried out during the night.
NOBALL Missions	Missions directed against V-1 and V-2 rocket launch sites. These sites were very well camouflaged and heavily defended with 20 and 88 mm flak guns.
Truckin' Missions	These were non-combat missions flown to carry fuel and supplies to US forces after the D-Day invasion.
RТВ	R eturn T o B ase – to drop out of formation over enemy controlled air space to return to their home field. This was the "kiss of death" as the German fighters looked for stragglers and readily shot them down.

<u>NOTES OF INTEREST</u>

A few items of interest that have been questioned about:

Weather was never "Just Cause" to abort a scheduled mission take off! Even when visibility was zero/zero and less than 50 feet. Only the time between aircraft cleared for takeoff was increased from 30 seconds to one minute.

At the time the 445th Bomb Group became operational as a part of the Second Combat Bomb Wing, Second Bomb Division, Eighth Air Force; a combat tour was defined as being 25 combat missions. An Air Medal was presented to each aircrew member for each five missions completed. On completion of a tour, the airman received the Distinguished Flying Cross instead of another Air Medal. Each of these awards was specified in writing, on General Orders, issued by Second Division Headquarters.

On April 23rd 1944, a tour was re-defined as being 30 combat missions and the required missions for receiving the Air Medal was increased to six. The Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) was given at 30 missions instead of the Air Medal. By the end of May 1944, a Combat Tour was again redefined as being 35 missions with an air medal every seven missions and a DFC upon completion of 35 mission.

A Lead Crew (three per squadron) flew each day, whether on a mission or not and thus accumulated many additional flying hours. Since it could take twice as long (in calendar days) to complete a tour, crews in this category were only required to fly 30 missions.

On March 1, 1945 the 701st Squadron was officially designated as the "Lead Crew Squadron" requiring crew adjustments throughout the Group. All "Lead crews" were assigned to the 701st.

Definition of a Combat Mission:

We have found that the Group was credited with a combat mission once the takeoff has occurred. If Division HQ later issued a "Recall Order", the mission did not count for the individual crews. If a mission was aborted by order of the Wing Air Commander, the mission might or might not be counted for their required number of missions to be flown. This could be true even within a group.

On one or two occasions I have had to make, a "judgment decision" based on other documents. One thing was certain; no air crewman flew beyond his pre-defined combat tour unless he volunteered to do so. Any crew member could remove themselves from flight status at any time.

<u>Credits</u>

The information contained herein has been assembled from historical documents found in the **National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)**, College Park, MD. and notes taken from the personal collection of Richard F. Gelvin, a former Navigator with the 700th Bomb Squadron, 445th Bomb Group (Heavy). Upon his passing in 2005, the responsibility fell to the son of the 445th Group Bombardier Capt. Leland Simpson – Capt. Michael S. Simpson, USAFR.

Additional records have been procured from the **Air Force Historical Research Agency** located at Maxwell AFB, AL. These records, totaling some 70,000 pages, provide information regarding mission reports, 8th Air Force Field Orders, General Orders and Special Orders, and a myriad of other files pertaining to the 2nd Air Division of which the 445th Bombardment Group (Heavy) was assigned to.

Reconnaissance and target photos are provided from the ©National Collection of Aerial Photographs – A UK based organization that has in their Allied Central Interpretation Unit collection some 36 million aerial photographs made by USAAF, RAF, and other Allied reconnaissance forces.

Information about German airfields in the occupied countries of Fr, Be, Ho, and in Ge is provided courtesy of Henry L. deZeng IV and his fabulous database on the website http://www.ww2.dk called *Luftwaffe Airfields 1935 – 1945*. Henry's graciously offered to help in the identification of German fighter units.

The 445th Bombardment Group (Heavy), a segment of the Second Combat Bomb Wing, Second Air Division, Eighth Air Force, was officially credited with 280 combat missions. Their first mission was on 13 December 1943 and their last was on 25 April 1945. During those 280 missions, a total of 109 aircraft were lost as a result of enemy action. Missing Air Crew Reports (MACRs) were generated and have been requested to complete the information available about the 445th.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

I must first thank <u>*Edward W. Zobac*</u> and <u>*Richard F. Gelvin*</u>. Ed is the son of S/Sgt. Robert W. Zobac, a waist gunner in the 700th Squadron. Following his father's death in 1977, Ed became interested in his father's WW II experiences. Richard F. 'Dick' Gelvin was a lead navigator with the 700th Bomb Squadron. When Dick learned of the material available from the National Archives in College Park, MD, he planned to spend a week at the Archives, collecting information. When Ed learned of Dick's proposed trip, he helped plan the trip via e-mails, and a whole new approach for their transport, timing, and lodging for the trip emerged. Ed drove from his home in Ft. Wayne, IN to Washington, DC and Dick flew in from Mesa, AZ. They spent a week there and had transportation to and from a local motel. Their plan was to go through the boxes of records, making copies of crew load lists, and any other records that they thought

might be needed (mission summaries, Missing Air Crew Reports (MACRs), intelligence reports, etc.). The end product was some 4,400 copied pages.

Thanks seems a very small acknowledgement of <u>*Kitty Strickland Shore*</u>, widow of Lt. Jennis (Jack) M. Strickland. Jack was a lead pilot in the 700th and was killed on a mission supporting Operation VARSITY (the last airborne operation of World War 2) just prior to the end of the war in Europe. Kitty (d. April, 2002) lived in nearby Chevy Chase, MD, and "wanted to help". She ran the copier for most of the 4,000+ selected documents.

Very special thanks go to <u>Mary Beth Barnard</u>, daughter of S/Sgt Harold Kennedy, who was a waist gunner in the 701st Squadron. At one time Mary Beth was vice president, historian at THE MIGHTY EIGHTH AIR FORCE MUSEUM in Savannah, GA. It was her guidance through the labyrinth of military documents at the Archives that made Dick and Ed's trip a success.

Thanks also to <u>*The Kassel Mission Memorial Association*</u> for their support and encouragement of this project. Although the association has halted operations, the <u>*Kassel Mission Historical Society*</u> has stepped in to keep the memory of the Kassel Mission alive.

<u>Marilyn Burns Parylak</u>, my Mother-In-Law, encouraged me to learn more about my family and has provided many good ideas for research and where to look for info. Her interest in genealogy was one of the reasons I started searching and eventually lead to me preparing these mission histories.

To my wife <u>**Deborah Simpson</u>** goes a special thanks for her tireless work in these mission histories, cleaning up the microfilm images, restoring photographs and MACRs used on the website and these mission histories. Her suggested format changes have helped the military histories become a living military biography of the veteran's time in service with the 445th Bomb Group (H).</u>

Last, but not least, I must thank my Father, <u>*Captain Leland S. 'Spike' Simpson*</u>, for striking a spark of interest in me, even though it finally caught on many years after his death. It was my interest, like that of Ed Zobac, to learn more of my Dad's military service that brought me to this point in my life. My search led me to Dick, Ed and a multitude of former 445th members. They are the driving force behind the 445th's website and these Personal Mission Histories.

Michael S. Simpson Webmaster, 445th Bomb Group website 445th Bomb Group Historian



445th in formation. Image courtesy of 445th Bomb Group Archives

BATTLE HONORS

The following are the battles and campaigns for which the 445th Bomb Group was given official battle participation credit as outlined in War Department General Orders and the French Republic.

AIR OFFENSIVE, EUROPE

Time limitation --- 4 Jul 42 to 5 Jun 44

NORMANDY

Time limitation --- 6 Jun 44 to 24 Jul 44

NORTHERN FR

Time limitation --- 25 Jul 44 to 14 Sep 44

RHINELAND

Time limitation --- 15 Sep 44 to 21 Mar 45

ARDENNES Time limitation --- 15 Sep 44 to 21 Mar 45

CENTRAL EUROPE

Time limitation --- 22 Mar 45 to 11 May 45

The French government awarded members of the 445th Bomb Group the French Croix de Guerre with Palm in recognition of the unit's efforts to liberate Fr.

FRENCH CROIX DE GUERRE with PALM

Time limitation --- 1 Dec 43 to 1 Feb 45

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

Time limitation – 1 Dec 43 to 21 Mar 45

GENERAL ORDERS) WAR DEPARTMENT NO. 42) Washington 25, D.C., 24 May 1945

BATTLE HONORS--Citation of units

- Section IX

6. As authorized by Executive Order 9396 (sec. I, WD Bul. 22, 1943), superseding Executive Order 9075 (sec. III, WD Bul. 11, 1942), citation of the following unit in General Orders 129, Headquarters 2d Air Division, 11 April 1945, as approved by the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, is confirmed under the provisions of section IV, WD Circular 333, 1943, in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction. The citation reads as follows:


The 445th Bombardment Group (H), 2d Air Division. is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy. On 24 February 1944 this group participated, with other heavy bombardment groups of the 2d Bombardment Division, in an attack on the Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A.G. located at Gotha, Ge. On this occasion the attacking bombers met and overcame the fiercest and most determined resistance the enemy was able to muster in defense of this target, so vital to his ability to wage war. Unprotected by friendly fighter cover the 445th Bombardment Group (H) was under almost continuous attack from enemy aircraft for a period of 2 hours and 20 minutes. Although antiaircraft fire was hurled at the formation along the route to and from the target as well as at the target itself, the most deadly opposition was given by enemy aircraft. For 1 hour and 20 minutes before bombs away savage attacks were made by single and twin-engine enemy fighters in a vain attempt to keep the bombers from reaching their target. On the actual bombing run, that critical period of each bombardment mission, fierce and relentless attacks were unable to keep the bombers from accomplishing their task. For another hour after bombing, the group continued to be the object of ferocious fighter attacks. Of this group's 25 aircraft which penetrated enemy territory, 13 were lost to these fierce fighter attacks, which number is approximately twice the loss suffered by any of the other groups participating in this mission. In addition, 9 of the surviving 12 aircraft returned from the mission with battle damage. With heroic determination the 445th Bombardment Group (H) flew its assigned course, destroying 21 enemy attackers, probably destroying 2 more, and damaging 7 during the long running battle. The target was located and bombed with extreme accuracy and devastating results This target, the most important source of ME. 110's, was so well hit that the enemy air force suffered a most telling blow. The courage, zeal, and perseverance shown by the crew members of the 445th Bombardment Group (H), 2d Air Division, on this occasion were in accordance with the highest traditions of the military service of the United States and reflect great credit on themselves and the group, and the Army Air Forces.


BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL Chief of Staff


OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO Major General The Adjutant General






Aerial photograph of RAF Tibenham England airfield (USAAF Station 124) Image courtesy of 445th Bomb Group Archives




Lead Squadron

1-3:	Lead Element	4-6:	High Right Element
7-9:	Low Left Element	10-12:	Slot Element




High Right Squadron

13-15:	Lead Element	16-18:	High Right Element
19-21:	Low Left Element	22-24:	Slot Element



Low Left Squadron

25-27:	Lead Element	28-30:	High Right Element
31-33:	Low Left Element	34-36:	Slot Element



High High Right Squadron


37-39:	Lead Element	40-42:	High Right Element
43-45:	Low Left Element	46-48:	Slot Element



High High Right Element Squadron Formation As seen from head-on Uncovered for bombing




High Right Element



Lead Element

Low Left Element



- 1. 1st Pilot (left) & Co-Pilot
- 2. Nose Turret
- 3. Bombardier


- 4. Navigator
- 5. Radio Operator
- 6. Engineer Top Turret Gunner
- 7. Right Waist Gunner
- 8. Left Waist Gunner
- 9. Tail Turret Gunner
- 10. Ball Turret Gunner



(Top) Front view of a B-24. (Below) 6 Oct 1944 Low Left Element Images courtesy of 445th Bomb Group Archives



Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ©





Above

Tahelenbak

701st Bomb Squadron Aircraft Type: B-24H-20 FO Tail Number: 42-94921 Call Letter: B-Baker (MK-B+)

Images courtesy of 445th Bomb Group Archives

Left **General Hodges** 2nd Bomb Division Commander

Center **General Timberlake** 2nd Combat Wing Commander

Right **Colonel Terrill** 445th Bomb Group Commander

Indv Msn No	Gp Msn No	Date	Primary Target	Primary Target Type	Acft T/O	Acft Lost
1	195	27 Nov 44	Offenburg, Ge	Railroad Marshaling Yard	20	0
2	197	30 Nov 44	Homburg, Ge	Railroad Marshaling Yard	21	0
3	198	04 Dec 44	Bebra, Ge	Railroad Marshalling Yard	30	0
4	199	05 Dec 44	Münster, Ge	Railroad Marshaling Yard	34	0
5	200	10 Dec 44	Bingen, Ge	Railroad Marshaling Yard	20	0
6	201	11 Dec 44	Maximiliansau, Ge Hanau, Ge	Railroad Bridge Railroad Marshaling Yard	22 23	0 2
7	205	24 Dec 44	Bitburg, Ge	German Communications Center	45	0
8	208	29 Dec 44	Zülpich, Ge	German Communications Center	31	0
9	212	02 Jan 45	Güls, Ge	Guls Rail Bridge	29	0
10	223	28 Jan 45	Dortmund, Ge	German Oil Depot	19	0
11	238	25 Feb 45	Giebelstadt, Ge	German Airfield	31	0
12	240	27 Feb 45	Halle, Ge	Railroad Marshaling Yard	42	2
13	241	28 Feb 45	Arnsberg, Ge	Railroad Viaduct	31	0
Trans	ferred t	o the 701 st Bo	omb Squadron as part o	of the reorganization and consolidation of	of lead	crews
14	247	07 Mar 45	Soest, Germany	Railroad Marshalling Yard	21	0
15	251	11 Mar 45	Kiel, Germany	Deutsche Werke Krupp Germania Submarine Pens	33	0
16	255	18 Mar 45	Henningsdorf, Ge	Armored Fighting Vehicle Assembly Plant	33	0
17	258	21 Mar 45	Achmer, Ge	German Me 262 Jet Airfield	40	0
18	260	22 Mar 45	Giebelstadt, Ge	German Me 262 Jet Airfield	33	0

19	262	24 Mar 45	Wesel, Ge	Operation VARSITY Supply Drop	27	2
20	265	30 Mar 45	Wilhelmshaven, Ge	Sub Pens, Docks and Port Area	33	0
21	267	04 Apr 45	Perleberg, Ge	German Me 262 Jet Airfield	44	2
22	268	07 Apr 45	Halle, Germany	German Army Headquarters	27	0
23	270	08 Apr 45	Fürth, Ge	Jet Aircraft Industry	33	0
24	273	11 Apr 45	Amberg, Ge	Railroad Marshaling Yard	33	0
25	276	16 Apr 45	Landshut, Ge	Railroad Marshaling Yard	33	0
26	280	25 Apr 45	Salzburg, Austria	Railroad Marshaling Yard	19	0



Norfolk, England bomb damage caused by a V-2 rocket Image courtesy of 445th Bomb Group Archives



Col William Jones, 445th BG CO, thanks Glenn Miller for the show 9/1/44 Image courtesy of 445th Bomb Group Archives



Jimmy Stewart at the piano Image courtesy of 445th Bomb Group Archives



Lt. Jack Reed relaxing in the Officer's Club Image courtesy of 445th Bomb Group Archives



Lt Col Fleming (left) and Col Jones on the control tower Image courtesy of 445th Bomb Group Archives



Ground Ordnance Crew loading B-24 with 2,000-pound general purpose bomb (2,000 lb. GP).


Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ©

Note: Bomb casing and tail fin assembly are united at the airplane, the fuses are inserted after the bomb is hung in the shackles. With only 28 inches of clearance, the men put the bomb on a cradle dolly so it could slide under the plane into the bomb bay. Each B-24 could carry as many as four of these 2,000 lb. AN-M66 General Purpose bombs.

The usual bomb load would consist of 10-12 500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs, or the same number of 500 lb. AN-M17 Aimable Incendiary Cluster bombs or any mix of these bombs and others totaling five to six thousand pounds of ordnance. Depending on how deep a penetration into German air space, the bomb load would vary. Usual fuel load for a B-24 Liberator was 2,700 gal. of 100 octane aviation gas.



Maintenance crew of the 445th Bomb Group work on the engine of a Consolidated B-24. Image courtesy of 445th Bomb Group Archives



One of four runs over the D-Day invasion beaches – 6 Jun 44. Image courtesy of 445th Bomb Group Archives






Bombardiers and navigators get instruction on the nose turret's controls.

Images courtesy of 445th Bomb Group Archives



Turret maintenance instructions being given to flying and support personnel.






St. Malo Island is hidden under bomb bursts as a B-24 bomber of the 389th Bomb Group, 2nd Bomb Wing flies by – August 13, 1944 **(Air Force Photo)** The Wing Commander commended the 445th for their excellence of its bombing on this mission.




Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ©

January 4, 1944 – Base transfer ceremony. Image courtesy of 445th Bomb Group Archives



Direct hit by flak took the left wing of this 445th B-24 aircraft Image Courtesy of Capt. Charles L. Walker, 1st Pilot, 700th Bomb Squadron



V-1 rocket also known as "Buzz Bomb" Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$



V-2 Rocket – 1^{st} Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration \odot

The following information contains the 8th Army Air Force (AFF) Summaries of Combat Operations in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). The Mission number after the date is the 8th AAF Field Order Number. The tabular data at the start of a particular day's operations are the specifics pertaining to the 445th Bombardment Group (Heavy), 2nd Combat Wing, 2nd Air Division and the crew who flew that particular mission.

The crew positions are based on their relative position within the aircraft. 1st Pilot and Co-Pilot are listed first, then the Navigator, Bombardier, Nose Turret Gunner (if no bombardier is carried), Flight Engineer, Radio Operator, Left and Right Waist Gunners, Ball Turret Gunner (if onboard) and finally the Tail Turret Gunner.

The differences you will see in the crew load lists come for many reasons. After the initial set of operations, the 445th did not have all crews fly with a bombardier. Designated lead crews would fly with a full complement, and the other aircraft would have an enlisted gunner flying in the nose turret who would 'toggle' the bomb release from within the turret when the lead aircraft dropped their bombs.

Later on, orders came down from 8th Air Force HQ for the B-24 units to fly with a 9-man crew and not lowering the ball turret or removing the ball turret completely. By removing the turret, the plane could be lightened by some 800 – 900 pounds. This means more fuel or more bombs could be carried. The reasoning behind this came from the statistics of how many enemy fighters were destroyed or damaged by the ball turret gunners. This decision would have disastrous consequences for the 445th later on in the war. In September 1944, the 445th would lose 25 aircraft in about 5 minutes to Luftwaffe fighters attacking from astern (behind) and low. Immediately following the Kassel mission, Headquarters, 2nd Air Division, ordered the ball turrets put back into the aircraft.

Indv Msn #:	1					
Date:	27 Nov 44					
Mission #:	195					
Position #:	35					
Acft Type:	B-24J-1 FO					
Tail No:	42-50565					
Call Letter:	Q-Queen (IS- <u>Q</u> +)					
Acft Name:	Ole King Cole					
Target Type:	Offenburg Railroad Ma	arshalling	Yards			
Target City:	Offenburg, Germany				Sent: 20	Lost: 0
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position	
Hines	Howard	Е		2nd Lt	1st Pilot	
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot	
Lupher	Harry	М	Jr	Flt/Off	Navigator	
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Pilotage Navigate	or
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier	
Durant	Merlin	D		S/Sgt	Engineer	
Posner	Aaron	А		Sgt	Radio Operator	
Cobb	Richrd	М		Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	er
Simon	Taffe	S		Sgt	Right Waist Gun	ner
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	Sgt	Tail Turret Gu	Inner

MONDAY, 27 NOVEMBER 1944 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

Mission 727:

530 bombers and 770 fighters are dispatched to make PFF attacks on marshalling yards in Germany and fighter-bomber strikes on 4 oil centers in N and C Germany; they claim 102-4-12 aircraft; 15 fighters are lost:

148 of 190 B-17s hit the Bingen marshalling yard; 2 others hit targets of opportunity; 46 bombers are damaged; 2 airmen are WIA. Escorting are 91 of 95 P-51s; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA).

181 of 186 B-17s hit the Offenburg marshalling yard; 1 hits Freiburg; 14 B-17s are damaged; 1 airman is WIA. Escorting are 105 of 107 P-51s; 2 P-51s are lost (pilot MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.

144 of 154 B-24s hit the Offenburg marshalling yard; 7 others hit targets of opportunity; 9 B-24s are damaged. Escorting are 45 of 48 P-51s without loss.

460 P-47s and P-51s fly fighter-bomber missions against oil targets in N and C Germany; about 750 Luftwaffe fighters, the largest sighting to date, attack in the Magdeburg-Munster-Hannover areas when the Germans mistake the fighters for a heavy bomber formation; the AAF claims 98-4-11 aircraft in the air and 4-0-1 on the ground; 2 P-47s and 10 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).

FIRST MISSION, OFFENBERG, GERMANY Nov. 27. 1944 I went on my first combat mission today. We hit a marshalling yard at Offenberg, Germany. It was in support of ground troops. We hit meager flak but enough of it toomake you realize that this was noo longer a practice mission but the real thing. We saw no enemy fighters but the bomber stream was hit and there was bandits reported in the area. I lost one of my best buddies on yesterday's raid. It was reported that every one got out for they saw 9 parachutes. They were hit by fighters. Our field lost 5 ships. I flew the tail turret in Wilson's Place. I got a good look at Switzerland and it is a beautiful country. We had an excellant on the bomb strike.

Personal note on mission #1 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 10x500 lb. AN-M17 Aimable Incendiary Cluster bombs. **Losses:**

There were no losses on this mission. -

Tactical Mission Report:

Mission of 27 November 1944 - F. 0. 530					
Primary Target + Offenturg M/Y					
Secondery Targ	<u>et - Pforzheim</u>				
Battle Order 96th CEW 14th CEW 2nd CEW	No. A/C Dispatched - 154 No. A/C Over Targets - 151				
20th CBW					
n. The lead navigator, 14th Ting, langer run, Because of this, some interfere causing the Lead Squadron of the 445th Group bomb run. This Squadron returned last in the	the resulted with the 491st Group, $a = 10^{-10}$ to execute a 360 degree turn on the				
2. Difficulties on The Semb Bun and B	<u>mtine</u>				
<u>a:</u> All units bombed the primery, using visual and GH with visual as- sistance methods. Results ranged from obscured through poor to excellent. 2 - 4/10 cloud, heavy bomb sucks, resulting from let Division bombing, and meager flak were encountered in the target area.					
b. Deputy lead, lead Squadran, 44 short of the target due to an error in targe on this release.	b. Deputy lead, Lead Squadran, 445th Group, drapped backs twenty miles short of the target due to an error in target identification. Two aircraft drapped on this release.				
3. Route Out					
 In the Route Cut the order of 2nd Combat Fing (LL Squadron) making londfol 	<u>n.</u> In the Route Cut the order of upits was not as scheduled, with the 2nd Combat Fing (LL Squadron) making lendfoll first - briefed third,				
4. Engry Action Enclustered					
No energy sireraft corp encounts	r-d.				
5. <u>L'sses</u>					
g. There were no losses.					
6. Gress Errers	6. <u>Gress Errers</u>				
• g. Deputy lond, Lond Soundron (445th Gr up) - personnal error in target identification, causing premeture release upon which two Aircorft bombed.					
7. <u>Comments</u>					
felling on the choke point of the porshellin trial props. Effectiveness of the bombing a	<u>c.</u> LL Squedrin, 44th Griup, damage results were very good with bombs felling on the choke point of the preshelling yords and on business and indus- trial pross. Effectiveness of the bombing of the Lord Squedran, 467th Graup, was probably very good, this Squedran having 100 per cost mithin 2,000 feet.				

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency C



Offenburg Railroad Marshalling Yards Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration C

Indv Msn #:	2						
Date:	30 Nov 44						
Mission #:	197						
Position #:	24						
Acft Type:	B-24J-1 FO						
Tail No:	42-50565						
Call Letter:	Q-Queen (IS- <u>Q</u> +)						
Acft Name:	Ole King Cole						
Target Type:	Homburg Railroad Marshalling Yards						
Target City:	Homburg, Germany				Sent: 21	Lost: 1	
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position		
Hines	Howard	Е		2nd Lt	1st Pilot		
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot		
Lupher	Harry	М	Jr	Flt/Off	Navigator		
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Pilotage Navigator		
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier		
Durant	Merlin	D		S/Sgt	Engineer		
Posner	Aaron	А		Sgt	Radio Operator		
Cobb	Richard	М		Sgt	Left Waist Gunner		
Wilson	F	Α	(io)	Sgt	Right Waist Gunner		
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	Sgt	Ball Turret Gunner		
Simon	Taffe	S		Sgt	Tail Turret Gunn	Tail Turret Gunner	

THURSDAY, 30 NOVEMBER 1944 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 731:

1,281 bombers and 972 fighters are dispatched to hit synthetic oil plants in SE Germany and rail targets; intense accurate flak downs 29 bombers and 3 fighters are lost:

451 B-17s are sent to hit the Zeitz (132) and Bohlen (68) oil plants; 116 hit the secondary, the Leuna oil plant at Merseburg; targets of opportunity are Gotha (22), Gera (17), Rudolstadt (17), Fulda (12), Saalfeld (12), Ohrdruf (10), Meerane (6) and other (9); 11 B-17s are lost, 4 damaged beyond repair and

287 damaged; 8 airmen are KIA, 16 WIA and 100 MIA. Escorting are 357 of 384 P-51s; they claim 4-0-0 aircraft in the air; 2 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).

539 B-17s are sent to hit the Leuna oil plant at Merseburg (301) and the Lutzkendorf (169) oil plant; targets of opportunity are Zeitz oil plant (19), Weissenfels (9) and other (12); 17 B-17s are lost, 6 damaged beyond repair and 325 damaged; 17 airmen are KIA, 42 WIA and 295 MIA. Escorting are 452 P-47s and P-51s; 2 P-51s are damaged beyond repair.

291 B-24s are sent to hit marshalling yards at Neunkirchen (180) and **Homburg (104)**. Escorting are 56 of 60 P-47s; 1 P-47 is lost (pilot MIA).

Mission 732:

7 B-17s and 6 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands and Germany during the night.

Individual Mission Notes:

There was no personal note written about this mission.

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 10x500 lb. AN-M17 Aimable Incendiary Cluster bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

30 Nevember 1944 - F. C. 532 Mission of τs N. unkirchen M/ Secondary Target -

General Information and Comments on Missions of 26, 27, 29, 30 November 1944

Battle Order 14th CBW 20th CBW 96th CBW 2nd CBW

Nc. A/C Dispatched - 299 Nc. A/C Over Targets - 235

1. Route In

<u>a.</u> On penetration, the lead of the 14th Combat "ing, which was leading the Division had a faulty flux gate compass; this caused the column to fly south of course up to twenty-five miles.

2. Difficulties on the Bomb Run and Bombing

a. Ecmbing was by GH methods through 10/10 clouds with unobserved results.

3. Route Out

<u>a</u>. On return, all units deviated from the briefed route as the Division lead's flux gate compass was in error. Units flow up to twenty-five miles off course.

4. Lasses

n. One eircraft, 446th Group - AA over Neunkirchen

b. One sircreft, 446th Group - Crashed thirty miles NE of Mancy on return from target.

c. One aircraft, 445th Group - WR believed to have landed in friendly territory.

5. Gross Errors

A. There were no gross errors.

6. <u>Comments</u>

n. Weather scruting was excellent throughout the mission.

By command of Major General KEFTER:

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There was one aircraft reported missing that landed behind friendly lines on this mission. No record of the crew or aircraft tail number involved.



Homburg Railroad Marshalling Yards Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	3					
Date:	04 Dec 44					
Mission #:	198					
Position #:	12					
Acft Type:	B-24J-1 FO					
Tail No:	42-51263					
Call Letter:	E-Easy (IS-E+)					
Acft Name:	Un-named					
Target Type:	Bebra Railroad Marsha	alling Yar	ds			
Target City:	Bebra, Germany				Sent: 31	Lost: 0
Name	First Name MI Succ Rank Position					
itanic	i ii st Name	1.17	Succ	Nalik	rosition	
Hill	William	M	Succ	2nd Lt	1st Pilot	
			Succ	-		
Hill	William	M	Succ	2nd Lt	1st Pilot	
Hill	William Robert	M	Jucc	2nd Lt 2nd Lt	1st Pilot Co-Pilot	ner
Hill Haynes Golub	William Robert Eugene	M B E		2nd Lt 2nd Lt 2nd Lt	1st Pilot Co-Pilot Navigator	ner
Hill Haynes Golub Evans	William Robert Eugene Robert	M B E G		2nd Lt 2nd Lt 2nd Lt S/Sgt	1st Pilot Co-Pilot Navigator Nose Turret Gunr	ner
Hill Haynes Golub Evans Boyko	William Robert Eugene Robert Sam	M B E G (nmi)		2nd Lt 2nd Lt 2nd Lt S/Sgt S/Sgt	1st Pilot Co-Pilot Navigator Nose Turret Gunr Engineer	
Hill Haynes Golub Evans Boyko Crossland	William Robert Eugene Robert Sam Robert	M B E G (nmi) (nmi)		2nd Lt 2nd Lt 2nd Lt S/Sgt S/Sgt Sgt	1st Pilot Co-Pilot Navigator Nose Turret Gunr Engineer Radio Operator	r

MONDAY, 4 DECEMBER 1944 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 736:

1,191 bombers and 977 fighters are dispatched to make PFF attacks on rail targets in Germany; 3 bombers and 3 fighters are lost:

419 B-17s are dispatched to hit marshalling yards at Kassel (212) and Soest (188); 2 others hit targets of opportunities; 4 B-17s are damaged beyond repair and 3 damaged. Escorting are 375 P-47s and P-51s; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA).

315 B-24s are sent to hit the Bebra marshalling yard (199); targets of opportunity are marshalling yards at Koblenz (78) and Giessen (21) and other (1); 1 B-24 is lost and 15 damaged; 10 airmen are MIA. Escorting were 290 P-47s and P-51s; they claim 6-0-11 aircraft on the ground.

457 B-17s are sent to hit marshalling yards at Mainz (221) and Giessen (62); targets of opportunity are the Freiburg marshalling yard (119), Fulda (24), barges on the Rhine River (11) and other (6); 2 B-17s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 106 damaged; 1 airman is WIA and 18 MIA. Escorting were 238 of 244 P-51s; 2 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).

Mission 737:

10 of 11 B-17s and B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands, France, and Germany during the night.

Individual Mission Notes:

Second Mission, Bebra, Germany.
Gas load- 2500
Time: 7:35
SECOND MISSION, BEBRA GERMANY
Dec. 4, 1944
We went to a marshalling yard at Bebra, Germany.
Our fighter coverage was very good. Our escort consisted of P-51's, 38's and P-47's.
The flak was meager and in- accurate. I flew on Lt.' Hill's crew in the waist. Being the extra gunner on our crew I think they will put me on Hill's crew.

Personal note on mission #3 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 10 x 500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs and 4 x 500 lb. AN-M7 Incendiary Cluster bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

<u>Lission of 4</u>	December 1944 - F. C. 535
Primar	y Target - Fobra K/Y
Scconder	y Target - Koblenz 11/Y
Battle Order 96th CBW	No. A/C Disprtched - 315
2nd CB7	•
14th CPT 20th CBT	No. 4/C Over Targets - 300
1. Assembly	
5. Assemblies wore good w good order.	ith units leaving the coast on time and in
2. Boute In	
	upon penetration. The 14th and 20th Wings, r, flew the route in generally five to fifteen
3. <u>IP</u>	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
a. The 96th and 2nd Tings	arrived at the IP five minutes behind schedule

a. The 96th and 2nd 7ings arrived at the IP five minutes behind schedule with the 14th and 20th Tines arriving almost simultaneously with the 2nd Ting, thus cousing bunching at this point.

4. Difficulties on the Bomb Run and Bombing

<u>c</u>. The primery target was bombed through 10/10 cloud by the 96th and 2nd Wines and the 491st and 392nd Groups. GH methods were used by the lead, 467th Group with succeeding units bombing on spake flores of preceding Groups. The 392nd Bomb Group was the only other unit using GH on the primery. All results were unobserved.

b. The 491st Bemb Group was forced to make a right turn on the bomb run due to a collision course with preceding units. Being unable to pick up the tracking pulse, this Group bombed on the smoke markers of the 2nd Combat Wing. The 44th General Information and Comments on Missions of 2. 4. 5 and 6 December 1944

Group succoded in getting on the tracking trace but was forced to turn short of the target in order to avoid a collision course with the 96th and 2nd Wings. The deputy lead (PFF) 44th Group then assumed the load and a target of opportunity Kolschnusen, was bended on the return route. The 20th Ming attacked the secondary target, using H2X due to failure of GH equipment. Bending of the secondary was performed through 7 - 3/10 cloud with undetermined results.

5. Rolly Point

<u>n</u>. The 96th Wing, Division lond, rallied eight miles south of the briefe point and the 2nd Combat Wing also by-presed the Bally Point, flying south of it; it was at this time that the 14th Wing experienced interference.

6. Route Out

n. The route out was flown with only slight d victions with the exception of the A91st Group, which flow from five to twenty miles north of course.

7. Enery Action Enclustered

r. No energy aircroft were encountered.

8. Lossos

a. One A/C, 44th Bomb Grour - left formation between IP and target (Bebra $\frac{1}{2}$); seen to lose altitude under control. We further information evaluate.

9. Gross Errors

n. There were no pross errors.

10. <u>Computs</u>

5. Manaver in the IP, Target (Prinary), and RP area was not as briefed, reculsing inconfusion.

b. A total of dighteen Squadrons dropped successively on snoke flores of preciding units with the Division lend, four Squadrons (407th Group) being the only unit of the eighteen Squadrons using GM equipment. The B92nd Group was the only other unit using GM equipment.

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission



Bebra railroad marshalling yard Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	4					
Date:	05 Dec 44					
Mission #:	199					
Position #:	31					
Acft Type:	B-24J-1 FO					
Tail No:	42-50722					
Call Letter:	H-How (IS-H+)					
Acft Name:	Un-named					
Target Type:	Münster Railroad Mars	shalling Y	ards			
Target City:	Münster, Germany				Sent: 34	Lost: 0
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position	
Hines	Howard	Е		2nd Lt	1st Pilot	
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot	
Lupher	Harry	М	Jr	Flt/Off	Navigator	
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Pilotage Navigate	or
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier	
Durant	Merlin	D		S/Sgt	Engineer	
Posner	Aaron	А		Sgt	Radio Operator	
Cobb	Richard	М		Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	er
Simon	Taffe	S		Sgt	Right Waist Gun	ner
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	Sgt	Tail Turret Gu	unner

TUESDAY, 5 DECEMBER 1944 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

3 missions are flown.

Mission 738:

589 bombers and 884 fighters are dispatched to make attacks on Germany; an estimated 275-300 Luftwaffe fighters attack and AAF fighters claim 90-7-30 aircraft; 12 bombers and 17 fighters are lost:

451 B-17s are dispatched to make PFF attacks on munitions and tank plants at Berlin (404); targets of opportunity are Nienburg (2) and other (23); 12 B-17s are lost and 169 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 8 WIA and 115 MIA. Escorting are 630 of 711 P-51s; they claim 90-7-23 aircraft in the air and 0-0-2 on the ground; 15 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.

114 of 129 B-24s hit the marshalling yard at Münster; 10 B-24s are damaged. Escorting are 141 P-47s and P-51s; 2 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA) and 1 P-47 damaged beyond repair.

6 of 6 B-24s fly a screening mission.

23 of 25 P-51s fly a scouting mission.

Mission 739:

This is an APHRODITE mission with 2 B-17 Castor drones, 3 B-17 control and observation aircraft, a P-38 observation aircraft and 17 of 17 P-51s as escort; the P-51s claim 1-0-0 aircraft.

Mission 740:

11 of the 14 B-17s and 8 B-24s dispatched drop leaflets in the Netherlands, France and Germany.

Individual Mission Notes:

Third Mission, Munster, Germany
Gas load- 2300
Time: 6:00
THIRD MISSION, MUNSTER, GER. Dec. 5, 1944 We raided the rail yards at Munster, Germany.
Our bomb load consisted of 10 x 500 $\#$ demo's.
The flak was pretty heavy and it seemed that it was poping off our wing tips. It was the heaviest flak I have encountered so far.
The escort was very good. I flew the tail again and now I am the permanent tail gunner as Wilson has been grounded. He never was very enthused about flying.

Personal note on mission #4 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 10x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

Mission of 5 December 1944 - F. C. 536 Primery Tarnet - Hunster M/Y (GH or Misuel) Secondary Target - Junster 11/Y (12X) Battle Order 2nd CD No. 4/C Dispatched - 130 14th CBT 20th CBT No. A/C Over Thrats - 125 · 96th CBW . 1. Assembly 2. The 20th Combat Wine arrived three minutes late at the DAL and fell in trail of the 96th Combat Ving, thus interchanging briefed positions. 'To close the distance between Wings, both the 96th and the 20th Wings cut the DAL short. 2. Difficulties on the Somb Run and Bombing a. All units bombed the assigned target through 10/10 cloud with unobserved results.

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General Information and Comments on Missions of 2, 4, 5 and 6 December 1944

b. GH was used by all Wings except the 20th which used H2X equipment after GH equipment failure.

c. The HR Squadron, 93rd Group, attempted to make the bomb run on GH, but could not pick up the tracking station until too late along the run. It was then too late for the H2X deputy to take the lead. This Squadron did not attack.

3. Rally Point

2. The rally was executed in an execlient manner.

· · · · · · ·

4. Encmy Action Encountered

A. One jet A/C was sighted but no enemy attacks were experienced.

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5. Losses

n. There were no losses.

6. Gross Errors


n. There were no gross errors.

7. Comments

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission



Münster Railroad Marshalling Yards Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ©

Indv Msn #:	5					
Date:	10 Dec 44					
Mission #:	200					
Position #:	14					
Acft Type:	B-24J-1 FO					
Tail No:	42-50722					
Call Letter:	H-How (IS-H+)					
Acft Name:	Un-named	•				
Target Type:	Bingen Railroad Marsh	alling Ya	rds			
Target City:	Bingen, Germany				Sent: 20	Lost: 0
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position	
Hines	Howard	E		2nd Lt	1st Pilot	
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot	
Lupher	Harry	М	Jr	Flt/Off	Navigator	
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Pilotage Navigate	or
Schumaker	Jack	J		1st Lt	Bombardier	
Durant	Merlin	D		Sgt	Engineer	
Callaghan	John	G		T/Sgt	Radio Operator	
Cobb	Richard	М		Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	er
Simon	Taffe	S		Sgt	Right Waist Gun	ner
Yagley	Anthomy	J	Jr	Sgt	Tail Turret Gu	unner

SUNDAY, 10 DECEMBER 1944 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

Mission 745:

534 bombers and 690 fighters are dispatched to make PFF attacks and a fighter sweep in Germany; 2 fighters are lost:

173 of 225 B-24s hit the marshalling yard at Bingen and 3 hit targets of opportunity; 4 B-24s are damaged. Escorting are 287 P-47s and P-51s; 1 P-47 and 1 P-51 are lost and 1 P-47 and 1 P-51 are damaged beyond repair.

277 of 309 B-17s hit the Lutzel marshalling yard at Koblenz and 13 hit targets of opportunity; 2 B-17s are damaged beyond repair and 27 damaged; 2 airmen are KIA. Escorting are 226 P-47s and P-51s without loss.

96 of 111 P-51s make a fighter sweep E of the bomber's targets; they claim 0-0-1 aircraft; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.

Individual Mission Notes:

Fourth Mission, Bingen, Germany								
Gas load- 2300								
Time: 6:00								
FOURTH MISSION, BINGEN, GER.								
Dec. 10, 1944								
We raided another rail yard today in direct support of the ground troops.								
The flak was exceptionally light. We had good fighter escort and we really like to look up and see our little friends above. It's like a good life insurance policy.								
The ammunition looked bad in the tail turret, so I fired as much as possible so the armorer would have to replace it.								
We have a new radio operator. His name is Cala ko n.								
We almost took an armorer on the mission by mistake but he really raised cayneuntil we called the pilot and said we had a spare.								
Our target was at Binger Germany.								

Personal note on mission #5 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 40x100 lb. AN-M30 General Purpose bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

	Mission of 10 December 1944 - F. 0. 539
	Primery Target - Bingen M/Y
	Secondary Terret - Meinz
Battle Order	•
14th CBW 20th CBT	No. 4/C Dispatched - 227
96th CBW	No. A/C Over Inrgets - 215
2nd CEV	

1. Assembly

r. The 96th Combat Wing was six minutes inte on the DAL and flew fourth in the column, briefed third.

2. Route In

<u>A</u>. Units arrived at the energy const from five to nine minutes behind schedule. From that point to the IP, the route was flown creatically, the lead 14th Combat Wing, being from five to twenty-five miles north of course. These deviations were attributed to poor navigation. However, lead Nevigators! logs should that positions off course were known and that necessary Air Companders! decisions were not made.

3. Difficultics on Bomb Run and Pombing

All units except the 14th Combat Wing bombed the primary through 10/10 clouds, using GH methods with unobserved results.

b. The 14th Corbet Ming (4 Squadrons) did not bemb due to failure of GN equipment. The 44th Group started a 360 degree turn to drop on another Group's flares but smoke markers were drifting too fast for accurate bonbing. No target of opportunity could be found in the area, so a return with bombs was made.

c. Land mircraft, 445th Group, picked up the wrong GH signal and bombed prematurely with six mircraft dropping on this release. Balance of the Group continued to the target and dropped on preceding Group's smoke markers.

d. One A/C, 93rd Bomb Group, had two bombs hang and drop through doors near Charleroi, Belgium.

4. Enery Action Encountered


n. No enemy aircraft were encountered.

General Information and Comments on Missions of 10, 11, 12 and 18 December 1944 5. Losses <u>5. Nonc.</u> 6. <u>Gross Errors</u> <u>a. Lead Squadron, 445th Group - personnel error in picking up wrong</u> signal, bombing short of target upon which six aircraft released. <u>b. Two aircraft, 44th Group - accidental releases due to personnel</u> error four minutes after IP. 7. <u>Comments</u> <u>a. GH Station 114 repeated its tendency to fade out on run from IP to</u> target, regaining strength in part near the target.

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission



Bingen Railroad Marshalling Yards Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	6					
Date:	11 Dec 44					
Mission #:	201					
Position #:	14					
Acft Type:	B-24J-1 FO					
Tail No:	42-50722					
Call Letter:	H-How (IS-H+)		_			
Acft Name:	Un-named					
Target Type:	Hanau Railroad Marsh	alling Yaı	ds (`B' G	iroup)		
Target City:	Hanau, Germany				Sent: 23	Lost: 0
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position	
Hines	Howard	Е		2nd Lt	1st Pilot	
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot	
Lupher	Harry	М	Jr	Flt/Off	Navigator	
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier	
Schumaker	Jack	J		1st Lt	Pilotage Navigate	or
Durant	Merlin	D		T/Sgt	Engineer	
Callaghan	John	G		T/Sgt	Radio Operator	
Cobb	Richard	М		Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	er
Simon	Taffe	S		Sgt	Right Waist Gun	ner
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret Gu	unner

MONDAY, 11 DECEMBER 1944 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 746:

The largest number of bombers so far dispatched, 1,586, and 841 fighters are sent to hit rail targets and bridges in W Germany using PFF means; 5 bombers and 2 fighters are lost:

319 of 334 B-17s hit the marshalling yard at Frankfurt; 2 others hit targets of opportunity; 2 B-17s are damaged beyond repair and 9 damaged. Escorting are 167 of 181 P-51s without loss.

297 of 353 B-24s hit the marshalling yard at Hanau; 5 hit the secondary, Karlsruhe, and 2 hit targets of opportunity; 4 B-24s are lost and 7 damaged; 36 airmen are MIA. Escorting are 143 of 159 P-51s; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.

353 of 540 B-17s hit the marshalling yard at Giessen; 135 hit the secondary, the marshalling yard at Koblenz; targets of opportunity are Euskirchen (12) and other (11); 1 B-17 is damaged beyond repair and 9 damaged; 2 airmen are WIA. Escort is provided by 349 P-47s and P-51s; they claim 0-0-1 aircraft on the ground; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.

171 of 182 B-17s hit bridges at Mannheim; 1 B-17 is lost and 18 damaged; 9 airmen are MIA. Escorting are 54 of 59 P-51s without loss.

154 of 177 B-24s hit a bridge at Maximiliansau (Force `A'); 23 others hit the secondary (Force `B'), the marshalling yard at Hanau; 8 B-24s are damaged; 2 airmen are MIA. Escorting are 34 of 37 P-47s without loss.

30 of 30 P-51s fly a scouting mission.

Mission 747:

3 B-17s and 8 B-24s drop leaflets in France, the Netherlands and Germany; 1 B-24 is lost.

Individual Mission Notes:

FIFTH MISSION, HANAU, GERMANY Dec. 11, 1944 We hit rail yards at Hanau Germany. Flak was moderate and we hit no other enemy resistence. We had a malfunction, in the bomb racks. The bombs wedged themselves in the bomb bay and we had to drop the rest out manually. We carried them back to the waist and dropped them out the escape hatch in the channel. Hemrick almost fell out of the bombbay while he was dislod ging the bombs

> Personal note on mission #6 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 40 x 100 lb. AN-M30 General Purpose bombs and 1 x 500 lb. AN-M17 Aimable Incendiary Cluster bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

Missions of 11 December 1944	- Field Orders 540 and 541
E 0 5/0 - Primary Target -	Meximiliansau R.R. Bridges (GH)
	- Karlsruhe M/Y H2X
F. C. 541 - Primary Torgot -	
Secondary Target	- Hanay M/Y (112X)
•	
Battle Orders	
	No. A/C Dispatched - 530
F. 0. 540 F. 0. 541	No. A/C Dispacened = 950
· 20th CBW 20th CBW	No. A/C Over Targets - 472
96th CBW 14th CBW	no. n'o over rargeos - the
96th CBW 14th CBW 2nd CPW 2nd CBW 14th CBW 96th CBW	No. No over infeeds - the

F. 0. 541

1. Asstibly

Division resembly was not effected due to misunderstanding about the change in zero hour. The lead 20th Combat' ing departed Dover as briefed but eight minutes behind schedule. The 14th departed Felixstowe, the 2nd Dover and the 96th Felixstowe.

2. IF

<u>n</u>. All units made the IF good but were from seven to fourteen minutes behind schedule.

....

3. Difficulties on the Bonb Run and Bonbing

1. The assigned treat mas bombed by H2X methods through 10/10 clouds.

b. LL Squrdron, 453rd Group, dropped four minutes ofter the Lord Squrdron on a smoke bomb that hung and thes tripped out four minutes ofter Lord Squedron had bembed.

c. Due to faulty M2X couldness, the 93rd Group and one Soundress of the 44°th Group made a second run on the target. This was contrary to instructions in the Division Field Order.

d. 445th Fort Group experienced interference from the 20th Soubet "ing on the borb run.

4. Relly Foint

. Rellies were normal with the 20th Combet Wine cutting the Relly Foint short and flying the new route on return.

5. Route Out

<u>General Information and Comments on Missions of 10, 11, 12 and 19 December 1944</u>
<u>6. Enemy Action Encountered</u>

<u>a</u>. No enemy aircraft were seen.


7. <u>Losses</u>

<u>a</u>. Two aircraft, 445th Group - believed to have collided near Strasbourg.
<u>b</u>. Two aircraft, 491st Group - NYR no information available.

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency C

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission



Hanau Railroad Marshalling Yards Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	7]					
Date:	24 Dec 44						
Mission #:	205						
Position #:	39						
Acft Type:	B-24J-1 FO						
Tail No:	42-50722						
Call Letter:	H-How (IS-H+)						
Acft Name:	Un-named						
Target Type:	Military Communicatio	ns Cente	r				
Target City:	Bitburg, Germany				Sent: 45	Lost: 0	
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position		
Hines	Howard	Е		2nd Lt	1st Pilot		
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot		
Lupher	Harry	М	Jr	Flt/Off	Navigator		
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Pilotage Navigator		
Schumaker	Jack	J		1st Lt	Bombardier		
Durant	Merlin	D		T/Sgt	Engineer		
Callaghan	John	G		T/Sgt	Radio Operator		
Cobb	Richrd	М		Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	er	
Simon	Taffe	S		Sgt	Right Waist Gun	ner	
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret Gui	nner	

SUNDAY, 24 DECEMBER 1944 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) AIRBORNE OPERATIONS (IX Troop Carrier Command):

160 C-47s drop 160 tons of supplies at Bastogne, Belgium.

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 759:

10 of 12 B-24s hit the La Pallice coastal battery in France without loss.

Mission 760:

A high-pressure front across W Europe brings clear weather and the Eighth AF launches a maximum effort against airfields and communications in W Germany; this was the largest air strike of WWII; 2,034 bombers and 853 fighters are dispatched; they claim 92-6-21 Luftwaffe aircraft; 12 bombers and 10 fighters are lost:

858 B-17s are dispatched to hit airfields at Darmstadt (189), Frankfurt-Rheine (143), Bilbis (100), Babenhausen (96), Zellhausen (85) and Gross Ostheim (60); secondary targets hit are marshalling yards at Pforzheim (37) and Kaisereslautern (24) and Haildraum (60); 26 targets of opportunity are hit by 37 B-17s; they claim 18-5-1 aircraft; 8 B-17s are lost, 11 damaged beyond repair and 337 damaged; 15 airmen are KIA, 21 WIA and 76 MIA. Escorting are 343 of 358 P-51s; they claim 53-0-6 aircraft; 7 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.

542 B-17s are dispatched to hit the Merzhausen air depot (198) and airfields at Giessen (74), Kirchgons (54), Nidda (53) and Ettinghausen (43); secondary targets hit are Koblenz (42), Darmstadt (7), Kaisereslautern (5) and Babenhausen (4); 20 B-17s hit a target of opportunity; 2 B-17s are lost, 9 damaged beyond repair and 109 damaged; 21 airmen are KIA, 23 WIA and 18 MIA. Escort is provided by 350 of 368 P-51s; they claim 13-1-13 aircraft; 3 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.

634 B-24s are dispatched to hit communication centers at Euskirchen (62), Wittlich (62), Gerolstein (59), Mayen (59), Ahrweiler (54), **Bitburg (35)**, Eller (32), Pfazel (28), Ruwer (27), Schonecken (26), Rheinbach (25), Daun (24), Wetteldorf (18), and Cochem (11); 75 others hit 18 targets of opportunity; 2 B-24s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 150 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 5 WIA and 20 MIA. Escorting are 87 of 92 P-47s and P-51s; they claim 4-0-0 aircraft without loss.

Individual Mission Notes:

Sixth Mission, Mitgen Germany Gas load- 2500 Time: 6:45 SIXTH MISSION, MITGEN, GERMANY Dec. 24, 1944 We hit the town of Migen, Germany. It was in support of the ground troops. It was the largest raid yet compiled by the 8th Air Force. It consisted of 2200 bombers. We took off in a snow storm. We were to try to stem the Germans advances in that immediate area. The flak was moderate. We got our first flak holes an d Cobb got a piece of flak 4" long and a square. It missed them by about two feet and me about the same. It scared mewhen I first looked at the hole it made It was a visual target and this accounts for the accuracy of the flak gunners. We shall receive our Air Medal for this mission. A nice Xmas present. This was the largest raid ever made by the American Air Forces. They had 14 individual targets.

> Personal note on mission #7 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Unable to determine bomb loads per aircraft due to the varying loads as a result of be assigned multiple targets.

Tactical Mission Report:

No Tactical Mission Report or Statistical Analysis Report from either the 445th Bomb Group, 2nd Bomb Wing, or 2nd Bomb Division are available.

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission reported by the unit adjutant.



Bitburg Communications Center Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	8					
Date:	29 Dec 44					
Mission #:	208					
Position #:	14					
Acft Type:	B-24J-1 FO					
Tail No:	42-50722					
Call Letter:	H-How (IS-H+)		_			
Acft Name:	Un-named					
Target Type:	Zülpich Communicatio	ns Cente	r			
Target City:	Zülpich, Germany				Sent: 31	Lost: 0
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position	
Hines	Howard	Е		2nd Lt	1st Pilot	
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot	
Lupher	Harry	М	Jr	Flt/Off	Navigator	
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Pilotage Navigate	or
Schumaker	Jack	J		1st Lt	Bombardier	
Durant	Merlin	D		T/Sgt	Engineer	
McClendon	Robert	L		T/Sgt	Radio Operator	
Cobb	Richrd	М		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	er
Simon	Taffe	S		Sgt	Right Waist Gun	ner
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret Gu	inner

FRIDAY, 29 DECEMBER 1944 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

Mission 769:

827 bombers and 724 fighters hit communications targets in W Germany; 4 bombers and 3 fighters are lost:

219 B-17s are dispatched to hit marshalling yards at Frankfurt (124), and Aschaffenburg (67); 10 hit the secondary, the Frankfurt S marshalling yard; and 9 hit a target of opportunity; 1 B-17s is lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 101 damaged; 5 airmen are WIA and 12 MIA. Escorting are 267 of 282 P-51s; 2 are lost (pilots MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.

304 B-17s are sent to hit the Bingen marshalling yard (144), Bullay rail bridge (74) and communication center at Wittlich (50); targets of opportunity are Grosslittgen (12) and one near Diekirch (13); 2 B-17s are lost and 132 damaged; 11 airmen are WIA and 15 MIA. Escorting are 61 of 64 P-51s; 1 is lost.

262 B-24s are sent to hit communications centers at Schleiden (9), **Zülpich (31)**, Stadtkyll (32) and Drum (10), the Irlich rail bridge (51), the Gerolstein marshalling yard (26) and the Remagen Bridge (30); targets of opportunity are Fensbach (19), Duppach (8) and 10 others; 1 B-24 is lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 95 damaged; 17 airmen are KIA and 5 WIA. Escort is provided by 106 of 119 P-51s without loss.

38 B-17s are sent to hit the Lunebach communications center (35); 1 hits the Telm marshalling yard; 23 B-17s are damaged. Escorting are 101 of 104 P-51s without loss.

Individual Mission Notes:

Seventh Mission Zulpick, German	1 y
Gas load- 2300	
Time::5:45	
SEVENTH MISSION, ZULPICK, GERMANY	
Dec. 29, 1944	
We hit a marshalling yard at Zulpick, Germany. The flak was meager and the target was G. H.	
We saw a few rockets. We had good fighter coverage but they stayed out of sight most of the time. We flew B Lead but the lead lost an engine on the run so we took over and dropped on the smoke markers of the other squadrons.	

Personal note on mission #8 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 20x250 lb. AN-M57 General Purpose bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

Mission of 29 December 1944 - F. C. 559 Irinery Targets - Heinbach, Genund, Schleiden, Zulpich, Altenah, Kenagen, Keuweid, Stadtkyll, Gerelstein, Prup, and Ditburg (GH). Secondary Target - Kablanz N/Y (H2X) Tattle Order 20th CF No. L/C Disprtched - 262 2nd CI - 14th CF No. 1/C Over Tergets ='250 96th CIT 1. Difficultics on the Bonb Run and Denbing a. Seven of the cloven assigned primeries (Zulpich, Remegen, Neuwoid, Stedtkyll, Heimbech, Gorelstein and Prum) were attacked by GH and visual means with results from unobserved through excellent. b. Four targets of opportunity (Fousdorf, St. Vith, Pont and Duppach) wore attracked because of GH failure at the primeries with results from peer to good, c. 2 -- 10/10 olouds and light accurate flak yoro encountered at the targets. d. The 491st Group experienced, interf rence on the bonb run from a I-17 Group, crusing a 1000 feet loss of altitude. 2. Eneny Letien Eneruntered a. No enemy aircraft were encountered. 3. Losses c. One circreft, 392nd Group - hit by anti-circreft neer St. Vith, and pulled cut of formation under control. b. Cnc circreft, 392nd Group - hit by anti-circreft near Trior at 1240 hours; loft formation under control. c. One aircraft, 453rd Group - hit by anti-aircraft over Houried (target) at 1305 hours. Fell behind the formation apparently under control. 4. Gress Errers e. Lord, 44th Group - distance from the MPI. b. Lond, 93rd Group - equipment - select lover melfunction upon which the Squedren dropped trenty-three miles southrest of the MFI. c. HR, 466th Group - distance from the MPI - poor demage results. d. 467th Group (1 Soundron) - personnel - Command Pilot refused to let GH sirereft toko over load at the IP. He told GH sirereft to take over the load after turning on the bonh run. The run could not then be recomplished due to the fact that the tracking coordinate had been passed up by fifteen miles.

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission



Zülpich Communications Center Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	9									
Date:	02 Jan 45									
Mission #:	212									
Position #:	14									
Acft Type:	B-24J-1 FO									
Tail No:	42-50722									
Call Letter:	H-How (IS-H+)		_							
Acft Name:	Un-named									
Target Type:	Köblenz/Güls Railroad	Bridge								
Target City:	Köblenz, Germany				Sent: 29	Lost: 0				
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position					
Hines	Howard	Е		2nd Lt	1st Pilot					
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot					
Lupher	Harry	М	Jr	Flt/Off	Navigator					
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Pilotage Navigate	or				
Schumaker	Jack	J		1st Lt	Bombardier					
Nelson	Donald	Е		T/Sgt	Engineer					
Bally	Carl	F		T/Sgt	Radio Operator					
Tate	James	0		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	er				
Cobb	Richard	М		Sgt	Right Waist Gunner					
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret Gui	nner				

TUESDAY, 2 JANUARY 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 776:

1,011 bombers and 503 fighters are dispatched to attack communications and tactical targets in W Germany visually and using Gee-H; 4 bombers and 3 fighters are lost:

299 B-17s are dispatched to hit the Gerolstein marshalling yard (74) and communications centers are Mayen (68), Prum (34), Daun (34), Kyllburg (37) and Bitburg (36); 3 others hit a target of opportunity; 70 B-17s are damaged. Escorting are 128 of 130 P-51s; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.

296 **B-24s are dispatched to hit the** Lutzel (65) and **Güls (59) rail bridges at Köblenz** plus rail bridges at Irlich (59), Remagen (56) and Engers (43); 3 others hit a target of opportunity; 1 B-24 is damaged beyond repair and 26 damaged. The escort is 215 P-47s and P-51s without loss.

410 B-17s are sent to hit marshalling yards at Bad Kreuznach (73) and Ehrang (66), a rail junction at Bad Kreuznach (67), a rail bridge at Kaisereslautern (34) and tank concentrations at Lebach (128); targets of opportunity are marshalling yards at St Wendell (11) and Trier (3) and other (3); 4 B-17s are lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 36 damaged; 10 airmen are KIA, 2 WIA and 37 MIA. Escort is provided by 125 of 127 P-51s; 2 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).

6 of 6 B-17s fly a screening force mission.

23 P-51s escort 6 F-5s and a Spitfire on a photo reconnaissance mission over Germany.

Mission 777:

2 B-17s and 6 B-24s drop leaflets in France and Germany during the night.

Individual Mission Notes:

```
Eighth Mission, Koblenze, Germany
 Gas load-2500
 Time::6:30
  EIGHTH MISSION, KOBLENZE, GERMANY
                           Jan. 2, 1945
     We hit the town of Koblenze, Ger.
Our target was a bridge over the Ruhr
        The flak was very meager and
River.
we saw no flak over the target. We
only hit flak at the battle lines.
The bomber stream was hit by enemy
fighters but our group not touched.
      Today being Durants birthday we
all went down to the dispensary and
had a drink to celebrate his day.
```


Personal note of mission #9 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:


- Each aircraft carried 3x2,000 lb. AN-M34 General Purpose bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

PORT	V-1 2	nt Di	isio	.			2`			1.21	TALIN TYL JIO	C. G		_ 563		CF G			3-Ja		(2445		ولجعم	
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AS3 L LL RR	10	10 11 10 11	2992 1	10 10 11			10 10 11	•	Kobl	lena/	latoni		4314000 6414000 841000 84500 25500 1214000 25500 1214000 25500 1214000 25500	1.4657 1.2257 1.2257										
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
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	PLACE TIME	ALT. 13522	TRUE HEADING	
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	5230-0758 1132	23000	130 CP3	
	5220-2833 1142	22500	185	
	5:15-882: 1158	22522	195 IP 240 PRIMARY T	ADCTT
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	5018 2719 1215	22500 22501	320 R.P.	
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Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency C

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission.



Köblenz/Güls Railroad Bridge Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	10	7								
Date:	28 Jan 45	_								
Mission #:	223	_								
Position #:	14									
Acft Type:	B-24JSH-5 FO									
Tail No:	42-51547	_								
Call Letter:	B-Baker (IS-B+)									
Acft Name:	Un-named									
Target Type:	Kaisersthul Benzol Ref	finery								
Target City:	Dortmund, Germany				Sent: 19	Lost: 0				
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position					
Hines	Howard	Е		2nd Lt	1st Pilot					
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot					
Lupher	Harry	М	Jr	2nd Lt	Navigator					
Pohner	William	R		Flt/Off	Pilotage Navigat	or				
Curran	William	J		2nd Lt	Radar Navigator					
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier					
Durant	Merlin	D		T/Sgt	Engineer					
Cobb	Richard	М		Sgt	Radio Operator					
Rausch	Karl	Н		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	er				
Kaufmann	Charles	F		S/Sgt	Right Waist Gun	ner				
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret Gu	unner				

SUNDAY, 28 JANUARY 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 809:

With the prospect of improved weather over Germany, 1,006 bombers and 249 fighters are dispatched to hit marshalling yards, bridges and benzyl plants at Dortmund; 10 bombers are lost:

225 B-24s are sent to hit oil targets at Kaiserstuhl (115), Dortmund (19) and Gneisenau (58); targets of opportunity are Lippstadt (9), Neheim (5) and other (11); bombing is by Gee-H; 7 B-24s are

lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 97 damaged; 2 airmen are KIA, 7 WIA and 71 MIA. Escorting are 68 of 77 P-51s.

421 B-17s are sent to hit the Gremberg marshalling yard at Cologne (273) and the Hohenzollern Bridge at Cologne (69); secondary targets are Gutersloh (31) and Bielefeld (7); 3 others hit a target of opportunity; Gee-H and H2X radar are used to bomb; 3 B-17s are lost and 172 damaged; 4 airmen are WIA and 35 MIA. The escort is 69 of 76 P-51s.

360 B-17s are dispatched to hit the Hohenbudberg marshalling yard (169) and Rheinhausen Bridge at Duisburg (80); 10 hit the secondary, the highway bridge at Duisburg; targets of opportunity are Friemersheim (13) and other (2); some targets are hit visually while others are hit using Micro H; 2 B-17s are damaged beyond repair and 195 damaged; 14 airmen are KIA and 20 WIA. 35 of 38 P-51s escort the B-17s.

40 P-51s fly a sweep of the tactical area escorting Ninth AF B-26s.

13 of 18 P-51s fly a scouting mission.

Mission 810:

2 B-17s and 6 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Germany during the night.

Individual Mission Notes:

NINTH MISSION, DORTMUND, GERMANY Jan. 28, 1945 Our target was a benzal plant at Dortmund, Germany. The weather was perfect not a cloud in the sky. The flak was extremly heavy and accurate. They had over 260 guns and they were all shooting at me I'm afraid. That ship felt like a Model "T" Ford going over rail road ties. We had over 56 holes over 1" in diameter and a multiple of smaller holes. The hydrallic and electrical system was shot out and the holes in the turret amounted to five. Durant had his oxygen system also shot out. It was my roughest mission and the lost 3- B-24's and a P-51 also got knocked out of the sky. There were quite a few injuries and one waist gunner was killed. They sure play rough at times over here. I guess they don't realize our intentions are of the best and only in their interest. The total number of holes was 79.

> Personal note on mission #10 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:


- Each aircraft carried 6x1,000 lb. AN-M44 General Purpose bombs

Tactical Mission Report:

No post-mission report available in records from 445th Bomb Group, 2nd Bomb Wing, or 2nd Air Division. There were some radio teletype strike reports, but the text was unreadable.

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission.



Hoesch-Benzin GmbH benzol-oil plant in Dortmund Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration C

Indv Msn #:	11					
Date:	25 Feb 45	_				
Mission #:	238	_				
Position #:		_				
	25	_				
Acft Type:	B-24JSH-20 FO	_				
Tail No:	44-48844					
Call Letter:	B-Baker (RN-B)		_			
Acft Name:	Un-named					
Target Type:	Giebelstadt Airfield					
Target City:	Giebelstadt, Germany				Sent: 31	Lost: 0
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position	
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		1st Lt	1s Pilot	
Wilgus	James	R		1st Lt	Co-Pilot	
Freeman	George	N		2nd Lt	Navigator	
Pohner	William	Н		2nd Lt	Pilotage Navigato	or
Curran	William	J		2nd Lt	Radar Navigator	
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier	
Durant	Merlin	D		T/Sgt	Engineer	
Cobb	Richard	М		S/Sgt	Radio Operator	
Rausch	Karl	Н		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	r
Kaufmann	Charles	F		S/Sgt	Right Waist Gunr	ner
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret Gun	ner
Franz	Anthony	R		S/Sgt	Extra Gunner	

SUNDAY, 25 FEBRUARY 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 847:

1,197 bombers and 755 fighters are dispatched to hit tank factories, airfields associated with jet aircraft, oil depots and rail targets visually; they claim 34-0-21 Luftwaffe aircraft; 5 bombers and 8 fighters are lost:

377 B-17s are sent to hit the Maybach tank factory at Friedrichshafen (63) using Gee-H, and the station and marshalling yard (73) and oil storage tanks and marshalling yard (174) at Munich; 51 hit the secondary target, the marshalling yard at Ulm; 1 other hit Kitzingen, a target of opportunity; 2 B-17s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 135 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 2 WIA and 18 MIA. Escorting are 136 of 149 P-51s; they claim 1-0-2 aircraft on the ground; 2 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).

452 B-17s are dispatched to hit the marshalling yard at Munich (315) and Neuburg (88); targets of opportunity are Kaufbeuren (13), Ludwigsfeldt marshalling yard (12), Kempten (1), Durladingen (2), Rortwell (1) and other (5); 3 B-17s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 197 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 3 WIA and 27 MIA. 140 of 145 P-51s escort and claim 2-0-3 aircraft on the ground.

368 **B-24s are sent to hit the** marshalling yard (115) and tank factory (54) at Aschaffenburg and the **airfields at Giebelstadt (96)** and Schwabishch Hall (93); 1 B-24 is damaged beyond repair and 31 damaged; 3 airmen are KIA and 6 WIA. The escort is 126 of 135 P-51s.

262 P-47s and P-51s fly close escort and area patrols claiming 21-0-4 aircraft in the air and 10-0-12 on the ground; 6 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA) and 1 P-47 is damaged beyond repair.

8 P-51s escort 4 F-5s on a photo reconnaissance mission over Germany.

32 of 34 P-51s fly a scouting mission.

Mission 848:

12 B-24s drop leaflets in France, the Netherlands and Germany during the night.

Tenth Mission, Giebelstadt, Germany

Gas load- 2700

Time: 9:00

TENTH MISSION, GIEBELSTADT ?, GERMANY

Feb. 25, 1945

We hit a Jet Air Base. It was at Giebelstadt, Germany.

Our bombing altitude was on 16,600 ft. and the target was visual, so we really knocked it out. I saw the bombs hit and ours landed on the barracks and hangers. We were flying lead so the credit goes to our bombadier.

There were a lot of enemy fighters up but they couldn't get into us due to our fighter protection. Flak was light but they got four holes in our ship. I saw the town of Ulm and there was a column of smoke about 3000' high. Some of the fellows in the other ships saw the jets trying to land about the time we hit and some of them cracked up. It may have been due to some damage done by our fighters that he never saw. The mission was 9 hours and 30 minutes long.

> Personal note on mission #10 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 10x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs and 4x500 lb. AN-M17 Aimable Incendiary Cluster bombs

Tactical Mission Report:

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Tactical Analysis of Mission 25 February 1945 - F. O. 611

c. Remarks

(1) Forecast - Contrails, moderate to dense, persistent within 1000 feet of modium and high cloud. Target wind: at 20000 feet - 320/35.

(2) Actual - Winds and temperatures as forecast - intermittent light to moderate sumi-persistent contrails, 18 - 22,000 feet east of 0500E.

2. Takeoff, Assembly and DAL

a. Takeoffs were normal with all units having excellent weather conditions. Group and Combat Wing assemblies were from fair to excellent. Assemblies were in southern England because of poor forecast weather conditions in the base areas. The Division Assembly was good, with all units being on time, on course, and visual.

3. Navigation - Penetration

a. The wings were closed up along the D.L and up to the French coast, being about three minutes ahead of schedule at landfall.

b. The 14th Combat Wing, leading, made the route good to the IP; however, the load ship of this Wing was slower than indicated by its instruments. The result was a closing up of the entire Division. The second wing in column managed to keep near course but uncovered generally to the right of course. The third wing in column uncovered considerably, allowing the fourth wing to replace it in the direct column. Although the closing of the wings was a result of an improperly calibrated set of instruments in the lead ship, some of the trouble could have been avoided if the briefed penetration leg had not been straight for about 300 miles.

c. All Wings (except the 96th Wing, which had replaced the 2nd Wing as third in the column) approached the IP in good order. The Groups of the 96th Wing were well uncovered before reaching the IP.

d. The routes from the IP to the target were generally direct. Where succeeding units used the same IP, the point of turn was gradually moved back. The broups of the 96th Wing, being uncovered before the IP, had no more effective runs than those of other Wings. One Group, the 466th, actually had to alter course on the bomb run. The 2nd Wing alone dropped to 17,000 feet to insure visual bombing of its target, Giebelstadt/Wurzburg M^{T} .

4. Bombing inclysis

a. Another "Red Letter" day for 2AD: history in the making! This mission was undoubtedly one of the best examples of precision bombing ever accomplished in the ETO.

b. The L4th Combat Wing attacked U/Y's at .schaffenburg. Lead and L1 squadrons of the 491st scored 100, within 1000 feet. HR hit slightly right of the FI but with good damage results on choke points. The pattern was a little loose. Lead 44th Bomb Group followed with good concentration on the HFI; however, there lead 44th Bomb Group followed with good concentration on the HFI; however, there lead 44th Bomb Group followed with good concentration on the HFI; however, there lead 44th Bomb Group followed with good concentration on the HFI; however, there lead 44th Bomb Group followed with good concentration on the HFI; however, there is evidence of loose formation. The HR undoubtedly had trouble synchronizing due to smoke; however, in spite of this adverse condition, a good concentration was laced in the marshalling yards. Bombing results of the L1 Squadron are not known laced in the marshalling yards. Bombing results of the L1 Squadron are not known -/C with camera landed on the Continent. The Lead Squadron of the 392nd Group started the clean up of what was left. Its pattern was slightly right of and over the MFI with a good concentration on the marshalling yards and an ordnance depot in the WE end of the yards. The HR Squadron scored with a hit right and short in the marshalling yards and a built-up area with a good concentrated pattern. The L Squadron all but "shacked" its MPI - there were a few scattered bursts. Two quadrons from the 93rd Group were assigned the "mop up" position and did a fine ob. The Lead Squadron identified its H1. and left it for the "Kraut" wrecking trews. Last but not least the LL Squadron of the 93rd Group had to "pick the ones." It was necessary to choose another aiming point - this was done and

- 2 -

Tactical Analysis of Mission 25 February 1945 - F. O. 611

the sidings were blanketed with a tight pattern.

(1) The bombing on this target was from very good to excellent. Bombardiers and pilots should make every possible effort to keep the formation tight and get the bombs out on the lead. This is an old gripe yet the most important for good pattern bombing. There was evidence of "smoke trouble" in one case. Use every possible check point to keep those cross hairs from moving!

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c. The 20th Combat Wing, with the exception of two Squadrons from the 93rd Group, was assigned the Armed Vehicle Works for its primary. Needless to say this target will not be up for attack again for sometime, if ever. The bambing of the Lead Squadron of the 448th Group might well be used as an example of what can be done. IL Squadron followed with very good results on auxiliary buildings in the target area. The HR blanketed the iPI and scored hits on what was left of buildings immediately north of the main building. An excellent job of bombing! The lead of the 446th Group had an accidental release thirty-three miles from the target - entire Squadron released. [LL Squadron scored hits in cuxiliary target buildings with very good results - pattern was elongated. HR Squadron had trouble at the IP and broke up, some #/C bombing with Lead 93rd and others with LL Squadron 446th. The premature release of the Lead Squadron was not a personnel error - cause was found to be due to a short circuit. .

d. The 2nd Combat Wing was assigned an air field at Giebolstadt near Wurzburg as its primary target. The over-all results were very good. The HR Squadron of the 453rd Group hit in open fields 4000 feat over the 1PI. The error was due to damaged electrical and mechanical equipment caused by flak. The entire Wing had to lose altitude in order that visual sighting might be done. In so doing, the effective separation point of the 117 IB's was lost. While there were no apparent aiming errors, the change in altitude caused the M17 IB's to hit . intact. This was no personnel error. The decision made enabled a successful com-, pletion of the mission.

e. The 96th Combat Wing had as its primary, Schwabisch-Hall air field. The entire Wing accomplished a very successful job on this target with results from very good to excellent.

(1) Too much emphasis cannot be placed on the need for good navigator-bombardier coordination, good tight formations, better pilotage navigation and continued target identification study.

5. Navigation - Withdrawal

a. Rallies were fair but slow as visibility at altitude was poor. Only two Groups made good the briefed rally points. The 14th Wing out the actual point short, entirely; the 20th Wing followed the briefed route as did the 96th Wing. The 2nd Wing at lower altit ... extended the point of rally considerably.

b. The routes from the rolly point to eight degrees east were generally good. The 96th Wing withdrew along the briefed route in good order. The routes flown by the other units from eight drees east to the English coast were haphazard. The 44th Group deviated from course to 0530E at which point it corrected to the briefed route, but missed landfall by twelve miles. In the 20th Wing, second in column the 448th and 446th Groups were off course up to 0630E and 0530E respectively. At these points they corrected to course and made landfall correctly. The remaining Group of this Wing started on course but gradually edged northward, making landfall fifteen miles north of the briefed point of exit. In the 2nd Wing, third in column, the 309th and 445th Groups adhered to the briefed route out, but the 453rd Group deviated considerably from course although finally acking landfull at the correct point. After considering the various withdrawal routes, it is apparent that relaxation of control rather than poor navigation was the primary cause of the deviations, weather potwithstanding.

Tactical Analysis of Mission 25 February 1945 - F. O. 611

6. Fighter Support

and B Groups on close escort, with the 55th A and B, 361 A and B, and the 78th A area support near the targets.

7. Enemy Action Encountered

a. There was no enemy reaction to the Bomber effort. Fighter Groups on strafing missions reported slight reaction.

b. Anti-Aircraft Gunfire - On route considerable difficulty was found in negotiating the gap to the south of Strasbourg, and meager to moderate accurate predictor control fire was encountered north of Freiburg. Meagor AA was also encountered by a few Groups from the outskirts of Karlsruhe and Stuttgart, and also free the vicinity of Heilbronn. No AA Gunfire was encountered at any of the targets. Practically all the battle damage sustained during this operation occurred in the vicinity of the Rhine. A few red bursts were also seen in this area.

8. Losses

a. There were no losses,

- 9. Scouting Force
 - a. Planning

(1) The Scouting Force was set up with a route force preceding the lead Combat Wing by thirty minutes, and a target force reporting target weather twenty minutes before target time.

b. Execution

(1) The route weather force functioned normally, with no weather difficulties encountered on penetration or return. The target force reported that Aschaffenburg and Schwabisch-Hall could be bombed visually and that the \sqrt{F} at Giebelstadt (Wurzburg) had some cloud but could be bombed at 17,000 feet. Upon this recommendation, the 2nd Combat Wing descended to 17,000 feet and bombed visually.

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10. <u>Bereening Force</u>

a. No Screening Force was used for this mission as visual conditions were expected and targets were lightly defended.

11. Radar

а.	H2X Analysi	.5		
Group	Number Dispatched	Satisfactory For Navigation	Satisfactory For Bombing	Remarks
389th 445th 4 53rd	7 2 3	7. 2 2	7 2 2	l abort - engineering
44th	7	• 4	3	2 H2X failure
392nd 491st	3 4	3 4	3	2 being investigated l personnel error
		· - 4 -	•••	

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission.

Target Data:

© Luftwaffe Airfields 1935 - 1945 database, used with permission of Henry L. deZeng IV.

Giebelstadt (GER) (49 39 10 N - 09 58 30 E)

General: Fliegerhorst in Bavaria 15 km S of Würzburg and 1.6 km E of the village of Giebelstadt.

History: construction began in late summer 1934 and was completed June 1935. The infrastructure, especially the housing area, was designed to reflect a so-called "Luftwaffe Modern" style and on completion the base was considered one of the most attractive in Germany. Officially designated a Luftwaffe Fliegerhorstkommandantur by fall 1935. Hitler visited the airfield on 17 September 1936. From June 1940 to 1944, Giebelstadt was used by the Ergänzungsgruppe (reserve training group) of several bomber units and briefly by other units that arrived to rest and refit or to convert from one type of aircraft to another. In 1944 Giebelstadt was selected as an active base for jet aircraft and a great deal of hurried construction took place.

Dimensions: approx. 915 x 915 meters (1,000 x 1,000 yards).

Runway: had one 2,500-meter concrete runway just completed (Sep 44) and a paved taxiway. A 600meter runway extension was under construction. Starting platforms have been built along the E and W boundaries at the N end of the runway. Obstruction lighting, flare path, beam approach and visual Lorenz for night landings.

Infrastructure: multiple refueling points, munitions dump and communications facilities. One very large, 5 large and 1 medium hangar in three clusters on the N and E boundaries and at the SE corner, all with paved aprons. Additional workshop buildings around the hangars. The very large hangar was probably for repairs. Station HQ, flight control and supply buildings located on the N side of the field among the hangars. Barracks, quarters, messes, and canteens/clubs were in a wooded area at the NE corner. A single- track branch rail line was run to the airfield.

Dispersal: two remote areas to the N and E of the field were under construction in Sep 44.

Defenses: Flak positions were located about 1 km off the N boundary and at the SW corner.

Remarks:

- 09 Aug 44: low-level attack by VIII Fighter Command P-51s claimed 5 x Bf 109s, 5 x Bf 110s and 4 x Me 210s destroyed, plus 10 x Bf 110s, 1 x Me 210 and 1 x Fw 200 damaged.
- 09 Sep 44: bombed by 112 B-17 Fortresses.
- 03 Oct 44: bombed by 49 B-17s.
- 06 Jan 45: low-level attack by VIII Fighter Command P-51s claimed 9 x Ju 88s, 2 x Do 217s and 3 x unidentified aircraft destroyed.
- 13 Jan 45: low-level attack by VIII Fighter Command P-51s claimed 1 x Me 262, 1 x Ju 88 and 1 x Do 217 destroyed, plus 1 x Ju 88 damaged.

- 16 Jan 45: low-level attack 1 x Me 262 A-1 from II./KG(J) 54 destroyed on the ground.
- 06 Feb 45: low-level attack by 9th AAF P-47 fighter-bombers 1 x Fw 190 from I./KG(J) 54 damaged.
- 11 Feb 45: low-level attack by 9th AAF P-47 fighter-bombers 1 x Fw 190 claimed destroyed.
- 20 Feb 45: low-level attack by VIII Fighter Command P-51s 1 x Me 262 A-1 from I./KG(J) 54 damaged and 1 x He 177 damaged. (German report). The Allied fighters claimed 2 x Bf 109s and 1 x Ju 88 destroyed.
- 21 Feb 45: low-level attack by approx. 11 P-51s 1 x Me 262 A-1 and 1 x Bü 181 C-3 from I./KG(J) 54 destroyed or damaged. (German report)
- 23 Feb 45: low-level attack by VIII Fighter Command P-51s claimed 1 x He 177 destroyed and another damaged.
- 25 Feb 45: bombed by 96 B-24 Liberators 4 Me 262 A-1s and 2 x Bü 181 C-3s from I./KG(J) 54 destroyed or damaged; 1 KIA and 2 WIA. (445th Bomb Group Mission #238 31 B-24's dropped 188x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs and 100x500 lb. AN-M17 Aimable Incendiary Cluster bombs)
- 19 Mar 45: low-level attack by approx. 8 P-51s 3 x Me 262 A-1 from KG(J) 54 destroyed or damaged. (German report)
- 21 Mar 45: strafed by 36 P-51 Mustangs German accounts state there was little damage aside from a single Me 262 shot down while attempting to land.
- 22 Mar 45: bombed by 75 B-24s 11 x Me 262 A-1s and 2 x Bf 109s from KG(J) 54 destroyed or damaged plus 2 x Ju 88s destroyed; runway and the western third of the landing area heavily cratered; Me 262 operations no longer possible. (German report)
- 01 Apr 45: airfield taken by elements of the U.S. 12th Armored Div. The landing area was heavily cratered, and many buildings had been destroyed.

Operational Units: Fliegergruppe Giebelstadt (Oct 35 – Apr 36); I./KG 155 (Apr 36 – Feb 38); III./KG 355 (Jul 38 – May 39); III./KG 53 (May 39 – Feb 40); I./KG 2 (Feb-May 40); I./KG 76 (Oct 40 – Mar 41); /KG 1 (Jun 41); Stab, I./KG 77 (Dec 41 – Jan 42); II./KG 76 (Apr-May 42); III./KG 100 (Aug-Sep 44); Stab and I./KG(J) 54 (Aug 44 – Mar 45); Stab, I./KG 51 (Mar 45).

School Units: Verkehrsfliegerschule (Commercial Aviation School) Giebelstadt (Jun-Sep 35).


Reserve Training & Replacement Units: Schulstaffel/KG 53 (Jun – Sep 40); IV./KG 76 (Apr 41 – Sep 42); IV./KG 100 (May 43 – Sep 44)?;

Station Commands: Fl.H.Kdtr. L Giebelstadt (1940); Fl.H.Kdtr. A(o) 10/XII (Apr-Jun 44); Fl.H.Kdtr. A(o) 26/VII (Jun 44 – Apr 45).

Kommandant (mainly prior to the establishment of numbered station commands – not complete): Obstlt. Heinrich Christenn (? - ?) 9/39; Oberst Johann Gehfink (? - Aug 43) 3/43; Obstlt. Georg Kugel (Aug 43 - ?).

Station Units (on various dates – not complete): Stab/2. Fliegerdivision (Sep 44); Koflug Giebelstadt (Jul 39 – c.Aug 40); 8.Flugh.Betr.Kp./KG 53; Werft-Abt. (v) 117/XII (1944-45); schw.Feldwerft-Abt. V/30 (Mar 45); 118. Flugh.Betr.Kp. (Qu) (Sep 44); 129. Flugh.Betr.Kp. (Qu) (Sep 44); 136. Flugh.Betr.Kp. (Qu) (Sep ; 3. Flugh.Betr.Kp. (S) (Sep 44); 4. Flugh.Betr.Kp. (S) (Sep 44); Flugh.Betr.Kp. (FK) 3 (Sep 44); Lufttorpedo-Betr.Kp. 2 (Sep 44); Lufttorpedo-Betr.Kp. 7 (Sep 44);

Lufttorpedo-Betr.Kp. 8 (Sep 44); Lufttorpedo-Betr.Kp. 9 (Sep 44); D 1 R – Nachschublager d.Lw. 1/XII (1944-45); Lw.-Bau-Btl. 6/XIII (Apr 40); Startbahnbauzug 1 (summer 44); E-Hafen-Ausrüstungs-Kolonne (mot) Giebelstadt.



Giebelstadt Airfield – circles indicate Me 262 jet fighters Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	12					
Date:	27 Feb 45					
Mission #:	240					
Position #:	37					
Acft Type:	B-24JSH-20 FO					
Tail No:	44-48851					
Call Letter:	C-Charlie (MK-C+)					
Acft Name:	Un-named					
Target Type:	Halle Railroad Marsha	alling Yard	S			
Target City:	Halle, Germany				Sent: 42	Lost: 2
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position	
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		Ι	1st Pilot	
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		Н	Co-Pilot	
Freeman	George	Ν		Н	Navigator	
Pohner	William	Н		Н	Pilotage Navigat	or
Curran	William	J		Н	Radar Navigator	
Hamrick	Harold	Т		Ι	Bombardier	
Durant	Merlin	D		Е	Engineer	
Cobb	Richard	М		D	Radio Operator	
Rausch	Karl	Н		D	Left Waist Gunne	er
Kaufmann	Charles	F		D	Right Waist Gun	ner
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	D	Tail Turret G	unner
Franz	Anthony	R		D	Extra Gunner	

TUESDAY, 27 FEBRUARY 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 851:

1,107 bombers and 745 fighters are dispatched to hit road and rail communications at Halle and Leipzig using H2X radar; they claim 83-0-19 Luftwaffe aircraft; 2 B-24s and 2 P-51s are lost:

314 of 351 B-24s hit the marshalling yard at Halle; targets of opportunity are Bitterfeld (21) and other (3); 2 B-24s are lost and 4 damaged; 1 airman is KIA and 18 MIA. Escorting are 196 P-47s and P-51s; they claim 1-0-0 aircraft in the air and 45-0-3 on the ground; 2 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).

717 of 756 B-17s hit the rail center at Leipzig; 7 others hit targets of opportunity; 1 B-17 is damaged beyond repair and 3 damaged; 2 airmen are KIA. The escort is 453 of 489 P-51s; they claim 1-0-0 aircraft in the air and 36-0-16 on the ground without loss.

28 P-51s fly a scouting mission without loss.

13 P-51s escort 2 F-5s and 2 Spitfires on a photo reconnaissance mission over C and E Germany.

Mission 852:

During the night of 27/28 Feb 23 of 26 B-24s bomb Wilhelmshaven oil storage by PFF without loss and 1 B-17 and 11 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands and Germany.

Eleventh Mission , Halle, Germany
Gas Load-2500
Time: 8:30
ELEVENTH MISSION, HALLE, GERMANY
Feb. 27, 1945
We hit a rail yard at the city of Halle, Germany. It is on the out skirts of Leipzig, the roughest target in Ger, The flak was very heavy but it was all about 1000' below us. The cloud cover- age was ten/tenths so we bombed P.F.F.
One ship had a direct hit by a rocket and it burst into flames and then it blew up. No one got out, it was a new crew, they only had two missions in.
It sure gives you an odd feeling to actually see one blow up.

Personal note on mission #11 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 9x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

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Page 93 of 285

Tactical Analysis of Mission 27 February 1945 - F. 0. 613

o. Remarks

(1) Forecast - Moderate non-persistent contrails at 26,000 feet and above and moderate non-persistent in small patches between 20,000 feet and 26,000 feet. Target winds: at 20,000 - 300/55, at 25,000 - 300/60.

(2) Actual Winds and temperatures as forecast - nil contrails.

2. Takeoff and Assembly

a. Takeoffs were normal and accomplished between 0830 and 0956.

Combat Wings	Assembly	First Actual Takeoff	Briefed Time For OP 1	Assembly Time
2 nd	8,300	0830	1018	1:48
14th	7,500	0836	1021	1:45
96 th	7,000	0845	1024	1:39
20 th	9,100	0836	1027	1:51

b. <u>Division assembly was poor as a result of poor timing at the DAL by</u> the Wings.

(1) The 14th Wing was flying poor wing formation at the DAL.

(2) There was a very large gap maintained between the 96th and 20th Wings. (20th was behind all day.)

(3) Too fast a climb was thought partly responsible for stringing out the Groups and Wings.

(4) Units departed the English coast from one and one-half minutes early to three minutes late. The 14th Combat Wing was not visual with the 2nd Combat Wing.

3. Navigation - Penetration

a. At landfall units were generally two to four miles left of course. The Division column at this point was eighteen minutes long - due to poor timing at the DAL by the Wings.

b. Route in to the IP was maintained within five miles of course by all units except in the first leg of the flight in enemy territory and in the maneuver just before the IP. At these points, some units were up to fifteen miles off course. Low eloud, 9/10 - 10/10 coverage, did not afford visual check points for navigators.

c. The maneuver at the IP was effected well, with units uncovering to bomb by Squadrons on H2X. Although cloud cover was 10/10 over the route here, navigation was good.

d. The IP to target run was made good by all units except the 44th Group, which bombed Bitterfeld. This Group made an "S" turn after leaving the IP to uncover from the preceding Wing. This action confused the H2X operator who had a weak return on his scope for the primary target. A run was made on Bitterfeld, which was mistaken for the primary target. No visual aids were available to assist in navigation.

4. Bombing Analysis

a. All bombing was accomplished through 10/10 clouds with unobserved results. All Mickey Navigators and Bombardiers, the 44th Group excepted, reported good runs.

b. The 44th Group had to make an "S" turn after leaving the IP in order

- 2 -

Tactical Analysis of Mission 27 February 1945 - F. 0. 613

to make proper uncovery. A weak return on the scope caused the H2X Operator to become confused. Bitterfeld, mistaken for the primary, was banbed.

e. In mission planning, ample time is allotted to allow making good H2X runs. Air Commanders should endeavor to space their Groups properly to avoid any confusion at the IP or immediately thereafter. Little, if any time, is allowed for "milling around" in the process of getting squared away for the banb run.

5. Navigation - Withdrawal

a. All units rallied generally three to eight miles south of course so as to allow for turns, bringing Groups into wing formation again. The 96th Wing overshot the rally by ten miles and was ten miles left of course until the second turn after the target.

b. The route out was not followed closely by units. The 2nd Combat Wing stayed within five miles of course except for one point at the battle line where it was twelve miles morth of course. The lith Wing was generally on course until it reached 9°E, where it went south of course fifteen miles - on course again over the battle lines and morth of course by ten miles at landfall out. The 96th Combat Wing stayed generally on course, except at two points where it was twelve miles south of course. Mavigators reported a wind shift along the route south of the target and at the battle line. The 20th Combat Wing was generally on course except when crossing the battle line where it was ten miles morth of course. The undercast was not broken enough to afford mavigators good visual aids.

c. At landfall units were from two to five miles right of the briefed point of exit - the Division column was eighteen minutes in length at this point.

6. Fighter Support

a. 2d Air Division had the 4th A and B, 479th A and B, 361st A and B, and the 355th A and B Fighter Groups as close escort from the Malmedy area - on penetration - in the target area and upon withdrawal to the Malmedy area. The 56th Group furnished area support at the target.

- 7. Enemy Action Encountered
 - a. There was no enemy aircraft reaction to the Bomber Force.
 - b. Flak barrage type light to moderate, inaccurate to accurate.
- 8. Losses

a. One aircraft, 445th Group - Hit by AA fire over the target, Halle - one chute observed.

b. One aircraft, 445th Group - Last seen with the group formation on the route out - was not observed leaving the formation - no further information is available.

9. Scouting Force

a. Plan - As no difficulties were anticipated, only one force was utilized to report target weather twenty minutes prior to scheduled time of attack.

- b. Bomber Reports Bootleg good.
- c. Scout Reports
 - (1) Formations generally fair poor rally.
 - (2) Communications good.

Tastical Analysis of Mission 27 February 1945 - F. 0. 613

- (3) Target obscured by 9/10 aloud cover.
- (4) Smoke markers well concentrated.
- 10. Screening Porce
 - a. Plan and Resoution

(1) Plan - Normal method of "S-ing" through target area on routes and times based upon wind vector and rate of chaff fall to put chaff at the position and altitude of the Division leader at the time of bomb release. The force was also instructed to dispense chaff on penetration through the Frankfurt area. Because of the concentration of flak defenses in the target area and the resulting difficulty of skirting for rally. It was stipulated that the A/C of the Screening Force would take up maximum dispersal and go straight through, should visual conditions prevail.

(2) Execution - As planned - 2nd Combat Wing encountered accurate barrage type fire through the overcast. The Screening Force never did effect its planned fighter rendesvous, but instead it received cover from the 2nd Combat Wing escort and the Scouting Force.

b. Air-Ground Liaison

(1) Plan and Execution

(a) Plan - Righth Air Force arranged for ground forces to provide an artillery barrage directed against enemy AA defenses at the front line crossing point during both penetration and withdrawal. 2AD furnished a B-25 to orbit in that area and ast as air-ground liaison. This A/O was to communicate with the lead and last group of each Division and, in the case of straggling units, with MEW, and was to relay information regarding the Bombers to the Artillery Ground Control Station.

(b) Execution - The liaison A/C functioned well and transmitted all the necessary information, although 2AD units only and the MEW station, "Nuthouse" established communication. Routes were flown accurately and only one Squadron of 2AD encountered flak over the front lines.

11. Radar

a. H2X Analysis



b. H2X operation for this mission was very satisfactory. There were no personnel errors and set failures were at a minimum.

By command of Major General KEPNER:

FRANCIS H. GRISHOLD Brigadier General USA Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT H. TERRILL Colonel GSO Dep C of S for Operations

- 4 -

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were two losses on this mission:
 - MACR #12778; Aircraft: 42-51506, Named: un-named; 1st Pilot: 2nd Lt Vitkavage; Casualties: 2 KIA, 7 POW; Reason For Loss: Damaged by flak over Halle M/Y, 1 engine feathered falling out of formation, shot down by flak near Betzenhausen, Germany.
 - MACR # 12794; Aircraft: 42-51518, Named: un-named; 1st Pilot: 2nd Lt Weaver; Casualties: 6 KIA, 3 POW; Reason For Loss: Hit by flak over the target, blew off right wing between fuselage and #3 engine.



Halle Railroad Marshalling Yards Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ©

Indv Msn #:	13					
Date:	28 Feb 45	_				
Mission #:	241					
Position #:	25					
Acft Type:	B-24JSH-20 FO					
Tail No:	44-48851					
Call Letter:	C-Charlie (MK- <u>C</u> +)					
Acft Name:	Un-named					
Target Type:	Arnsberg Railroad Via	ducts				
Target City:	Arnsberg, Germany				Sent: 31	Lost: 0
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position	
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		Ι	1st Pilot	
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		Н	Co-Pilot	
Freeman	George	Ν		Н	Navigator	
Pohner	William	Н		Н	Pilotage Navigat	or
Curran	William	J		Н	Radar Navigator	
Hamrick	Harold	Т		Ι	Bombardier	
Durant	Merlin	D		Е	Engineer	
Cobb	Richard	М		D	Radio Operator	
Kaufmann	Charles	F		D	Left Waist Gunne	er
Rausch	Karl	Н		D	Right Waist Gun	ner
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	D	Tail Turret Gui	nner
Franz	Anthony	R		D	Extra Gunner	

WEDNESDAY, 28 FEBRUARY 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

3 missions are flown.

Mission 854:

1,104 bombers and 737 fighters are dispatched to make PFF attacks on rail targets in Germany; they claim 18-0-11 Luftwaffe aircraft; 1 B-17 and 5 P-51s are lost:

378 B-17s are sent to hit marshalling yards at Soest (143), Hagen (151) and Schwerte (74) using Gee-H; 1 other hits a target of opportunity; 1 B-17s is lost; 3 airmen are MIA. 106 of 112 P-51s escort without loss.

346 **B-24s are dispatched to hit the Arnsberg (95)** and Bielefeld (81) **railroad viaducts**, the Siegen marshalling yard (77) and the Henschel tank plant at Meschede (79); 1 other hits the Neustadt road junction, a target of opportunity; all attacks are made using Gee-H; no casualties. Escorting are 117 of 123 P-51s; 1 is lost (pilot MIA).

364 of 380 B-17s hit the marshalling yard at Kassel, the secondary target; 6 others hit 6 targets of opportunity; the attacks are made using H2X radar; no casualties. The escort is 113 of 118 P-51s; they claim 0-0-1 aircraft in the air and 10-0-4 on the ground; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA).

308 of 318 P-51s fly a strafing run in the Wurzburg-Munich area; they claim 8-0-6 aircraft on the ground; 3 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).

18 of 20 P-47s fly a fighter-bomber mission against Abler, Offenbach and Werdorf marshalling yards and factory buildings without loss.

16 P-51s escort 4 F-5s and 1 Spitfire on a photo reconnaissance mission over Germany.

Mission 855:

11 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands and Germany during the night without loss. 1 Mosquito flies a SKYWAVE mission over Germany. (SKYWAVE is a special navigational mission to calibrate LORAN equipment.)

Mission 856:

22 of 24 B-24s bomb the Freiburg rail depot during the night using PFF methods: no losses.

Individual Mission Notes:

Twelfth Mission, Arnsberg, Germany Gas load: 2300 Time:6:45 TWELTH MISSION ARNSBERG, GER. Feb. 28, 1945 We hit a marshalling yard at Arnsberg near Kassel. There was no flak and the mission on a whole was one of the easiest I have had so far since I have started flying combat. We briefed at 0700 so that was a good deal considering that we usually brief at from 0300 to 0500. The cloud coverage was ten/ tenths so we did not see the target We lead the 1 ow left again. It was the third time in a row.

Personal note on mission #12 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 10x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs and 1x500 lb. AN-M17 Aimable Incendiary Cluster bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

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Tactical Analysis of Mission 28 February 1945 - F. O. 614

c. Remarks

(1) Forecast - Nil contrails - target winds: at 20,000 - 270/40, at 25,000 - 270/40.

(2) Actual - Winds and temperatures aloft as forecast. No contrails except a few light, non-persistent at 28,000 feet at 0700-0800E.

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2. Takeoff, Assembly and DAL

Combat	Altitude	First Actual	Briefed Time	Assembly
Wing		Takeoff	For CP 1	Time
96th	10,000	1040	1214	1:34
20th	10,000	0955	1217	2:22
2nd	10,000	1035	1223	1:45
14th	10,000	1040	1223	1:43

b. Group and Combat Wing assemblies were good. All units were generally on time, on course and visual. The 20th Combat Wing was slightly early approaching Control Point 1 and had to dogleg to the north to avoid conflict with the 96th Wing. Because of this maneuver, the 20th Wing crossed out morth of Control Point 1

3. <u>Navigation - Penetration</u>

a. The penetration route on this mission was flown well. Only one Group of the Division was off course at landfall and this Group corrected to course by $5^{\circ}E$.

b. In approaching the IP's, the first three Fings followed the briefed route until turning into the GH reference lines. The 389th Bomb Group, being behind in time, cut corners to successfully reach the IP. The 14th Combat Jing, last in the column, had difficulty with its GH equipment.

c. All runs from the IP to the target were good, including those of the 14th Combat Wing, although the latter did not make good the briefed IP.

4. Bombing Analysis

a. Bombing of all Combat Wings was done by GH through 10/10 clouds. The cloud coverage was such that it was impossible to make any visual corrections or make any observations.

b. The 96th Combat Wing bombed its primary, Bielefeld. The 446th of the 20th Combat Wing, which bombed its primary, Meschede, was slightly left of course on the bomb run. The 2nd Combat Wing bombed its primary, Arnsberg. The 453rd Group reported an excellent run.

c. The 392nd, leading the 14th Combat Wing, bombing in group formation, attacked its primary, Siegen. A malfunction in both sight and Gi equipment of the lead A/C and deputy lead was reported. The GH tracking station went out one minute before bombs away and returned one minute after releasing bombs. Despite this and malfunction in bombsight, the A/C was able to drop. The navigntor had his drift killed before tracking station went out and was able to follow in on target. The malfunction in sight was not enough to hinder the bombardior from making proper synchronous checks on bomb run. The Group dropped bombs on smoke markers of this ship. The 44th and 491st Groups bombed by GH, with the exception of one Squadron of the 491st Group, which bombed by H2X.

e. Bombardiers must be certain to pre-flight all equipment throughly before leaving the ground. This is particularly applicable to bomb sights and auto-pilot equipment.

- 2 -

5. Navigation - Withdrawal

a. Rallios were good and the first two Combat Wings followed the briefed

Taotical Analysis of Mission 28 February 1945 - F. O. 614

route to the coast. Two Groups of the 2nd Combat Wing out corners and were slightly north of course on the way out, as was the 14th Combat Wing, last in the column.

b. Landfall out was as briefed with the Wings in close formation.

6. Fighter Support

c. There were three Fighter Groups assigned to escort 24D Bombers. The 479th Group escorted the lead Combat Wing, the 361st Group covered the 2nd and 3rd Combat Wings, with the 355th Group covering the last Combat Wing. All Groups flew close escort and R/V was made at 5017N-0530E. The 4th Group was directed to fly the Bomber route on withdrawal as added support for the 1st Combat Wing of Bombers, which was withdrawing alone on the northerly route.

7. Enemy Action Encountered

a. There was no enony aircraft reaction directed toward 2AD Bombers.

b. No flak was experienced at the targets.

- 8. Losses
 - c. There were no losses.
- 9. Scouting Force
 - a. Planning

(1) The Scouting Force was planned as utilizing two forces. One force reporting on the target at Bielefeld, the other force reporting on the targets at Siegen, Meschede, and Irnsburg. Both forces were to report target weather twenty minutes before target time.

b. Execution

(1) The Scouting Force functioned normally and no difficulties were encountered.

10. Screening Force

t. H2X Analysis

a. No Screening Force was planned since targets were virtually flak free.

11. Roder

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(1) H2X operation for this mission is considered satisfactory. The 2nd Cambat Wing had no set failures. There were five set malfunctions and these could not be remedied in flight by the H2X navigator. One 4/C, 44th Group, did not use H2X - this A/C is a combination H2X-CH A/C and CH was used. One A/C, 467th Group, had malfunctions of an undetermined nature - these malfunctions occur only while this A/C is in flight - ground checks have not succeeded as yet in determining the nature of the faulty operation of this set. .0.30

11 12 C b. GH operation on this mission was poor due to the distance of the targets from the stations. Of the nineteen GH aircraft over the target only one could not receive the signals; however, fifteen GH navigators reported weak signals.

CONFIDENTIAL

Tactical Analysis of Mission 28 February 1945 - F. 0. 614

12. Comments

Fa: The nevigation on this mission was far above average and can be classified as excellent to superior. Individual navigators concerned should be congratulated for subh-good work.

> FRANCIS H, GRIS'OLD Brigginer General USA Chief of Staff

By Sammand of Major General KEPNER:

OFFICIAL: will Colonel GSC Dep C of S for Operations

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission



Arnsberg Railroad Viaduct is destroyed Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ©

Indv Msn #:	14						
Date:	07 Mar 45						
Mission #:	247						
Position #:	13						
Acft Type:	B-24JSH-5 FO						
Tail No:	42-51547						
Call Letter:	B-Baker (MK- <u>B</u> +)						
Acft Name:	Un-named						
Target Type:	Soest Railroad Marshalling Yard						
Target City:	Soest, Germany				Sent: 21	Lost:	0
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position		
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		1st Lt	1st Pilot		
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot		
Freeman	George	Ν		2nd Lt	Navigator		
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier		
Durant	Merlin	D		T/Sgt	Engineer		
Cobb	Richard	М		S/Sgt	Radio Operator		
Rausch	Karl	Н		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunner		
Kaufmann	Charles	F		S/Sgt	Right Waist Gunner		
Franz	Anthony	R		S/Sgt	Top Turret Gunner		
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret Gunner		
Pohner	William	Н		2nd Lt	Pilotage Navigator		
Curran	William	J		2nd Lt	Radar Navigator		

WEDNESDAY, 7 MARCH 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

3 missions are flown.

Mission 869:

946 bombers and 322 fighters are dispatched to hit oil and communication targets using PFF; 1 P-51 is lost:

246 B-24s are sent to hit the marshalling yard at Soest (144) and the Schidesche water viaduct at Bielefeld (80); Gee-H and H2X radar are used for bombing; 1 B-24 is damaged beyond repair and 3 damaged; 10 airmen are KIA. Escorting are 77 P-47s and P-51s.

344 B-17s are dispatched to bomb the Horderverein (24) and Harpenerweg (62) oil refineries at Dortmund; secondary targets hit are the marshalling yards at Paderborn (11), Siegen (113) and Giessen (87); Gee-H and H2X radar are used; 1 B-17 is damaged beyond repair and 20 damaged; 1 airman is KIA. The escort is 74 of 85 P-51s.

340 B-17s are sent to hit the Emscherlippe benzyl plant at Datteln (173) and the Rauxel benzyl plant at Castrop (77); secondary targets hit are the marshalling yards at Siegen (43) and Giessen (28); 1 other hits a

target of opportunity; Micro H and H2X radar are used; 56 B-17s are damaged. 75 of 76 P-51s escort the bombers.

Mission 870:

11 of 12 B-24s drop leaflets in Germany and the Netherlands.

Mission 871:

19 of 20 B-24s bomb Dortmund during the night using PFF; 1 B-24 is lost.

Individual Mission Notes:

(12-A)) Thirteenth Mission, Soest, Germany Gas load: 2300 Time:: 5:15 12A THIRTEENTH WISSION, SOEST, GER. March 7. 1945 We hit another marshalling yard at Soest. We bombed G.H. and the cloud coverage was ten/ tenths. The flak was very light and most of it was below us. We lead the high right. The formation was exceptionally bad for some unknown reason.

> Personal note on mission #14 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

 Each aircraft carried 10 x 500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs and 2 x 500 lb. AN-M7 Incendiary Cluster bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

Tactical malysis of Mission 7 March 1945 - F. 0. 620. SUBJECT : TO Commanding Generals, All Combat Bomb Wings, This Division, APO 558. : This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem necessary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of mission reports and information obtained from Combat Wings and Groups. A/C OVER DISPATCHED SECONDARY T.RGET BATTIL ORDER PRIMARY 96th CB7 Siegen WY (H2X) 82 78 Soest M/Y (GH or Vis.) 11 76 71 2nd CBI 11 11 Bielefeld M/Y (H2X) 52 20th CBI 53 Rielefeld 40 14th CBJ 252 241 2AD 1. Takeoff and Assembly a. Takeoffs Assembly First Actual Briefed Time assembly Combat iltitudes Wings Takeoff For CP 1 Time 12,000 0855 96th 0715 1:40 0657 0858 2:01 2nd 12,000 12,000 0900 2:03 20th 0657 0715 14th 12,000 0902 1:47 (1) Takeoffs occurred without event. (2) Some \sqrt{C} of the 2nd and 14th Combat Wings reported moderate to severe clear icing during the instrument climb. At least two \sqrt{C} aborted on this account - one of these went into a spin but recovered after four crew members had bailed out. This condition appears to have been localized and was not discovered by the weather scouts. b. Assemblies (1) assemblies were normal. Units departed in good order, being one minute late. 2. Navigation - Penetration a. Landfall was made at the briefed point by all units. The Division column here was eleven minutes in length. All units were forced to make a 360 turn in order to gain altitude to top clouds over the Channel. Some units were forced up to 23,000 feet. b. The briefed punctration route was flown by all units. c. The approach to the IP was executed as briefed. The only conflict at the IP was between the 20th and 14th Wings. The 14th Combat Wing did not keep its interval and over-ran the 20th Wing. This did not cause any serious trouble and all bomb runs were made on briefed headings.

3. Bombing Analysis

a. The 96th and 2nd Combat Wings attacked Soest 1/Y by GH methods through 10/10 clouds. All results were unobserved. The high right Squadron of the 389th Group had a GH equipment failure but bombed on smoke markers of the preceding unit Tactical Analysis of Mission 7 March 1945 - F. 0. 620

without difficulty. The Lead Squadron of the 458th Group failed to uncover properly at the IP and interfered with the third Squadron of the 467th Group on the bomb run.

b. The 20th and 14th Combat Wings attacked the Bielefeld Viaduct. There was 7 - 8/10 cloud cover in the target area and only limited visual assistance existed. Results were unobserved to excellent with probable hits on the viaduct and its approaches. The deputy lead of the lead Squadron of the 93rd Group took over on the bomb run due to a GH equipment failure in the lead ship. This-Squadron and the LL Squadron of the 392nd Group had excellent results and there was evidence of superior GH navigator and bombardier coordination. The Lead Squadron of the 392nd Group had an equipment failure on the bomb run and, in violation of Paragraph 13 of 2.D F.O. 620, bombed its tertiary target, Paderborn M/Y, by H2X with unobserved results. Paragraph 13 states H2X secondary and tertiary targets will be attacked only in event of CH station failure. Units with equipment failure will drop on snoke markers of preceding unit.

4. <u>Nevigation - Withdrawal</u>

a. The 96th Combat Wing over-ran the rally point by five miles but corrected back to the briefed route before the next turning point was reached. The 2nd Combat Wing out short the rally point in order to close the interval between itself and the 96th Combat Wing. The 14th and 20th Wings made good rallies.

b. All Wings flew withdrawal as briefed until the battle line was crossed in this vicinity, because of poor navigation, the 96th and 2nd Wings flow ten miles north of course. The 20th Combat Wing flew about eight miles south of course on withdrawal. The 14th Combat Wing flow as briefod.

c. The 96th and 2nd Wings made landfall out ten miles north of course. The 14th and 20th Wings made landfall out as briefed.

d. Due to the fifteen minute loss of time over the Channel on penetration Wings were fifteen minutes late throughout the mission.

5. Fighter Support

a. Headquarters, Eighth hir Force, assigned two Fighter Groups as close support for 2d Lir Division: 56th Group on the first two Boxes and 361st Group on the last two Boxes. The 479th, 78th and 356th Groups under EM control were on patrol and performing area support in the target area and along the route. The 361st Group was unable to get off and the 479th Group took over its assignment via R/T directions from MEW.

6. Energy Action Encountered

a. There was no enemy 4/C reaction nor losses reported by the Fighters.

- b. Flak at Soest was light inaccurate, at Bielefeld, nil.
- 7. Losses
 - a. There were no losses.
- 8. Scouting Force
 - a. Plan

(1) For one force to report target weather twenty-five minutes before TOT. This time was so set to enable the Screening Force and units on the Scest K/rto use the alternate route should visual conditions exist.

(2) For one force to report route weather twenty minutes in advance of the bombers.

Tactical Analysis of Mission 7 March 1945 - F. 0. 620 b. Execution (1) Route force reported middle cloud from 18,000 to 20,000 feet, lying forty miles west of the Dutch coast, thus enabling the Division to make a 360° climbing turn and get over the layer. c. Bomber Reports (1) Information good - 14th and 2nd Combat Wings received it through the other Wings. d. Scout Report (1) Target weather - 10/10 with large break over IP. (2) Communications excellent. 9. Screening Force a. Plan (1) For Screening Force to precede the main force through the target area on a route and times based upon the wind vector and chaff rate of fall. b. Execution (1) Normal - as planned. 10. Radar a. H2X inalysis OK For iı∕c L/C Over OK For Navigation Dispatched Bonbing Renarks Group Target 389th 5 5 5 5 2 2 1 1 equipment failure 445th 2 453rd 3 3 3 3 44th 3 3 3 2 1 equipment failure 1 equipment failure 2 392nd 2 2 1 0 0 0 491st 0 2 2 2 93rd 2 4 0 40 446th 40 4 448th 0 3 5 4 33 3 5 4 33 3 3 458th 1 equipment failure 543 4 466th <u>3</u> 28 1 equipment failure 467tn (1) H2X operation for this mission was satisfactory. All sets were satisfactory for navigation. Five sets were unsatisfactory for bonbing, having malfunctions which could not be corrected in flight.

b. GEE - operated satisfactorily beyond 0800E on both the Ruhr and Reims chains. Some ineffective jamming was reported on both chains.


c. GH - stations 115 and 114 were used with good results. Of twentyfive ./C dispatched, twenty attacked, using GH methods. Good signals were reported The five failures consisted of: two - GH equipment failures, one - (deputy) dropper

Tactical unalysis of Mission 7 March 1945 - F. 0. 620 on a lead ship, one - bombed H2X, after being forced out on the GH run, one - de-puty lead took over too late to bomb by GH, but dropped using H2X equipment. By command of Major General KEPNER: FRANCIS H. GRISWOLD Brigadier General USA Chief of Staff OFFICIAL: Colonel CSC Dep C of S for Operations

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission.



Soest railroad marshalling yard Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	15						
Date:	11 Mar 45						
Mission #:	251						
Position #:	25						
Acft Type:	B-24JSH-5 FO						
Tail No:	42-51547						
Call Letter:	B-Baker (MK- <u>B</u> +)						
Acft Name:	Un-named						
Target Type:	Deutsche Werke/Krup	p Germai	nia Subrr	arine Pen	S		
Target City:	Kiel, Germany				Sent: 33 Lost: 0		
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position		
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		1st Lt	1st Pilot		
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot		
Freeman	George	Ν		2nd Lt	Navigator		
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier		
Durant	Merlin	D		T/Sgt	Engineer		
Cobb	Richard	М		S/Sgt	Radio Operator		
Rausch	Karl	Н		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunner		
Kaufmann	Charles	F		S/Sgt	Right Waist Gunner		
Franz	Anthony	R		S/Sgt	Top Turret Gunner		
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret Gunner		
Pohner	William	Н		2nd Lt	Pilotage Navigator		
Curran	William	J		2nd Lt	Radar Navigator		

SUNDAY, 11 MARCH 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 881:

1,256 bombers and 814 fighters are dispatched to make H2X radar attacks on U-boat yards at Kiel and Bremen and the shipyard and refinery area at Hamburg, Germany; 1 B-17 and 4 P-51s are lost:

344 of 352 **B-24s attack the Krupp Germania U-boat yard at Kiel**; 2 B-24s are damaged. 232 P-47s and P-51s escort; 1 P-51 is lost.

469 of 485 B-17s hit the Wilhemsburg oil refinery at Hamburg; 1 other hits a target of opportunity; 1 B-17 is lost and 41 damaged; 3 airmen are WIA and 10 MIA. Escorting are 252 of 265 P-51s; 2 are lost.

406 of 413 B-17s hit the Deschimag U-boat yard at Bremen; 9 B-17s are damaged. 237 of 255 P-51s escort; 1 is lost.

Mission 882:

11 of 12 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands and Germany during the night without loss.

Individual Mission Notes:

Fourteenth Mission Keil, Germany Gas Load: 2500 Time:6:43 FOURTEENTH MISSION, KEIL, GERMANY March, 11, 1945 We hit Keil, it is supposed to be the roughest target in Germany. The flak was intence but inaccurate We were exceptionally lucky today. for the R.A.F went to this target last year and lost 98 planes. The coverage was ten/tenths so that accounts for their great inaccuracy. Ι sure hope that we clabbered it for I wouldn't want to zo back there or have any of my buddies go there. We lead the low left again and it kept in pretty good shape.

> Personal note on mission #15 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 12 x 500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose.

Tactical Mission Report:

SUBJECT: Tactical Analysis of Mission 11 March 1945 - F. O. 624. : Commanding Generals, All Combat Bomb Wings, This Division, APO 558. TO This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem necessary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of mission reports and information obtained from Combat Wings and Groups. A/C OVER A/C DISPATCHED BATTLE ORDER PRIMARY SECONDARY TARGET 96th CBW Kiel (Visual) Kiel (H2X) 61 20th CBM 96 95 93 2nd CBil 96 et. 14th CBW -2AD 1. Takeoff, Assembly and DAL Takeoff's were normal - assemblies were good, and all units left the coast on time and in good order. Briefed Time First Actual Assembly Assembly Combat For CP 1 Wings Takeoff Altitudes Time 1100 96th 0655 8,000 2:05 8,000 20th 1102 0904 1:53 8,000 2nd 0920 1105 1:45 14th 0925 8,000 1108 1:43 2. Navigation - Penetration The long route to landfall was well flown. Deviations in this route were few and for specific reasons; namely - (1) doglegs to control time of arrival at Control Point 2, (2) resulting maneuver to keep column in order, (3) a lateral displacement to avoid prop wash. The column made landfall in excellent order and well on course. b. Routes to the IP were as briefed. c. Routes to target were as briefed with the last group of the column being the only one to pass beyond the briefed IP and then by less than five miles. The target was attacked in the briefed order. 3. Bombing Analysis a. Bombing of Kiel was accomplished through 10/10 cloud by H2X equipment. There were no difficulties encountered on the bomb run. b. PRU photographs taken shortly after the attack show extensive damage in two large shipyards, the Kiel Naval Docks, and built-up areas of the city. c. This mission is an excellent example of perfect bombardier and mickey operator coordination. 4. Navigation - Withdrawal a. All rallies were as briefed except that of the 2nd Combat Ving. The leader of this unit went a little wide to allow the following groups to close. The immediate landfall following resulted in the 2nd Combat Wing being south of course by five miles.

Tactical Analysis of Mission 11 March 1945

b. From landfall out to the last leg before England, the courses of the first two wings in the column,96th and 20th, were excellent. The following two wings, 2nd and 15th, allowed the groups to disperse laterally to some extent. The 445th Group was farthest to the south on this leg over water.

c. On the last leg, all groups flew on course while letting down. Two groups did 360 degree turns to accomplish this.

d. Landfall at England was to be at Cromer. A number of groups, to save time, cut this point short. This point was set up to avoid flying over the diver area during poor visibility. Cutting this point short is not only sloppy navigation but dangerous to formations.

5. Fighter Support

a. Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, assigned the 4th, 479th, 361st and 355th Fighter Groups as close support to 2AD Bombers. The 56th Group was assigned as free lance support in the target area.

6. Enemy Action Encounters

a. There was no enemy reaction to this mission by enemy 4/C. There was one loss by Fighters. One 4/C, 479th Group, éngine failure over the Channel. The pilot was dead when picked up by Air/Sea Rescue.

b. Flak at the target was from light to moderate, inaccurate - and was of a barrage type.

7. Losses

a. There were no losses.

8. Scouting Force

a. Planning - The Scouting Force was to report penetration weather thirty minutes ahead of the Bombers, and target weather twenty minutes before target time.

b. Execution - The Scouting Force gave good reports and communications were good. Weather enroute was 10/10 low cloud. At the target the cloud cover was 10/10 low, 2 - 9/10 middle, tops 18,000 feet and 3/10 cirrus base 28,000 feet. Scouts advised instrument bombing. The return route was covered by 10/10 low clouds.

9. Screening Force

a. Planning - The Screening Force consisted of four Mosquitoes. The Screening Force was to R/V with the main force thirty minutes prior to the IP, fly with the main force to the IP, then pull ahead and fly through the target to the rally point, discharging chaff from the target minus five minutes and through the defenses.

b. Execution - The screening maneuver was executed according to plan.

10. Rodar

a. H2X Analysis

Group	A/C Dispatched	A/C Over Target	<u>OK</u> For Navigation	OK For Bombing	Remarks
389th 445th 453rd	4. 4. 4.	4 4 4	4 4 4	4	·

Tactical	Analysis of	Mission 11	March 1945		
44th	5	5	4	44	l equipment malfunction
392nd	4	4	4	44	
491st	4	4	4	44	
93rd	4	4	4	4	l equipment failure
446th	14	4	3	3	
448th	14	4	3	3	
458th 466th 467th	0 4 5 46	0 4 5 146	0 4 4일	0 4 <u>4</u> 42	l equipment malfunction

(1) H2X operation for this mission is considered very satisfactory. There were four set failures. These sets could be used neither for navigation nor bombing and were due to causes the H2X navigator could not correct. The 2nd Combat Wing had no set failures on this mission.

b. GEE operation was satisfactory. Slight ineffective jamming was reported on the Ruhr chain - with the Northeastern Carolina chain operating as far east as the Danish coast, with excellent fixes to 0700E.

11. Comments

a. All Wing Commanders should endeavor to cut down the length of time required for assembly. It is believed that no more than thirty minutes should be required after the last aircraft has reached assembly altitude. Improved efficiency during assembly will allow more bombs with a smaller gas load.

By command of Major General KEPNER:

FRANCIS H. GRISWOLD Brigadier General USA Chief of Staff


OFFICIAL:

ROBERT H. TERR Colonel GSC Dep C of S for Operations

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission.



Kiel Krupp Germania Submarine Pen Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	16						
Date:	18 Mar 45						
Mission #:	255						
Position #:	25						
Acft Type:	B-24JSH-20 FO						
Tail No:	44-48851						
Call Letter:	C-Charlie (MK- <u>C</u> +)		_				
Acft Name:	Un-named						
Target Type:	Armored Fighting Veh	icle Asser	nbly Plar	nt			
Target City:	Henningsdorf, Germar	ny / Tege	l, Germa	ny	Sent: 33	Lost: 0	
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position		
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		1st Lt	1st Pilot		
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot		
Freeman	George	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Navigator		
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier		
Durant	Merlin	(nmi)		T/Sgt	Engineer		
Cobb	Richard	М		T/Sgt	Radio Operator		
Volk	Albert	L		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	Left Waist Gunner	
Bergstrand	Richard	Н		S/Sgt	Right Waist Gunner		
Frantz	Anthony	Р		S/Sgt	Top Turret Gunn	er	
Yagley	Anthony	J		S/Sgt	Tail Turret Gui	nner	
Pohner	William	Н		2nd Lt	Pilotage Navigat	or	
Curran	William	J		2nd Lt	Radar Navigator		

SUNDAY, 18 MARCH 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 894:

1,329 bombers and 733 fighters are dispatched to hit railway stations and tanks plants in the Berlin area; the attacks are made both visually and with H2X radar; the Luftwaffe makes it's most concentrated and successful attacks with Me 262s to date; the AAF claims 21-1-5 Luftwaffe aircraft; 13 bombers (8 to flak) and 6 fighters are lost:

421 of 450 B-17s hit the Schlesischer rail station in Berlin; 13 hit the secondary target, Zehdnuk; and 1 hits Vechta, a target of opportunity; they claim 6-0-0 aircraft; 5 B-17s are lost, 8 damaged beyond repair and 268 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 18 WIA and 49 MIA. 179 of 199 P-51s escort; they claim 4-0-2 aircraft; 2 P-51s are lost.

495 of 530 B-17s hit the Nord rail station in Berlin; targets of opportunity are Ludwigslust (3) and other (3); they claim 1-1-1 aircraft; 7 B-17s are lost, 6 damaged beyond repair and 319 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 12 WIA and 79 MIA. Escorting are 219 of 238 P-51s; they claim 7-0-1 aircraft; 2 P-51s are lost.

347 B-24s are sent to hit the Tegel (225) and Henningsdorf (80) tank factories in Berlin; targets of opportunity are Oranienburg (9), Uelzen (9) and other (3); 1 B-24 is lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 127 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 1 WIA and 11 MIA. The escort is 254 P-51s; they claim 3-0-1 aircraft; 2 P-51s are lost.

Mission 895:

10 of 12 B-24s drop leaflets in France, the Netherlands and Germany during the night without loss.

Individual Mission Notes:

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Fifteenth Mission, Berlin, Germany
Gas load:: 2500
Time: 7:50
FIFTEENTH MISSION, BERLIN, GER.
                    March 18, 1945
     We hit the big time today.
We hit Berlin, it was the largest
day light raid made on this target.
Tere were over 1300 heavies and over
700 fighter plane escort.
      We really clobbered the tar-
      It was a tank and flak gun
get.
factory.
      The flak was moderate to
heavy and quite accurate.
We got a hole in the #3
engine 7" long and over 1" wide.
The pilot got the piece of flak.
I wouldN't want to go back too
badly,-but I am glad now that
I went.
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Personal note on mission #16 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 42x100 lb. AN-M41 Incendiary bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

•									
HEADQUARTERS 23 AIR DIVISION KE-S-4 APO 558									
373.2			29 March 1945						
SUBJECT: Tactical Analysis	of Mission 18 March 1	945 - F. O. 631.							
TO . : Commanding Genera	ls, All Combat Bomb Wi	ngs, This Divisi	on, APO 558.						
This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem necessary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of mission reports and information obtained from Combat Wings and Groups.									
BATTLE ORDER PRIMARY SECONDARY DISPATCHED TARGET									
96th CBW Berlin (V: 14th CBW "	is.) Berlin (H		84						
2nd CBi Hennigsdo	mp (Vie.) H	* 86 * 87	83						
20th CB/		" 87 " 87	07 8/						
	24D	347	332						
	1.0	447	83 84 334 421						
	3.D	528	509						
1. Takeoff and Assembly	×.								
a. Takeoff - Time:	•								
Combat First	: Actual Assembly	Briefed Time	Assembly						
Wing Taked		For CP 1	Time						
96th 075	6 12,000	0948	1:52						
14th 075		0951	1:54						
2nd 075	0 12,000	0954	2:04						
20th 075	5 12,000	0957	2:02						
b m b c d d c c c c d d c c c c d d c c c c d d c c c d d c c c d d c c c d d c d d c d d d d d d d d d d									

b. Takeoffs were without incident.

c. Assemblies - Normal - units departed on time. The 2nd and 20th Combat Wings made a small dogleg after Control Point i to achieve the briefed order and interval.

2. Navigation - Penetration

a. Landfall in was made at the briefed point on the Dutch coast - the Divison column was eleven minutes long here. The lead of the 20th Combat Wing was forced to dogleg over the North Sea to keep from over-running preceding units.

b. Units flew the briefed route from landfall to the Dunner Lake area; after completing the Dummer Lake dogleg - the 20th Wing did not turn enough and cut short the next point. All other units mode this point good.

c. Approaching the IP, the Division was troubled with clouds, have and dense persistent controlls, which in some cases made it impossible to keep visual contact between Wings.

d. The 456th and 458th Group of the 96th Combat Wings made the IP good. The 467th over-ran the IP by ten miles in an endeavor to avoid contrails made by Groups ahead. On the bomb run, the H2X of the 466th Group went out and as it was too late to make a visual run on the target the unit decided to turn off and look for a target of opportunity.

e. 11 Groups of the 14th Ming made good the IP and bombed on the briefed hecding.

Tactical Analysis of Mission 18 March 1945

f. The 2nd Combat wing was troubled by a group of stragghers from the 14th Wing. In an effort to stay out of contrails caused by these stragglers, the 389th swung wide at the IP. Persistent contrails caused the 445th and 453rd Groups to lose contact with the load; however, all Groups made the run as briefed.

g. Il Groups of the 20th Combat Wing made good the IP and made the briefed borb rus.

3. Bombing (malysis

n. The 96th Combat Wing (466th Group excepted) bonbed the primary, Berliy The 465th Group had difficulties on the bonb run - the Lead Squadron's H2X equipment went out and a visual run was not possible - the 2nd Squadron was to the extreme left of course - the 3rd Squadron's Lead Bonbardier picked up the primary visually, but the pilot turned off the run to maintain group integrity. All three Squadrons bombed targets of opportunity: Ulzen, Orandenberg, and Wittstock. The squadrons bombed targets of opportunity: Ulzen, Orandenberg, and Wittstock. The lead WC of both the Lead and the 2nd Squadron ware hit by flak on the bonb run, causing the bonbardier of the Lead Squadron to lose a sight of the aining point; the lead WC of 2nd Squadron was knocked out of formation; the deputy lead had the target in the sight, but was able to make only one course correction - damage results of the Lead and 2nd Squadron has not been definitely established. Damage results of the Javardon has not been definitely established. Damage results of the Lead and 2nd Squadron has not been definitely established. Damage results of the Lead and 2nd Squadron ware from good to excellent.

b. The 14th Combat wing bombed its primary, Berlin, by H2X equipment with some visual assistance. The HR Squadron of the 44th Group bombed the secondary by H2X. Heavy contrails, 3 - 9/10 clouds and intense flak were encountered on the bomb run. The damage results were from fair to excellent.

c. The 2nd Combat Wing bonbed its princry, Hennigsdorf by H2X with some visual assistance. Five A/C of the HR Squadron of the 389th Group released early on intermittent signal by RBR. The LL Squadron (because of clouds and contrails) bombed the secondary. The damage results for the Group were excellent. The 453rd Group bonbed the secondary target after the Lead Squadron had changed its HPI because of heavy bonb snoke. Excellent results on chosen MPI were achieved. The 445th, Lead Squadron, bonbed the secondary - LL and HR Squadrons bonbed the primary. The damage results for the Group were fair.

d. The 20th Combat Wing bombed both the secondary, Berlin, and the primary, Honnigsdorf. Bombing was done by H2X with some visual assistance. The 446th Group bombed the primary with poor results. The 448th Group bombed the secondary due to cloud coverage over the primary. Results were unobserved. The Lead Squadron of the 93rd Group bombed the primary with excellent damage results. The other two Squadrons bombed the secondary with poor damage results.

4. Navigation - Withdrawal

c. Clouds and contrails at flight altitude in the target area made rally almost impossible. The 458th Group lost its wing leader at the target and did not effect complete wing rally; however, rally was made with assorted units of various groups.

b. The 466th-Group cut short the rolly point and went on to bomb targets of opportunity at Ulzen and wittstock.

c. The 467th Group over-ran the rally point but made the next turning point.

d. The 14th Combat Wing swung wide at the rally but made the next point good - the Wing rallied without too much difficulty.

e. The 2nd Wing made its rolly as briefed.

- 2 -

Tactical Analysis of Mission 18 March 1945

f. The 446th and 448th Groups cut their rally short to avoid contrails but made good the next point on the route. The 93rd Group swung wide off the targot and joined the rest of the king at the point after the rally.

g. The route from rally point to landfall out was made generally as briefed. Contrails were still causing trouble and formations were spread out.

h. Landfall out was made at the briefed point by all but the 2nd Wing which came out slightly south of course. The Division column at this point was seventeen minutes in length.

5. Fighter Support

a. Four Fighter Groups flew close escort for 2.D Bonbers. The Mosquito Observer aircraft and the 96th Combat Wing were covered by the 479th A and B Groups The 14th, 2nd and 20th Combat Wings were covered respectively by the 4th A and B, 355th A and B and the 361st A and B Fighter Groups. Two other Fighter Groups were in the target area on free lance support to all 8th AF Bonbers.

6. Energy action Encountered

a. ...Jul88, darting in and out of the clouds, made two passes at a straggling B-24 in the vicinity of Ulzen. Each time P-51's from the 4th Group tried to intercept it but the aircraft ovaded by escaping into clouds. Members of the 4th Group believe this Jul88 was radar controlled. The B-24 was safely escorted to friendly territory where it landed at Brussels. Two other sightings of jet aircraft were made but no encounters ensued.

b. Flak at Berlin varied from light to moderate to intense - inaccurate to accurate.

7. Losses

c. One aircraft, 467th Group - Hit by M over Berlin - Seen to go down in flames - Two to five chutes seen.

b. One circraft, 467th Group - Hit by 1.4. over Berlin - Seen spiralling down - Approximately seven chutes seen.

8. Scouting Force

a. Plan - There was a possibility of scattered middle cloud, tops 18,000 feet, and scattered high cloud, bases 22,000 feet, along the route. It was planned to use a route force thirty minutes in advance of the Bonbers and a target force reporting weather at TOT minus twenty minutes. ... non-operational P-51 stood by for possible use over the Champel.

b. Execution -

(1) ... B-24 was used over the Channel in lieu of the P-51.

(2) Scouts furnished good weather information.

(3) No communications were maintained between the Scouts and the 96th and 20th Combat Wing Loaders due to R/T difficulties in the wing L/C. However, weather information was relayed and transmitted to all Combat Wings.

9. Screening Force

a. Plan - Four Mosquito ../C to fly the normal screening maneuver.

b. Execution -

(1) Division Leader was unable to establish R/T..contect with the

Tactical Analysis of Mission 18 March 1945

Screening Force and lost vigual contact upon entering the contrails and haze prior to the IP.

(2) Screening Force report executing the operation as planned.

(3) The 96th Wing (Lead) reported intense and inaccurate to accurate flak. The only two NYR 4/C were from the 2nd group over the target (467th Group).

10. Redar

a. H2X inalysis

Group	<u>./C</u> Dispatched	./C Over Trrget	<u>OK For</u> Navigation	OK For Bonbing	Renerks
389 t h	4	4	4	4	1 equipment malfunction
445th	4	4	3	3	
453rd	3	3	3	3	
44th	4	4	3	3	1 equipment multunotion
392nd	4	4	4	4	
491st	3	3	3	3	
93rd	4	4	4	4	1 equipment melfunction
446th	4	4	4	4	
448th	3	3	3	2	
458th 466th	5 4	5 4	4 2	4 2	l equipment malfunction l flak damage l equipment malfunction
467th	<u>4</u> 46	<u>3</u> 45	<u>3</u> 40	<u>3</u> 39	1 MLA

(1) H2X operation for this mission is considered unsatisfactory. Failures were due to mechanical causes and could not be corrected by the H2X navigator.

b. GEE operation for this mission was satisfactory. Pulse jaming was reported on both the Ruhr and Rheims chains - fixes were obtained as far east as 0930E.

By command of Major General KEPNER:

FR.NCIS H. GRISHOLD Brigadier General USA Chief of Staff

OFFICEL:

ROBERT H. TERRILL GSC Colonel Dep C of S for Operations

1 Incl: Incl 1 - Weather Summary

- 4 -

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission



Henningsdorf Tank Factory Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ©

Loss of a personal friend:

On 20 Mar 45 S/Sgt William D. West, Jr. of De Ridder, Louisiana was Killed In Action on a bombing mission to Heligoland Island. Willie was the left waist gunner on Capt. John W. Barker's crew.



Sgt Wiliam D. West, Jr. Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

March 20, 1945

W.D. West and his crew were shot down over Helgoland. It is the school where the Germans train their flak gunners. From some of the fellows who were on the mission, their ship had a direct hit on the left wing between No. 1 and 2 engines.

The plane then flipped over on its side and then went into a flat spin. Willie was flying the upper turret. That is why I am reasonably sure that he went down with the ship. I hope and pray that he is all right for Willie and I were more like brothers thanfriends. I never was so let down in life as when I was informed of this. My one hope is that he did bail out for 4 chutes were seen but that is only 1/3 of the crew. What really mad e me so stupified was the fact that he was over this morning about ten o-clock and we were planning on going to town to see "Winged Victory" but then they came and said they were going to put up a mission at 12:00 so we had to cancel it and planned to go later on in the week. God I wish this hadn't happened.

Heligoland Island was the Luftwaffe's anti-aircraft gunnery training center. The gunnery school trained all of the gun crews on visually sighted and radar controlled anti-aircraft guns. A pilot from the 700th Bomb Squadron, 1st Lt. Thomas Shafer once had a close encounter with the gunnery school.

On a previous mission to Heligoland the flak was so intense that they abandoned the mission and made a sharp left turn to return to England. Lt. Shafer reported that a 4-gun battery had been tracking his aircraft during the turn and he watched the bursts explode at his altitude, drawing ever closer to his plane. The first two explosions were 80 feet, then 40 feet from his aircraft and a third explosion was 40 feet away on the opposite side of the plane, but there was no fourth explosion.

Upon returning to Tibenham the crew discovered a 3.5-inch hole in the left wing between the fuselage and the #2 engine. The mystery of the missing explosion was solved – the round was a dud when it struck the plane between the fuselage and the #2 engine. Had it exploded on impact, the explosion of an 88mm round would have probably resulted in the detonation of the #2 engine fuel tank and the resulting explosion could have blown the entire left wing off the plane.

Indv Msn #:	17						
Date:	21 Mar 45	_					
Mission #:	258						
Position #:	25						
Acft Type:	B-24JSH-5 FO						
Tail No:	42-51547						
Call Letter:	B-Baker (MK- <u>B</u> +)						
Acft Name:	Un-named						
Target Type:	Achmer Me 262 Jet Fi	ghter Airf	ield				
Target City:	Achmer, Germany				Sent:	Lost:	
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position		
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		1st Lt	1st Pilot		
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot		
Freeman	George	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Navigator		
Curran	William	J		2nd Lt	Radar Navigator		
Pohner	William	Н		2nd Lt	Pilotage Navigato	or	
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier		
Durant	Merlin	(nmi)		T/Sgt	Engineer		
Cobb	Richard	М		T/Sgt	Radio Operator		
Kaufmann	Charles	F		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunner		
Rausch	Karl	Н		S/Sgt	Right Waist Guni	ner	
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret Gu	ınner	
Franz	Anthony	R		S/Sgt	Top Turret Gunn	er	

WEDNESDAY, 21 MARCH 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

5 missions are flown.

Mission 901:

Preparatory air operations for the forthcoming (23 Mar) crossing of the lower Rhine River by Allied ground forces begin. 1,408 bombers and 806 fighters, in conjunction with Ninth Air Force and RAF aircraft, attack jet fighter bases; with one exception, all attacks are visual; they claim 58-3-49 Luftwaffe aircraft; 7 B-17s and 9 P-51s are lost:

107 of 152 B-17s hit the secondary target, the tank factory at Plauen; targets of opportunity are Reichenbach (34) and other (1); they claim 3-3-3 aircraft; 5 B-17s are lost and 48 damaged. The escort is 273 of 314 P-51s; they claim 9-0-0 aircraft in the air and 3-0-0 on the ground; 3 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.

129 of 151 B-17s attack Hardorf Airfield; 14 others hit Vorden Airfield, a target of opportunity; 1 B-17 is lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 71 damaged. Escorting are 94 of 98 P-51s; they claim 0-0-2 aircraft in the air.

214 B-17s are sent to attack the airfields at Zwischenahn (57), Marx (77) and Wittmundhaafen (74); casualties for 1., 2. and 3. above are 7 WIA and 56 MIA. 108 of 109 P-51s escort and claim 2-0-8 aircraft on the ground; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA).

518 **B-24s are dispatched to hit airfields at** Ahlhorn (61), Hesepe (165), **Achmer (180)** and Mulheim Airfield at Essen (90); 21 B-24s are damaged. Escorting is 95 of 99 P-51s; they claim 35-0-30 aircraft on the ground; 3 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).

373 B-17s are sent to hit airfields at Hopsten (159 using Gee-H) and Rheine (180); targets of opportunity are the airfields at Hesepe (13) and Achmer (12); 1 B-17 is lost and 49 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 3 WIA and 9 MIA. 97 of 102 P-51s escort; they claim 6-0-0 aircraft on the ground.

Mission 902:

In a DISNEY operation, 3 B-17s attack the E-boat pens at Ijmuiden, the Netherlands with rocket bombs; 6 P-51s escort.

Mission 903:

1 B-17 bombs Oberursel in a Micro-H Mk II radar test; 4 P-51s escort.

Mission 904:

During the afternoon, 90 of 92 B-24s attack Mulheim Airfield at Essen; 60 are damaged and 1 airman is WIA.

Mission 905:

8 of 9 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands and Germany during the night.

Individual Mission Notes:

Sixteenth Mission, Achmer, Germany Gas load- 2300 Time: 3:45 SIXTEENTH MISSION, ACHMER, GERMANY March 21, 1945 We hit another Jet field today. It was about 10 miles north of Osnabruck. The target was visual and we really clobbered it. The mission was one of my easiest so far, it was only 6 hours long and their was very little flak and no fighters.

Personal note on mission #17 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 8x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs and 20x100 lb. AN-M41 Incendiary bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

373.2			kie "	A
SUBJECT: Tactic	al .nalysis of M	issions 21 March		rders 634 and 635.
TO : Comman	ding Generals,	11 Coribat Bomb Wi	ngs, This Divi	sion, .PO 558.
nocesscry. The	deductions and r	ed for your consi emarks made below obtained from Com	cro the result	ny action you deen ts of the study of Groups.
		F. 0. 634		
BITTLE ORDER	PRULRY	SECOLD	A/C DI3P.TCHED	I/C OVER T.RGET
- 20th CB/	Alhorn (Vis.) Hescoo	Osnabruck (H2X)	104	101
96th CB/ 14th CB/	18 18 18 18	13 NV 19 12	101 99.	99 97
2nd CB.	n n	""" """ 21D	$\frac{114}{413}$	$\frac{112}{409}$
• • •		F. 0. 635	1	
B.TTLE ORDER	PRELRY	SECOID. RI	/C DISP.TONED	./C OVER T.RGET
96th CB. 2nd CB.	Esson ./F (Vis.) None	18 20	17 20
20th CE. 14th CE.	и и п 17 a 11	14 13	22 <u>32</u> 92	22 31 90
•		<u>F. 0. 634</u>		•• • • •
1. Takeoff.		T.		

1. Takeoff, issenbly, and D.L a: Takeoff's were normal with units experiencing no weather difficulties. Group and Combat wing assemblies were from fair to good with some units reporting slow assemblies. The Division assembly was effected with the 96th Combat wing being two minutes late and being third in the Division column instead of second. An attempt was made by the 96th Combat Wing to secure proper position in The Division column at Control Point ..., but due to the large force, this was not effected and units remained in the order (20th - 14th - 96th - 2nd) at entry to the D.L. It should be noted that once a unit is in improper position on the D.L it should remain in that position and not attempt to remain its briefed position unless the success of the mission (uncovery at 14 etc) will be depardized by so doing.

		(41.00701) : 3 11	000	Je Jeophraizaa b	y so doing.
		First		Driefed Time For CP 1	ssenbly Time
•	20th 96th 14th 2n1	0621 0631 0615 0615	14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000	082 3 0826 0329 032	2:02 ¹ 1:55 ² 2:14 2:17

. . .

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2. <u>Navigation - Penetration</u>

a. Landfall at eachy coast was very good - all units being within four niles of the briefed point. Visibility was very good. Division column here was eleven minutes in length.

Tactical ... nalysis of Missions 21 March 1945

b. Route in to the IP was unobscured by clouds and visibility was good, riding navigators to stay within six miles of course.

c. Hancuver at IP was normal; some units were two to four miles south due to conflict enong Squadron formations while uncovering.

d. Bomb runs were made visually - navigation check points were good.

3. Bombing Analysis

c. Six Squadrons from the 20th Ving (h/dth and 446th - 3 each) were able to attack the airfield at "lhorn visually with excellent results. Hesepe was attacked by four Squadrons of the 93rd Group, eleven Squadrons from the 96th Ving and three Squadrons of the 392nd Group. The choice of fragmentation bombs, ordered by Eighth Air Force for this target, was an error. Units assigned to this target aid excellent bombing - with the correct bomb loads a return trip to this cirfield would not have been necessary. The remaining force of the 14th Ving (7 Squadrons) and all of the 2nd Combat Wing dealt ...chner a blow that will keep it unserviceable for some time. Results of the mission were excellent.

b. The excellent job done is an example of perfect coordination. This is again proof that performances of this caliber can be expected when there is careful coordination from planning through execution.

4. Navigation - Withdrewel

C. Rallies were normal for three wings; the 96th Combat Wing experienced difficulty in rallying because of interference from B-17's, and came out seven miles south of the rally point.

b. The route out to landfall showed excellent navigation, and all units adhered closely to course.

c. Landfall out was very good. .ll units were on course. The Division columnwas eighteen minutes in length.

5. Fighter Support

c. Headquarters, lighth hir Force assigned the following Fighter Groups as close support: the 4th and 353rd. These Groups gave escort on penetration and in the target area. It "bombs away" they strafed the target /D's.

6. Energ ... ction Encountered

c. There was no energy reaction to this effort. The Groups strafin; the 1/D's were covered by four Fighter Groups from other forces. The 353rd Group claims 12-0-4 jets, 9-0-15 s/e, and 5-0-1 t/e on ground at ..chmer/Eramsche 1/D, for loss of 5 NTR. 4th Group attempted to strafe Hesepe 1/D but the flak was too heavy - the Group then adjourned to ..chmer and helped 355rl Group for claims of 1-0-0 t/j, 4-0-4 t/e, and 4-0-4 s/e - the losses were 5 NTR.

b. Flak at the targets was weager, indocurate.

7. Losses

C. There were no losses.

8. Scoutin Force

c. Planning - Both route and target forces were planned for this mission. Some weather difficulties were expected enroute from low middle cloud. The target force was to report weather thirty-five minutes before target time because the primaries were to be attacked visually only. In event the primaries were not visual, decision had to be made prior to the LP to go to the secondary target.

- 2 -

Tactical Analysis of Missions 21 March 1945

b. Execution - No weather difficulties were encountered and all targets were attacked visually. The scouting forces functioned normally.

9. Jor aniu, Force

a. As none of our targets was heavily defended, no Screening Force was planned.

10. Reder

a. H2X .nalysis

Group	1/C Disprtched	1/C Over Ternot	<u>OK For</u> Navi <u>sation</u>	<u>OK For</u> Bombing	Rencrks
389th	2 *	2	1	1	l equipment malfunction
445th	4	3	2	2	l equipment malfunction
453rd	6	6	6	5	l equipment malfunction
44th	6	6	6	6	l equipment molfunction
392nd	.4	4	3	3	
491st	.3	3	3	3	
93rd	4	4	3	3	1 equipment melfunction
446th	4	4	3	3	1 equipment melfunction
448th	3	3	2	2	1 equipment melfunction
458th 466th 467th	6 3 <u>5</u> 50	6 3 5 49	6 3 <u>5</u> 43	5 3 <u>5</u> 41	l equipment malfunction

(1) Radar performance on this mission is considered unsatisfactory. Relfunctions were of such a nature that they could not be fixed by the operator in the air.

b. GEE performance on this mission is considered satisfactory. There was some jamming but in most instances operation was unrestricted.

(1) Of 484 GEE ./C disputched for the to dissions of this date, only nine failures occurred.

c. GH inclysis

Group	<u>/C</u> Dispatched	<u>OK For</u> Bonbin	Rear rks
389th 445th 453rl	2 1 3	2 1 2	Bonted visually - signals good. Boubed visually - signals fair. ./C in LL did not turn equipment on. Signals fair - all visual bombing.
44th 392nd		3 3	Lead, 44.th - no signals - others, signals fair - all visual bombing. Gingood - all bombing visual.
93rd	. 3	Unknown	Thequipment not utilized.
458th 466th 467th	1 2 2	I Unknown Unknown - 3	Signals good - visual bombing. GH e puipment not utilized. GH equipment not utilized.

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission.

Target Data:

© Luftwaffe Airfields 1935 - 1945 database, used with permission of Henry L. deZeng IV.

Achmer (GER) (a.k.a. Achmer-Bramsche) (52 22 30 N – 07 55 15 E)

General: Fliegerhorst (air station or air base) 15 km NW of Osnabrück in Lower Saxony in NW Germany, 5.2 km SW of Bramsche, 2.8 km S of Achmer village and just a few kilometers from the airfields at Hesepe and Vörden.

History: construction began in 1936 and was completed in 1939, with additions and improvements continuing to 1944. First use by a flying unit dates from August 1940 (10.(Erg.)/KG 2 with Do 17s). Achmer was essentially a bomber base until 1943 and then a fighter base after that.

Dimensions: approx. 2380 x 1370 meters (2600 x 1500 yards).

Surface and Runways: three camouflaged concrete runways in the form of a triangle measuring 1,800 meters plus a 550-meter prepared strip at one end, 1,700 meters and 1,550 meters. Along the center of the S boundary were 14 ladder-type paved servicing hardstands with refueling points. Equipped with runway, perimeter, and obstruction lighting as well as a visual Lorenz system for night landings.

Fuel and Ammunition: munitions dumps were on the S and N sides of the field.

Infrastructure: compass swing and machine gun registration range were available, 1 medium and 1 small workshop hangar and buildings along the NE boundary, station HQ, admin buildings and some barracks along the S boundary, flying control (Flugleitung) at the center of the S boundary, motor pool and garages at the NE corner, a barracks camp on the outskirts of Achmer village, and in 1941 a camp for Russian POWs was built on the NW side of the airfield. Additional barrack blocks were under construction 8 km NW of the airfield and in a woods 4.8 km to the N of the field. A branch rail line served the building area, the fuel dump, and the munitions dump.

Dispersal: there were 52 open aircraft shelters and 6 additional parking sites along the perimeter and in a remote dispersal area S of the airfield in December 1944.

Defenses: a heavy Flak position with 4 x 12.8-cm guns was set up on the Bramscher Berg in fall 1943 and there were at least 12 light Flak positions surrounding the airfield, including some in specially built Flak towers.

Satellites and Decoys: *Achmer-Wallenbrock* (GER) (52 21 45 N - 07 49 50 E). Dummy 6.5 km WSW of Achmer airfield and 2.5 km NW of Wallenbrock. Had a large mock landing area, 1 mock hangar and several fake buildings at SW corner. Phony aircraft were parked at the NW and SW corners. [Sources: AFHRA A5257A p.602 (15 Aug 44)]

Remarks:

- 18 Aug 42: bombed 1 x Bü 131 from IV./KG 2 destroyed.
- 28 Nov 43: Fl.H.Kdtr. reported total enlisted strength as 438 NCOs and 742 men.
- 21 Feb 44: heavily bombed by B-17 Fortresses and B-24 Liberators 1 x Ju 188 E-1 from 1./KG 2 destroyed on the ground and 1 x Fw 190A from II./JG 1 damaged.
- 08 Mar 44: low-level attack by U.S. fighters 6 x Do 217s from III./KG 2 destroyed (4) or damaged (2).
- 23 Mar 44: bombed by 21 B-24s.
- 08 Apr 44: bombed by 60 B-17s 9 x Do 217s from III./KG 2 destroyed
- (8) or damaged (1).
- 15 Apr 44: low-level attack 1 x Do 217M from III./KG 2 destroyed.
- 26 Sep 44: low-level attack by VIII Fighter Command P-51s claimed 1 x Fw 190 and 1 x He 177 destroyed, plus 2 x Fw 190s and 1 x unidentified aircraft damaged.
- 16 Feb 45: bombed 1 x Me 262 and 1 x Fw 190 damaged, several barracks and airfield installations hit, and several munitions bunkers also hit. (German report)
- 24 Feb 45: strafed by 8 P-47s 1 x Bf 109 destroyed. (German reports)
- 20/21 Mar 45: bombed by 180 B-24s and 12 B-17s and strafed by VIII Fighter Command P-51s


 18 x Ar 234s from III./KG 76 destroyed (10) or damaged (8), 19 x Bf 109s and 1 x He 111 destroyed, 2 x Me 262s, 18 x Bf 109s and 1 x Fw 190 damaged (according to German sources). The VIII Fighter Command P-51s claimed 9 x Bf 109s, 19 x Fw 190s, 11 x Ar 234s, 3 x He 111s, 2 x Ju 88s, 3 x Do 217s and 1 x unidentified aircraft destroyed, plus 6 x Bf 109s, 6 x Fw 190s, 10 x Ar 234s, 1 x Me 410, 1 x Ju 88, 3 x Ju 188s, 2 x Do 217s and 5 x unidentified aircraft damaged. Additionally, the runways and landing area were hard hit, and 2 hangars burned down.
 (445th Bomb Group Mission #258 38 B-24's dropped 304x500lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs and 760x100 lb. AN-M41 Incendiary bombs).
- 24 Mar 45: bombed by 73 B-17s no significant new damage. (German report)
- 11 Apr 45: RAF units began operating from Achmer.

Operational Units: II./KG 27 (Feb-Mar, Apr-May 40); Stab/KG 2 (Nov 41); 6./KG 2 (Apr-Jun 41); 7., 8./KG 2 (Jun 41 – Jan 42); 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr. 100 (Jun 43); Stab, 1.(F), 2.(F)/FAGr. 5 (Jun/Jul – Dec 43); Sturmstaffel 1 (Oct-Dec 43); III./KG 2 (01.44 – 06.44), Erprobungskdo. 25 (Sep 43 – Mar 44); III./KG 3 (Apr-May 44); Stab, II./KG 30 (Aug-Oct 44); III./JG 11 (Sep-Oct 44); Sonderstaffel Einhorn (Sep-Oct 44); Erprobungskdo. 262 (Sep 44); Kommando Nowotny (Sep-Nov 44); 12./JG 54 (Oct-Dec 44); IV./JG 27 (Nov 44 – Mar 45); Stab/Aufkl.Gr. 123 (Dec 44 – Mar 45); II./KG 51 (Jan 45); Stab, III./KG 76 (Jan 45); Gefechtsverband Kowalewski (26 Feb – 5 Apr 45).

Reserve Training & Replacement Units: IV./KG 2 (Aug 40 – Aug 42).

Station Commands: Fl.H.Kdtr. A(o) 19/XI (Apr 44 – Apr 45).

Station Units (on various dates – not complete): Werft-Abt.d.Lw.(o) 19/XI (spring 44 – Apr 45); le.Flak-Abt. 743 (1943-44); 3./le.Flak-Abt.871 (1943-44); le.Hei.Flak-Bttr. 75/XI (1943-45); Ldssch.Zug d.Lw.110/IV (Feb 44)?



Indv Msn #:	18							
Date:	22 Mar 45							
Mission #:	260							
Position #:	25							
Acft Type:	B-24JSH-5 FO							
Tail No:	42-51547							
Call Letter:	B-Baker (MK- <u>B</u> +)							
Acft Name:	Un-named							
Target Type:	Giebelstadt Airfield / V	Vürzburg	Industri	al Complex	ĸ			
Target City:	Giebelstadt, Germany				Sent: 33	Lost: 0		
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position			
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		1st Lt	1st Pilot			
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot			
Freeman	George	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Navigator			
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier			
Curran	William	J		2nd Lt	Radar Navigator			
Pohner	William	Н		2nd Lt	Pilotage Navigat	or		
Durant	Merlin	(nmi)		T/Sgt	Engineer			
Cobb	Richard	М		T/Sgt	Radio Operator	Radio Operator		
Kaufmann	Charles	F		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunn	er		
Rausch	Karl	Н		S/Sgt	Right Waist Gun	ner		
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret G	unner		
Franz	Anthony	R		S/Sgt	Top Turret Gunr	ner		

THURSDAY, 22 MARCH 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 906:

Air attacks in preparation for the lower Rhine River crossing by Allied ground forces continue; 1,331 bombers and 662 fighters attack barracks and military encampments in the Ruhr and airfields in Germany visually; they claim 27-1-12 Luftwaffe aircraft; 1 B-17 and 3 P-51s are lost:

99 of 114 B-17s hit Ahlhorn Airfield; 13 others hit the marshalling yard at Oldenburg, a target of opportunity; 1 B-17 is lost; 9 airmen are MIA. Escorting are 95 of 99 P-51s.

457 B-17s are sent to hit military camps at Bottrop (36), Dorsten (74), Barningholten (111), Westerholt (116), Feldhausen N (74) and S (39); 3 B-17s are damaged beyond repair and 111 damaged; 2 airmen are KIA and 8 WIA. The escort is 95 of 99 P-51s.

297 B-17s are sent to hit military camps at Hinsbeck (67), Geresheim (73), Ratingen (75) and Mulheim (74); 114 B-17s are damaged and 3 airmen are WIA. 48 P-51s escort; they claim 0-0-1 aircraft on the ground.

342 B-24s are dispatched to hit airfields at Kitzingen (168), **Giebelstadt (75)** and Schwab Hall (82); **8 others hit Würzburg, the secondary target**; 1 B-24 is damaged beyond repair and 1 damaged; 8 airmen are KIA. The escort is 138 of 153 P-51s; they claim 3-0-1 aircraft in the air and 13-0-7 on the ground.

109 of 113 B-17s hit the Rhein Main Airfield at Frankfurt; 31 B-17s are damaged. Escorting are 56 P-51s.

Mission 907:

9 of 10 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands and Germany.

Individual Mission Notes:

Seventeenth Mission, Giebelstadt, Ger. Gas load-2700 Time: 8:30 SEVENTEENTH MISSION, GIEBELSTADT, GERMANY March 22, 1945 We hit Giebelstadt, Germany to-da y We flew the low left again today. There was no flak at our target but off a little ways they shot up rockets. There were reported Bandits but none of them got into the bomber stream. The target was a runway at a Jet field. We had an excellant hit. The second the bombadier had in two days. March 23, 1945 Skully Wilson and his crew went down today. I am so hurt I can hardly think. I still miss Willy West and I keep looKing for him sort of subconciously. On Wilson's crew there were only 3 chutes seen.to come from the ship. That is the

> Personal note on mission #18 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

second Tucson crew this week.

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 8x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs and 20x100 lb. AN-M41 Incendiary bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

JUBJECT: Tactical ...nelysis of Mission 22 March 1945 - F. 0. 636.

TO : Commanding Generals, 11 Combat Bomb Wings, This Division, 1PO 558.

This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem necossary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of mission reports and information obtained from Combat Vings and Groups.

BATTLE ORDER	PRIA RY	SECONDARY	<u>/C</u> DISP.JCHED	1/C OVER T.RGET
14th CBi 2nd CBi 20th CBi 96th CBi	Schwabisch-Hall (Vis.) Giebelstadt " Kitzingen "	∵urzburg (Vis. Or H2X) """""" """"""" """"" 22,D	83 87 85 <u>87</u> 342	82 84 84 <u>85</u> 335

1. Takeoff, issembly and Dil

c. Takeoffs and assembly were accomplished without incident. Units left the coast on time and in good order.

Combat	First Actual	ssembly	Briefed Time	Assembly
Wing	Takeoff		For CP 1	Time
14th	0755	8,000	0945	1:50
2nd	0800	9,000	0948	1:48
20 th	0811	8,000	0951	1:40
96th	0759	8,000	0954	1:55

2. Navigation - Penetration

a. ...ll units penetrated in good order from the coast of England to the target. Routes were flown exactly as briefed. Times were slightly slow due to a decrease of wind velocity.

3. Bombing inclysis

c. All bombing was visual. The 2nd Combat ming bombed its primary, the airfield at Giobelstadt. The damage results were excellent with damage done to runways, hangars, and AC, and repair shops. The only difficulties that were experienced were: haze over the target, and the HR of the 445th being unable to drop bombs on the primary because the LL Squadron was underneath it at the time for bombs away. The HR, 445th, bombed the secondary, Murzburg, with excellent damage results.

b. The 14th Combat Wing bombed its primary, Schwabisch-Hall, with excellent damage results. Haze and heavy bomb smoke were difficulties experienced on the bomb run. Runways, hangars and repair shops received considerable damage.

c. The 20th Combat Wing, boubing its primary Kitzengen, had from very good to excellent damage results. Four Squadrons were assigned an area target - the other Squadrons damaged gun emplacements, ../C, repair shops, and large hangars. The 96th Combat Wing bombed the same target, Kitzengen, with damage results being fair to excellent.

d. Letual bombing altitudes ranged from 13,200 - 16,500 feet - the briefed bombing altitude was 15,000 feet.

- 4. Navigation Withdrawal
 - a. The route flown by the 14th Combat Wing, leading the Division,

Tactical Analysis of Mission 22 March 1945

on withdrawal was excellent. The 2nd Combat Wing, next in column, had two Groups about ten miles north of course while withdrawing through the front line flak dedenses on the way out but returned to course at 0730E. From there out, the route was slightly south of course, being ten miles off at landfall. Next in the column, the 20th Combat Wing was well on course until 1446 where it deviated to avoid coast out as briefed due to an enemy position there. The entire Wing followed. The 96th Combat Wing, last in the column, was within three miles of course on the way out to Landfall.

b. The deviation from route, as explained by the 93rd Group leading the 20th Combat Ving, from a anvigational standpoint, spoiled as nearly a perfect mission as the 2nd Division has ever flown. Decisions to alter briefed routes are justified to avoid weather to attack secondary or last resort targets, or to avoid interference with other friendly formations, only. Other decisions to alter briefed routes in the dir are based on insufficient knowledge of the situation and are not justified.

5. Fighter Support

a. Three Fighter Groups were assigned as close escort to 2d ir Division Bonbers. The 55th μ and B Groups covered the 14th Combat Wing, the 78th μ and B covered the 2nd Combat Wing and the 355th μ and B covered the 20th and 96th Wings respectively. No free lance support was available due to the fact that Eighth ir force Fighters were also being used to escort the R.F and the 15th ir Force.

6. Energy Action Encountered

a. Fighters report sighting several Me262's attempting to attack Bombers but warded off their attack. The 55th Group intercepted two single 262's, making passes; claining one damaged. The 78th Group sighted several 262's and an Me163 near the Bomber IP but drove them off, destroying one. 2d .ir Division Bombers reported no sighting of enemy aircraft so apparently Fighter escort was doing a good job. The 4th Group of the 65th Fighter Wing, escorting 15th .ir Force B-17's caught 15 F.190's forming up over Furstenwalde ./D with claims of 11-1-3 for no loss. The 355th Group in strafing attacks claimed 12-0-9 for the loss of one ./C.

b. No flak was experienced at the targets.

- 7. Losses
 - a. There were no losses.
- 8. Scouting Force

a. Planning - The normal target and penetration forces were planned; however, the target force was to report target weather forty-five minutes early to allow units to let down and bomb from 15,000 feet if visual conditions existed.

b. Execution - No weather difficulties were encountered.

9. Screening Force

a. A screening force was not planned as the targets were fink free.

10. Radar

a. H2X malysis

Group	/C Dispatched	./C Over Target	OK For Navigation	OK For Bombing	Renarks
389th	3	3	3	3	l non-effective
445th	4	3		2	l equipment malfunction

453rd	4	4	3	3	1 equipment malfunction
44th	4	4	4	4	
392nd	4		4.	4	
491st	ż	. 3	3	3	
93rd	42	4 2	3 2	3 2	1 equipment mulfunction
446th	2	2	2	2	• •
448th	4	4	4	4	
	-	•		•	
458th	4	4	4	4	: .
467th	4	ů.	ż	ż	1 equipment melfunction
466th	4	4	Ĩ.	й Г	
	<u>4</u> 44	43	3 4 39	3 <u>4</u> 39	
b. was reported	OUT SET f GEE perf on the R chain wer	cilures w ormance o uhr and R e obtaine	hich coul n this ni heins chu d past 09	d not be ; ssion is (ins. but (n is considered satisfactory. repaired in the air. considered satisfactory. Januing operation was unrestricted. Fixes c GEE failures out of a total of
b. Was reported on the Sacr 338 GEE i/C a 11. <u>Corr</u>	our set f GEE perf on the R chain wer lispatche ments	cilures w ormance o uhr and R e obtaine d were re	hich coul on this ni theins cha d past 09 ported.	d not be ; ssion is ; ins, but ; OOE. Four	repaired in the air. considered satisfactory. Janning operation was unrestricted. Fixes of GEE failures out of a total of
b. Was reported on the Sacr 338 GEE 1/C of 11. Corr C. b. ing the Divis	our set f GEE perf on the R chain wer lispatche <u>ments</u> This was The supersion, is d	cilures w ormance o uhr and R e obtaine d were re a were re cn outst rior navi, deserving	hich coul on this mi theims cha d past 09 ported. anding day gation on	d not be ; ssion is ; ins, but ; OOE. Four y in the h this miss	repaired in the air. considered satisfactory. Jaming
b. was reported on the Sacr 338 GEE 1/C of 11. Corn a. b.	our set f GEE perf on the R chain wer lispatched ments This was This was The super sion, is d	cilures w ormance o uhr and R e obtaine d were re an outst rior navi, leserving gation.	hich coul on this mi theims cha d past 09 ported. anding day gation on of high p	d not be ; ssion is ; ins, but ; OOE. Four y in the h this miss	repaired in the air. considered satisfactory. Jaming operation was unrestricted. Fixes of GEE failures out of a total of distory of 2d .ir Division banbing sion by the 14th Combat Wing, lead the 96th Combat Wing also did an
b. was reported on the Saar 338 GEE i/C o 11. <u>Corn</u> a. b. ing the Divis	our set f GEE perf on the R chain wer lispatched ments This was This was The super sion, is d	cilures w ormance o uhr and R e obtaine d were re an outst rior navi, leserving gation.	hich coul on this mi theims cha d past 09 ported. anding day gation on of high p	d not be ; ssion is ; ins, but ; OOE. Four y in the ! this miss precise.]	repaired in the air. considered satisfactory. Jaming operation was unrestricted. Fixes of GEE failures out of a total of distory of 2d .ir Division banbing sion by the 14th Combat Wing, lead the 96th Combat Wing also did an

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission.

Target Data:

© Luftwaffe Airfields 1935 - 1945 database, used with permission of Henry L. deZeng IV.

Giebelstadt (GER)

(49 39 10 N - 09 58 30 E)

General: *Fliegerhorst* (airfield) in Bavaria 15 km S of Würzburg and 1.6 km E of the village of Giebelstadt.

History: construction began in late summer 1934 and was completed June 1935. The infrastructure, especially the housing area, was designed to reflect a so-called "Luftwaffe Modern" style and on completion the base was considered one of the most attractive in Germany. Officially designated a Luftwaffe Fliegerhorstkommandantur by fall 1935. Hitler visited the airfield on 17 September 1936. From June 1940 to 1944, Giebelstadt was used by the Ergänzungsgruppe (reserve training group) of several bomber units and briefly by other units that arrived to rest and refit or to convert from one type of aircraft to another. In 1944 Giebelstadt was selected as an active base for jet aircraft and a great deal of hurried construction took place.

Dimensions: approx. 915 x 915 meters (1,000 x 1,000 yards).

Runway: had one 2,500-meter concrete runway just completed (Sep 44) and a paved taxiway. A 600meter runway extension was under construction. Starting platforms have been built along the E and W boundaries at the N end of the runway. Obstruction lighting, flare path, beam approach and visual Lorenz for night landings.

Infrastructure: multiple refueling points, munitions dump and communications facilities. One very large, 5 large and 1 medium hangar in three clusters on the N and E boundaries and at the SE corner, all with paved aprons. Additional workshop buildings around the hangars. The very large hangar was probably for repairs. Station HQ, flight control and supply buildings located on the N side of the field among the hangars. Barracks, quarters, messes, and canteens/clubs were in a wooded area at the NE corner. A single- track branch rail line was run to the airfield.

Dispersal: two remote areas to the N and E of the field were under construction in Sep 44.

Defenses: Flak positions were located about 1 km off the N boundary and at the SW corner.

Remarks:

- 09 Aug 44: low-level attack by VIII Fighter Command P-51s claimed 5 x Bf 109s, 5 x Bf 110s and 4 x Me 210s destroyed, plus 10 x Bf 110s, 1 x Me 210 and 1 x Fw 200 damaged.
- 09 Sep 44: bombed by 112 B-17 Fortresses.
- 03 Oct 44: bombed by 49 B-17s.
- 06 Jan 45: low-level attack by VIII Fighter Command P-51s claimed 9 x Ju 88s, 2 x Do 217s and 3 x unidentified aircraft destroyed.
- 13 Jan 45: low-level attack by VIII Fighter Command P-51s claimed 1 x Me 262, 1 x Ju 88 and 1 x Do 217 destroyed, plus 1 x Ju 88 damaged.
- 16 Jan 45: low-level attack 1 x Me 262 A-1 from II./KG(J) 54 destroyed on the ground.
- 06 Feb 45: low-level attack by 9th AAF P-47 fighter-bombers 1 x Fw 190 from I./KG(J) 54 damaged.
- 11 Feb 45: low-level attack by 9th AAF P-47 fighter-bombers 1 x Fw 190 claimed destroyed.
- 20 Feb 45: low-level attack by VIII Fighter Command P-51s 1 x Me 262 A-1 from I./KG(J) 54 damaged and 1 x He 177 damaged. (German report). The Allied fighters claimed 2 x Bf 109s and 1 x Ju 88 destroyed.
- 21 Feb 45: low-level attack by approx. 11 P-51s 1 x Me 262 A-1 and 1 x Bü 181 C-3 from I./KG(J) 54 destroyed or damaged. (German report)
- 23 Feb 45: low-level attack by VIII Fighter Command P-51s claimed 1 x He 177 destroyed and another damaged.

- 25 Feb 45: bombed by 96 B-24 Liberators 4 Me 262 A-1s and 2 x Bü 181 C-3s from I./KG(J) 54 destroyed or damaged; 1 KIA and 2 WIA.
- 19 Mar 45: low-level attack by approx. 8 P-51s 3 x Me 262 A-1 from KG(J) 54 destroyed or damaged. (German report)
- 21 Mar 45: strafed by 36 P-51 Mustangs German accounts state there was little damage aside from a single Me 262 shot down while attempting to land.
- 22 Mar 45: bombed by 75 B-24s 11 x Me 262 A-1s and 2 x Bf 109s from KG(J) 54 destroyed or damaged plus 2 x Ju 88s destroyed; runway and the western third of the landing area heavily cratered; Me 262 operations no longer possible. (German report) (445th Bomb Group Mission #260 20 of 28 B-24's dropped 160x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs and 400x100 lb. AN-M41 Incendiary bombs).
- 01 Apr 45: airfield taken by elements of the U.S. 12th Armored Div. The landing area was heavily cratered, and many buildings had been destroyed.

Operational Units: *Fliegergruppe* (Aviator Group) Giebelstadt (Oct 35 – Apr 36); I./KG 155 (Apr 36 – Feb 38); III./KG 355 (Jul 38 – May 39); III./KG 53 (May 39 – Feb 40); I./KG 2 (Feb-May 40); I./KG 76 (Oct 40 – Mar 41); /KG 1 (Jun 41); Stab, I./KG 77 (Dec 41 – Jan 42); II./KG 76 (Apr-May 42); III./KG 100 (Aug-Sep 44); Stab and I./KG(J) 54 (Aug 44 – Mar 45); Stab, I./KG 51 (Mar 45).


School Units: Verkehrsfliegerschule (Commercial Aviation School) Giebelstadt (Jun-Sep 35).

Reserve Training & Replacement Units: Schulstaffel/KG 53 (Jun – Sep 40); IV./KG 76 (Apr 41 – Sep 42); IV./KG 100 (May 43 – Sep 44)?;

Station Commands: Fl.H.Kdtr. L Giebelstadt (1940); Fl.H.Kdtr. A(o) 10/XII (Apr-Jun 44); Fl.H.Kdtr. A(o) 26/VII (Jun 44 – Apr 45).

Kommandant (mainly prior to the establishment of numbered station commands – not complete): Obstlt. Heinrich Christenn (? - ?) 9/39; Oberst Johann Gehfink (? - Aug 43) 3/43; Obstlt. Georg Kugel (Aug 43 - ?).

Station Units (on various dates – not complete): Stab/2. Fliegerdivision (Sep 44); Koflug Giebelstadt (Jul 39 – c.Aug 40); 8.Flugh.Betr.Kp./KG 53; Werft-Abt. (v) 117/XII (1944-45); schw.Feldwerft-Abt. V/30 (Mar 45); 118. Flugh.Betr.Kp. (Qu) (Sep 44); 129. Flugh.Betr.Kp. (Qu) (Sep 44); 136. Flugh.Betr.Kp. (Qu) (Sep ; 3. Flugh.Betr.Kp. (S) (Sep 44); 4. Flugh.Betr.Kp. (S) (Sep 44); Flugh.Betr.Kp. (FK) 3 (Sep 44); Lufttorpedo-Betr.Kp. 2 (Sep 44); Lufttorpedo-Betr.Kp. 7 (Sep 44); Lufttorpedo-Betr.Kp. 8 (Sep 44); Lufttorpedo-Betr.Kp. 9 (Sep 44); D 1 R – Nachschublager d.Lw. 1/XII (1944-45); Lw.-Bau-Btl. 6/XIII (Apr 40); Startbahnbauzug 1 (summer 44); E-Hafen-Ausrüstungs-Kolonne (mot) Giebelstadt.



Giebelstadt Airfield – circles indicate Me 262 jet fighters Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration C

Indv Msn #:	19						
Date:	24 Mar 45						
Mission #:	262						
Position #:	13						
Acft Type:	B-24J-5 FO						
Tail No:	42-50811						
Call Letter:	E-Easy (RN-E)						
Acft Name:	Patty Girl						
Target Type:	Supply Drop for the Ju	ump Acro	ss the Rl	nine			
Target City:	Wesel, Germany				Sent: 27	Lost: 2	
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position	Position	
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		1st Lt	1st Pilot		
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot		
Freeman	George	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Navigator		
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier		
Pohner	William	Н		2nd Lt	Pilotage Navigat	or	
Durant	Merlin	(nmi)		T/Sgt	Engineer		
Cobb	Richard	М		S/Sgt	Radio Operator		
Rausch	Karl	Н		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	er	
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret Gu	unner	
Franz	Anthony	R		S/Sgt	Top Turret Gunn	er	

SATURDAY, 24 MARCH 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) AIRBORNE OPERATIONS (IX Troop Carrier Command):

2,000+ transports and gliders drop and land the British 6th Airborne and US 17th Airborne Divisions (plus artillery, vehicles, ammunition, and other supplies) E of the Rhine River N and NW of Wessel as the British Second and US Ninth Armies cross the river to the NW and SE.

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 911:

In conjunction with the allied ground forces assault across the lower Rhine River (Operation VARSITY) the Eighth flies bombing, supply, and armed reconnaissance missions; during the day, 1,749 bomber sorties and 1,375 fighter sorties are flown to attack airfields visually in W and NW Germany in the morning and afternoon and drop supplies to US and British troops at midday; they claim 54-0-6 Luftwaffe aircraft; 19 bombers and 9 fighters are lost.

175 of 179 B-17s bomb Vechta Airfield in the morning; 1 hit Rheine Airfield, a target of opportunity; 1 B-17 is lost; 1 airman is WIA and 9 MIA.

527 B-17s are sent to hit Steenwijk (114), Zwischenahn (74), Varel (88), Varrelbusch (113) and Plantlunne (13) Airfields in the morning; targets of opportunity are Wittmundhaafen Airfield (13) and other (2); 1 B-17 is lost and 2 damaged; 1 airman is KIA and 9 MIA.

294 B-17s are dispatched to hit Rheine (36), Hopsten (62), Vechtel at Furstenau (72), Achmer (73) and Hesepe (36) Airfields in the morning; 1 other hit a target of opportunity; they claim 1-0-0 aircraft; 3 B-17s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 100 damaged; 8 airmen are KIA, 5 WIA and 28 MIA.

All 58 B-24s hit Nordhorn Airfield without loss.

The 4 forces above have 1,158 P-47s and P-51s flying area support; they claim 53-0-2 aircraft in the air and 0-0-4 on the ground; 9 P-51s are lost (8 pilots MIA).

At midday, 240 **B-24s are sent to drop supplies in the US (122)** and British (118) **assault areas flying at 150 to 250-feet**; 14 B-24s are lost (mostly to small arms fire), 4 damaged beyond repair and 103 damaged; 5 airmen are KIA, 30 WIA and 116 MIA.

182 B-24s are sent to hit Stormede (96) and Kirtorf (65) Airfields in the afternoon; 9 hit Ziegenhain Airfield, the secondary, and 11 hit the Treysa marshalling yard, a target of opportunity; 16 B-24s are damaged.

114 B-17s are sent to hit Ziegenhain Airfield (104) in the afternoon; 6 others hit Siegen marshalling yard, the secondary; 2 B-17s are damaged.

152 of 153 B-17s hit Enschede Airfield at Twente; 20 B-17s are damaged.

The 3 forces above are escorted by 95 P-47s and P-51s without loss.

Mission 912:

10 of 12 B-24s drop leaflets in Germany and the Netherlands during the night and 24 B-24s fly CARPETBAGGER missions over Scandinavia.

Individual Mission Notes:

Eighteenth Mission, Wesel, Germany

Gas load: 2300

Time : 5:45

EIGHTEENTH MISSION, WESEL, GERMANY

March 24, 1945

We went on a special type of mission today. We dropped supplies to the Airborne Infantry and also the Paratroopers. They were supposed to establish a bridge head over the Rhine and then start the final drive to end this war. We went in at about 200' to 500' and at an air speed of only 135 M.P.H. then we nosed down and picked up our speed to over 200 M.P.H. and got out there in a hurry. We caught some ground fire but we didn't get any holes. Our wing ships did though.

We lost two crews today. One was another lead crew, and Otto Del Pero was a crew member. He, Willy West and I were very close buddies and Del was my bunk mate in the other barracks. The other crew came over with us and trained with us in Tucson. It was the third Tucson crew to go down this week. They never had a chance to get out for we were too close to the ground to bail out. So far we have lost about 70% of the fellows who came over with us. We dropped our bundles about 2 miles north of Wesel, Germany

> Personal note on mission #19 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried assorted supplies of ammunition, food, medical supplies and fuel that were air dropped to the American airborne troops who jumped just ahead of the bombers.

Tactical Mission Report:

SUBJECT: Tactical Report of Operation VARSITT - 24 March 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Righth Air Porce, AFO 634.

SUMMARY OF OPERATION

- 1. Data
 - a. Date of Mission 24 March 1945.

b. Primary Targets and Order of Battle -

2nd CBW (445th - 3 Sqdns, 389th - 3 Sqdns, 453rd - 3 Sqdns) SDP-W 14th ▲ CBW (44th - 2 Sqdns, 44th - 1 Sqdn, 392nd - Sqdn) SDP-W 14th B CBW (491st - 2 Sqdns, 491st - 1 Sqdn, 392nd - 1 Sqdn) SDP-B 20th CBW (93rd - 3 Sqdns, 446th - 3 Sqdns, 448th - 3 Sqdns) SDP-B

- c. Secondary and Last Resort Targets None.
- 2. Narrative

a. Planning

(1) First warning of this operation was received 9 March when Eighth Air Force called and stated that the 2d Air Division would be required to furnish 240 A/C for an airborne re-supply mission in the near future. Half of the force was to carry British supplies and the other half American supplies. Decision was made to use the 2nd, 14th and 20th Combat Wings with a force of 80 A/C each, the load to be distributed as follows:

2nd Combat Wing	80 Aircraft	imerican Load
14th Combat Wing 14th Combat Wing	40 Aircraft 40 Aircraft	American Load British Load
20th Combat Wing	80 Aircraft	British Load

Later on during the day, the Director of Intelligence was given the probable area of drop, namely, between Wesel and Emmerich, and ten miles to the east.

(2) On 14 March, the Director of Operations attended a meeting at Eighth Air Force, where General Rubank and Colonel De Russy presented briefly the tactical plan of the airborne operation. Essential factors governing the operation were that the first drop would be made between 1000 and 1500 hours; the Troop Carrier mission would involve about 1500 aircraft and would be two hours and fortytwo minutes in length; the 2d Air Division was to follow fifteen minutes after the last unit in the Troop Carrier column. The offensive role of the RAF, Eighth Air Force, 9th Air Force and 2d TAF on D-Day and the days preceding were briefly gone into. An overlay of the two targets for the 2d Division was received at this meeting, showing the American and British supply dropping zones. The drop would be made between 300 and 500 feet with forces turning 180 degrees and withdrwing immediately after dropping. A copy of 9th Troop Carrier Command's practice mission "Token", planned for 16 March, which was essentially the same as "Varity" in every detail, with the exception of the route from a point south of Brussels, was obtained. On the basis of the information received up to this point, a tentative tactical plan for this Division was set up, using a run which passed through both targets, roughly south to north, with a left hand turn for withdrewal. This plan was based on the following: an easily identifiable run, parallel to the Ehime for some distance, the avoidance of Wesel, and a minimum amount of time over enexy territory.

(3) On 16 March, lead crows from the 2nd, 14th and 20th Combat Wings

Tactical Report of Operation, VARSITY, 24 March 1945

were set up to take part in the practice mission "Token" which was, however, delayed until 17 March due to weather. This mission, although successful for practice in low level navigation, was unsuccessful from the standpoint of reception and identifloation of redic and visual aids placed along the route. One buncher at the French coast, several of the pundits and a yellow anoke column were the only aids identified. The drop areas were successfully identified. No conflict was experienced with the Troop Carrier column ahead.

(4) On 17 March, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and three of his Staff attended a meeting at the 2d Tactical Air Force, where representatives of all agencies involved in the operation were present. A complete agenda covering all questions concerning the operation was gone over and the tactical plan, date and zero hour were made firm. At this time, our forces were committed to follow the same route as the Troop Carrier column to avoid conflict and to turn right after our target in order to take advantage of the counter-measures in the target area. 9th Troop Carrier Command's Field Order No. 5 for "Varsity" classified Top Secret, was received at this Headquarters on 17 March. Distribution was not made to the Wings at this time.

(5) The Division tactical plan was then revised to follow the route of the Troop Carrier Command. The route started at Folkstone with the Division Assembly Line being between buncher 31 and Neumarket. The route after the target was then followed back to the point just south of Brussels where the plan was departed from to withdraw directly to Ostend and then to bases. Aircraft in trouble were to land at B-53 and those in doubtful condition to follow the Troop Carrier route home across the marrow Channel gap. There was quite a difference of opinion on the relative merits of a right or left turn off the target on the basis of expected ground fire.

(6) On 19-March, the Combat Wing Commaniers were briefed on the plan and given a copy of the 2AD Field Order for "Varsity". Only one additional aid was requested, that being the SCS-51 set located at the IP and beamed on the northern target. The force was to fly as a continuous column with the **2500**t units dropping in the northern some first and the southern some second. This necessarily made the order of Wings, 20th, 14th and 2nd. It was decided to fly nine ship Squadrons due to the flatness and flexibility of this type of formation. Drop was to be made between 300 and 500 feet at an air speed not to exceed 150 miles per hour.

(7) On 22 March, word was received from the 1st Allied Airborne Army that all 2d Air Division units would have to turn right to fit into the over-all tactical plan which had already been set up. This changed the order to 2nd, 14th and 20th since the southern target would have to be hit first. 2d Air Division Field Order 638 covering Flan "Varsity" was mimeographed and and distributed to the Groups and Wings that same evening.

(8) A normal bombing mission was run the morning of the 23rd but the forces were down by 1214 hours. Loading was started at 1430 on the basis of a good weather forecast. Word was received at 1700 hours by phone that the operation would go ahead as scheduled. Confirmation by TWX of the date and time were received at 2025 from the 1st Allied Airborne Army Headquarters.

(9) Final routes and timings were sent out along with communication details, fighter support and amendments to the Field Order. The weather was forecast as being practically CAVU all the way, and the assembly altitude of 3,000 feet was allowed to stand. At 0050 hours, 24 March, the plan was down-graded to Secret by verbal authority of Eighth Air Force.

b. Execution

(1) Assemblies were normal and accompliabed without difficulty or interference. Units departed the coast in proper order and flow the route to the IP as briefed with the exception of small doglegs by individual units to maintain proper interval.

Tactical Report of Operation, VARSITY, 24 March 1945

(2) Word was received from the Mosquito Obsrver that the Carrier column was on time and the mission would run as briefed. The weather was CAVU until approximately thirty miles from the IP when the hase increased considerably, lowering the visibility to a mile in certain areas.

(3) The IP was made good by all units, the altitude at this point averaging around 500 feet. On approach to the Rhine, the base became very bad, causing Squadrons to lose sight of one another, even though only one-half mile to a mile in trail. Buncher reception was poor but the pundits and amoke columns were plainly visible. The SCS-51 beamed on the northern target worked very well.

3. Dropping Tactics and Results

a. All dropping was accomplished visually.

b. Briefed times for the dropping of the supplies were: 1304 - 1310; actual dropping of supplies occurred between 1310 - 13302.

o. Units generally dropped the supplies from an altitude of 300 feet and at an indicated air speed of 145 miles per hour. No trouble was experienced in maintaining this speed or on the release of any of the loads.

d. One hundred per cent of the American loads were dropped in the target area with two Squadrons of the 389th Group making a second run to achieve this score. In the northern area, approximately eighty-six per cent of the load was dropped in the area with an additional ten per cent of it being so close that it was easily retrievable. Only three aircraft out of the whole force dropped short of the Rhine due to mechanical troubles or personnel errors.

4. Anti-Airoraft Gunfire

a. Practically no opposition was encountered prior to the supplies being dropped, but all formations were engaged during withdrawal by spasmodic small arms fire and very measur automatic weapons fire. Wuch of this fire came from the woods north of Wesel and from the vicinity of Wesel itself. A number of machine guns mounted on trucks also engaged our aircraft.

b. A total of fifteen aircraft were lost during this operation, seven due to either automatic weapons or small arms fire and eight to unknown causes. It is probable that some of the eight aircraft, about which nothing is known, were in fact shot down by small arms fire, although at least one of these is believed to have hit a mast.

5. Energy Aircreft Encountered and Fighter Support

a. No encay aircraft were encountered on this operation and fighters maintained good area support.

6. Losses and Claims

a. Seven aircraft were lost due to either automatic weapons or small arms fire and eight aircraft lost due to unknown causes.

b. Claims were mil.

Image courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were two losses on this mission:
 - MACR #13545; Aircraft: 42-50620, Name: "Ten Gun Dottie"; 1st Pilot: 1st Lt. Schultz; Casualties: 9 KIA; Reason For Loss: Hit by ground fire, left wing came off and aircraft exploded on ground contact.
 - MACR #13516; Aircraft: 42-51245, Name: Un-named; 1st Pilot: 1st Lt. Strickland; Casualties: 10 KIA; Reason For Loss: Pilot and Co-Pilot struck by ground fire and collapsed over control yoke causing the aircraft to pitch over and dive into the ground.

The following picture is of S/Sgt Otto Del Pero who was a close friend of S/Sgt Yagley. Otto was the left waist gunner onboard the deputy lead aircraft flown by 1st Lt. Jennis Strickland with Lt Col Carl Fleming flying as co-pilot. As their aircraft approached the drop zone of the American paratroopers their aircraft, flying at 140 MPH only 150 ft. above the ground, came under fire from German troops. Both Strickland and Fleming were killed instantly, and the B-24 pitched over and flew into the ground. The action happened very quickly and there wasn't sufficient time or altitude for any of the crew to bail out.



S/Sgt Otto Del Pero Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



Wesel Supply Drop – $453^{\rm rd}$ BG aircraft dropping supplies from 150 ft. Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration \odot

Indv Msn #:	20						
Date:	30 Mar 45						
Mission #:	265						
Position #:	25						
Acft Type:	B-24JSH-5 FO						
Tail No:	42-51547						
Call Letter:	B-Baker (MK- <u>B</u> +)						
Acft Name:	Un-named						
Target Type:	Sub Pens, Docks and I	Port Area					
Target City:	Wilhelmshaven, Germa	any			Sent: 33	Lost:	0
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position		
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		1st Lt	1st Pilot		
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot		
Freeman	George	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Navigator		
Pohner	William	Н		2nd Lt	Pilotage Navigate	or	
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier		
Curran	William	J		2nd Lt	Radar Navigator		
Durant	Merlin	(nmi)		T/Sgt	Engineer		
Cobb	Richard	М		T/Sgt	Radio Operator		
Kaufman	Charles	F		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	er	
Rausch	Karl	Н		S/Sgt	Right Waist Gun	ner	
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret Gu	unner	
Franz	Anthony	R		S/Sgt	Top Turret Gunn	er	
Kniaz	Walter	М		Capt	Command Pilot		

FRIDAY, 30 MARCH 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 918:

1,402 bombers and 899 fighters are dispatched to attack targets connected with U-boat construction or operation; they claim 8-1-12 Luftwaffe aircraft; 5 bombers and 4 fighters are lost:

530 B-17s are sent to hit 2 U-boat yards (64) and an oil depot (169) at Hamburg; 263 bomb the port area at Hamburg, the secondary target; 1 hits Bremen, a target of opportunity; bombing is both visual and using H2X radar; they claim 0-1-3 aircraft; 3 B-17s are lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 252 damaged; 14 airmen are KIA, 10 WIA and 28 MIA. Escorting are 289 of 304 P-51s; they claim 4-0-7 aircraft in the air and 1-0-1 on the ground; 3 P-51s are lost.

448 B-17s are sent to hit the U-boat yard (318) and rail bridge (109) at Bremen visually and with H2X; 1 B-17 is lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 225 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 6 WIA and 11 MIA. The escort is 268 of 287 P-51s; they claim 2-0-1 aircraft.

382 **B-24s are dispatched to hit the U-boat yard (273) and Bauhaben port area (85) at Wilhelmshaven both visually and with H2X**; 1 B-24 is lost and 56 damaged; 8 airmen are KIA and 1 WIA. 105 P-47s and P-51s escort.

32 of 36 B-17s fly a DISNEY mission to the U-boat yard at Farge; 14 B-17s are damaged.

Mission 919:

During the night, 13 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands and Germany; 19 B-24s fly CARPETBAGGER missions to Norway; 1 B-24 is lost and 1 crashes in the Orkney Islands.

Individual Mission Notes:

Ninteenth Mission, Wilhelmshaven, Ger. Gas load: 2500 Time : 6:10 NINTEENTH MISSION, WILHELMSHAVEN, GERMANY. March 30, 1945 We hit Wilhelmshaven, Germany, it was submarine work plants. We did encounter moderate flak but it was very inaccurate. We saw dog fights on the way back. The Jerry was jumping straglers but our fighters drove them off. I saw the island where Willy West was shot down. They really threw up a lot of flak. We had about 8/10 ths cloud coverage so this accounts for the bombardier did not get such a good hit. We had a command pilot.

> Personal note on mission #20 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 20x300 lb. AN-M55 General Purpose bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

SUBJECT: Tactical Analysis of Mission 30 March 1945 - F. 0. 643. : Commanding Generals, All Combat Bomb Wings, This Division, APO 558. то This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem necessary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of mission reports and information obtained from Combat lings and Groups. EFFECTIVE BATTLE ORDER PRIMARY SECOND.RY SORTIES SORTIES 14th CBW Wilhelmshaven (Vis.) Wilhelmshaven (H2X) 95 96th CBI Ħ 15 97 20th CB7 92 2nd CBV 11 98 2AD 1. Takeoff, Assembly, and DAL a. Takeoffs and assembly were normal and the Combat lings left the English coast on time and in good order. Combat First Actual Assembly Briefed Time Assembly Wing Takeoff Altitudes For CP 1 Time 14th 0955 12,000 1200 2:05 12,000 12,000 96**t**h 2:02 1001 1203 20th0943 1206 2:23 2nd 1013 12,000 1209 1:56 2. Navigation - Penetration a. The Division left the DAL in good order and formed into a close column on the route to landfall. b. The route flown was quite accurate although individual Groups had some difficulty - the dings were closed up. This was particularly noticeable at the turn prior to landfall. .t landfall the 14th ding (Division lead) column ex-tended six minutes in length - the 96th ding, following, was also six minutes in length, as were the columns of the 20th and 2nd dings. The Division column extended twenty minutes in length at landfall. Time intervals existed between Groups within each Wing, but there was an overlap between last Groups of the 14th and 20th Wings and the leading Groups of the 96th (following the 14th) and the 2nd (following the 20th). Successive overrunning of units occurred. c. The lead Squadron, 389th Group, tracked in on H2X and when cloud cover broke, the Squadron was three miles left of the target. It was too late for the bombardier to correct to the target. Had bombs been released they would have fallen in fields. Bombs were returned to base. Some crowding among units prevaile from landfall to target. 3. Bombing Analysis a. 2d Air Division attacked first and second priority targets by visual and H2X methods with good results. All lings experienced similar weather condition and restrictions. H2X was used to bring Squadrons to the target, where some units made slight visual corrections. Nothing was reported to denote personnel error. b. The mission showed good coordination between the bombardier and Lickey operator. Photographic coverage for this attack gives only incomplete information.

Tactical Analysis of Mission 30 March 1945

The report shows that the light Cruiser Koln was smoking but no thorough assessment of damage could be made. Several smaller boats were also smoking and one merchant vessel was sunk. Dry docks IV and VI, store sheds, mine sweeping depot, and oil tanks were hit, and severe scattered damage was noted in business and residential districts.

4. Navigation - Withdrawal

a. Rallies were good and the lings departed the enemy coast in good order.

b. Letting down after landfall out, the wings were forced to leave the briefed route in some instances to avoid low clouds. The lead Wing, the 14th Wing, made the route good. Those following deviated to the north of course. The 2nd Wing entered the coast of England at Buncher 24 rather than at Mundesley Beacon as briefed. This was also true of the 491st Group. Otherwise, landfall in was as briefed.

5. Fighter Support

a. There were three Fighter Groups assigned to escart 2.D Bombers. The 56th covered the Screening Force and the 14th and the 96th Combat Wings. The 479th Fighter Group covered the 20th and 2nd Combat Wings. The 355th Group was assigned to cover the rear of the 2.D force, patrolling the area_covered by the Bomber stree

6. Enemy Action Encountered

a. The only sighting of enemy aircraft by our Fighters was when the 4th Fighter Group spotted five Me262's northwest of Bremen. A chase ensued but the Jets easily pulled away. No further contact was made.

b. Flak at the target was meager to moderate, inaccurate to accurate.

(1) A smoke screen was present in the target area.

7. Losses

a. One aircraft, 491st Group - 4/C left formation at 5330-0605, trailing black smoke - observed following formation in distance - A/C ditched in Channel at 5336-0340. Two men rescued. No further information is available.

8. Scouting Force

a. Planning - Normal target and penetration forces were planned. Scouts were to broadcast target weather forty-five minutes early and, if a delay would help visual bombing, Combat Win's would make a 360 degree turn in place prior to the Continental coast in order to lose time.

b. Execution - No weather trouble was encountered on penetration. Cloud cover in the target area was from 5 - 10/10. Scouts advised that a delay would help but make no vital difference - Combat Wings did not delay. Units let down after the rally and returned below low cloud.

9. Screening Force

a. Planning

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(1) The normal Screening Force was planned with the force being 400 feet above and one minute ahead of the Bombers.

2.4.1

Execution

(1) The Screening Force made R/V properly. Communications were good. However, the Screening Force leader did not realize that the main force had arrived at the IP and did not pull ahead until it was too late. The 25th Recon Squadron at Watton is taking steps to see that this does not occur again.

Tactical	Analysis of	Mission 30 M	arch 1945		
10.	Radar	•			
	a. H2X Anal	ysis		•	
Group	A/C Dispatched	A/C Over Target	OK For Navigation	OK For Bombing	Remarks
389 t h	4	4	4	4	
445th	4	4	4	4	
453rd	4	4	3	3.	1 equipment malfunction
44th	4	4	4	4	•
392nd	4	· 4	4	4	
491st	4	4	4	4	
93rd	4	4	4	4	
446th	т. Г.	<u>i</u>	4	3	1 equipment malfunction
448th	4	4	4 2	2	2 equipment malfunction
458th	6	6	6	6	:
466th	4	4	4	4	
467th		1.	4	4	
ation are	4 50	50	47	46	

(1) A satisfactory mission as far as H2X results were concerned. The 14th and 96th Combat Wings had perfect records.

b. Jamming was reported on both the Ruhr and Rheims chains. Fixes were obtained past $08^{\circ}E$ on the Ruhr chain. Eight GFE failures of 379th GEE A/C dispatched occurred.

11. Comments

a. The deviation from briefed course at the English coast in by the 2nd Combat Wing and the 491st Group (Par 4b) denotes a laxness of discipline. A mission is not completed until engines are cut in the dispersal areas. Briefed routes and standard procedures must be followed as closely as weather and other factors beyond our control permit. Combat Wing integrity must be maintained up to the Combat Wing area.

b. Lack of air discipline results in lack of efficient control and lack of efficient control always results in a loss of efficiency.

By command of Major General KEPNER:

FRANCIS H. GRISTOLD Brigadier General USA Chief of Staff

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission.



Wilhelmshaven Sub Pens, Docks and Port Area Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ${\rm (C)}$

Indv Msn #:	21]				
Date:	04 Apr 45	-				
Mission #:	267					
Position #:	13					
Acft Type:	B-24JSH-5 FO					
Tail No:	42-51480					
Call Letter:	D-Dog (MK- <u>D</u> +)					
Acft Name:	Sweet Sue					
Target Type:	Perleberg Me 262 Jet	Airfield				
Target City:	Perleberg, Germany				Sent: 44	Lost: 2
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position	
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		1st Lt	1st Pilot	
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot	
Freeman	George	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Navigator	
Pohner	William	Н		2nd Lt	Pilotage Navigat	or
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier	
Curran	William	J		2nd Lt	Radar Navigator	
Durant	Merlin	(nmi)		T/Sgt	Engineer	
Cobb	Richard	М		S/Sgt	Radio Operator	
Kaufman	Charles	F		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	er
Rausch	Karl	Н		S/Sgt	Right Waist Gun	ner
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret Gu	unner
Franz	Anthony	R		S/Sgt	Top Turret Gunn	er

WEDNESDAY, 4 APRIL 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 926:

1,431 bombers and 866 fighters are dispatched to hit airfields, a shipyard and a U-boat shipyard in Germany; they claim 30-4-30 Luftwaffe aircraft; 10 bombers and 4 fighters are lost.

438 **B-24s are sent to hit** Parchim (33) and **Perleberg (29) Airfields**; 97 hit Wesendorf Airfield, the secondary; attacks are visual; they claim 6-4-6 aircraft; 6 B-24s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and

76 damaged; 1 airman is KIA and 59 MIA. Escorting are 324 P-47s and P-51s; the P-47s claim 14-0-20 aircraft and the P-51s claim 9-0-3 aircraft; 1 P-47 and 3 P-51s are lost.

443 B-17s are sent to hit Fassberg Airfield (149); secondary targets hit are Hoya (37) and Dedelstorf (13) Airfields; targets of opportunity are Unterluss (39) and other (24); bombing is visual; 1 B-17 is lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 58 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 6 WIA and 4 MIA. The escort is 220 of 232 P-51s; 1 is lost.

Mission 927:

505 of 526 B-17s hit the Deutsche shipyard at Kiel using H2X radar; 2 others hit Eggebeck Airfield, a target of opportunity; 3 B-17s are lost and 50 damaged; 27 airmen are MIA. 208 of 223 P-51s without loss.

Individual Mission Notes:

TWENTEETH MISSION ; PERLEBERG, GERMANY

April 4, 1945

We hit an Air Field at Perleberg Germany. When we reached the I.P. we were hit by Me-262 and Fw 190's. On their first pass the shot our deputy lead down. They started in us but our nose navigator drove them off, so they hit our No. II man instead. Two more came through from the nose about OlOO and I saw my tracers pass them by and a lot going into them, There were no attacks made on the tail but I gat a lot of shooting in on support firing.

Our group lost 4 ships but this was good compared with other groups. Our crew members saw as many as 4 ships going down from one group. I don't know how many ships went down but it was a lot. We had all of our guns going and so did most of group so this is why we only lost four ships.

A fellow in our barracks shot down a Jet. He is the first one from our field to get a Jetty. The flak was also pretty bad but we didn't get any holes. Lt. Lupher our old navigator went down today.

> Personal note on mission #21 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 8x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs and 4x500 lb. AN-M17 Aimable Incendiary Cluster bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

SUBJECT: Tactical Analysis of Mission 4 April 1945 - F. 0. 648. TO Commanding Generals, All Combat Bomb Wings, This Division, APO 558. This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem necessary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of mission reports and information obtained from Combat Jings and Groups. EFFECTIVE B.TTLE ORDER PRILAY SLCOID, RY SORTIES SOFFLES 20th CE7 Parchim (Vis.) iny L/F that may 108 106 2nd CB. be attacked visually 119 115 . 17 Perleberg " within the area: 96th CB. 5500-0800 5200-1200 105 103 14th CE! Kaltenkirchen (Vis.) 5300-0300 5500-1200 106 102 2.00 438 1,26 1. Takeoffs, Assemblies and DAL a. Takeoffs were normal. Group and Combat Ving assemblies were good and all units were on time and in good order on the Dal. Combat First Actual Assembly Briefed Time assembly wing Takeoff Altitudes For CP 1 Time 2nd 0535 11,000 · 0740 2:05 14th 0525 10,000 0748 1:53 96th 0546 10,000 0744 1:58 20th0526 10,000 0736 2:10 2. <u>Navigation - Penetration</u> a. Landfall in at the energy coast was good - the Division column was sixteen minutes in length. b. Route in to the 12 was flown within five miles of course. Cloud coverage was 8/10 to 10/10 and visual check points were not available. c. Maneuver at the IF was normal for units bombing assigned first priority targets and for units bashing second priority targets. Occasional breaks in cloud coverage aided navigators and bashardiers in making good runs. 3. Bombing Analysis a. Cloud cover from δ - 10/10 prevented seeing more than fleeting glimpses of assigned targets. Units which were able attacked with fair to good results. b. Three Squadrons of the 389th Group dropped with poor results. The lead Squadron had an HBR malrunction in deputy lead ./C which released smoke markers - the entire Squadron released, believing it to be bombs away. The two succeeding Squadrons, being unable to pick up targets, dropped on smoke markers of the lead Squadron; 453rd Group chose the second priority target and bombed it. Coordinated runs between lickey operators and bombardiers were made. Bombs were believed to have fallen north of the target. One Squadron of the 453rd Group did not bomb. 1.21.12 c. The entire 14th Combat Wing returned its bombs as no visual targets were seen. ··· · : . ··· d. The 20th Combat Jing bombed Wesendorf A/F with fair to good results.

Tactical Analysis of Lission 4 April 1945 - F. C. 648

Lead and LL Squadrons of the 446th Group scored hits on runways and landing ground. The HR Squadron, being unable to maneuver into position, failed to bomb and returned its bombs to base. LL and HR Squadrons of the 93rd Group managed to drop a few on the field. The Lead Squadron, failing to receive the code word for priority 2 target, remained in Wing formation. It is essential even under adverse bombing conditions to pass the target code word. Had the Squadrons been uncovered properly, bombing might have been accomplished. Three Squadrons of the five dispatched by the 448th Group (Ld, LL, HR) failed to bomb because of cloud cover. Cloud cover hampered a good run for the other two Squadrons - however, bomb plots indicate probable hits on the hangar area at wesendorf.

e. Only two Squadrons of the entire 96th Wing were able to bomb. One Squadron from the 467th Group attacked Ferleberg - results were believed poor. One Squadron of the 458th Group scored a tight oval pattern on the landing ground at Perleberg with good results. The remaining nine Squadrons of the 96th Wing returned bombs to bases.

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4. Navigation - Withdraval

a. Rallies were normal and effected in good order.

b. Route out to the energy coast was generally fair until units approached the area northwest of the Ruhr valley. Cloud coverage was 7/10 to 9/10, affording occasional visual check points. As units approached the Ruhr valley, they went north of course, making sure they cleared the flak areas, then altered course to the briefed route.

c. Landfall out was generally poor. Units out the course short and come out north of the briefed landfall point due to adverse weather. Meximum deviation from the briefed route was twenty miles.

5. Fighter Support

a. The following Fighter Groups were flying h and B Groups and giving close support to 2AD Combat Wings: 4th h and B on the Command Mosquito and the 20th Combat Wing, 361st A on 2nd h, 361st B on 2nd B, 56th h and B on 96th Combat Wing, and 479th h and B on 14th Combat Wing. The 339th h and B and the 355th A and B Groups swept check of the Bombers to cover operational jet fields.

6. Enemy Action Encounfored

a. The 20th Combet Wing, covered by the 4th Group, was attacked just before the IP by eight he262's flying in fours. The energy directift attacked in a climb from 5 o'clock and one B-24 was lost in this engagement. This Combat Wing was attacked again just just the IP by three 1.262's which came in from 6 o'clock and in a climb. This attack was in the vicinity of Stendal. The energy pilots were aggressive in these attacks. The total Fighter claims against the jets were 9-0-7. Four of our Fighters are 114 and two Fighters MYR.

b. anti-incraft

(1) Flak at the targets ranged from nil to measure and moderate and was generally inaccurate.

7. Losses

a. One aircraft, 389th Group - was shot down by jet attacks at 5348-1022E. Aircraft was seen to go down in a flut spin with its No. 3 engine on fire and the stabilizer coming off. No chutes were observed.

b. One aircraft, 445th Group - was shot down by jet direraft on the banb run. Aircraft was seen afire. Several chutes observed. Tactical Analysis of Mission 4 April 1945 - F. O. 648

c: One aircraft, 445th Group - was shot down by jet aircraft on bomb run. Aircraft seen with its elevator off. No chutes reported.

d. One aircraft, 448th Group - broke in half at the attack by jets. No further information is available. No chutes were observed.

e. One aircraft, 448th Group - was hit by jets and was seen anoking and went down in a long glide. Ten chutes seen.

f. One aircraft, 448th Group - last heard from with the pilot saying that he would try to make B-53. No further information received.

8. Scouting Force

a. Planning - The normal target force reporting target weather twenty minutes ahead of the lead Combat Ming.

b. Execution - Normal - no unusual weather was encountered.

9. Screening Force

a. No force was planned, as no target were heavily defended.

10. Radar

.a. H2% Analysis

Group	A/C Dispatched	A/C Cver Tarret	<u>OK For</u> Navigation	OK For Bombin;	Remarks
389th 445th 453rd	4 5 5	4 5 5	4 4 4	4 4 4	1 equipment malfunction
44th 392nd 491st	5 4 4	5 4 3	5 4 5	5 4 3	i non-effective
93rd 446th 448th	4 4 9	4 4 8	3 4 8	3 4 8	l equipment malfunction l non-effective
453th 466th 467th	6 6 <u>4</u> 60	6 6 <u>4</u> 58	6 5+1 <u>4</u> 54+1	6 5+1 <u>4</u> 54+1	1 landed surry

(1) H2X performance on this mission i: considered satisfactory. Malfunctions could not be remedied in the air by the operator.

11. Corments

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a. Alerts that bandits are in the area must be put out on Channels A, B, and C first by Air Commanders receiving the information and must be passed immediately to all members of the crew by the pilot or co-pilot.

By command of hajor General Killing:

FRANCIS H. GRISJOLD Brighter General USA Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were two losses on this mission:
 - MACR #13728; Aircraft: 42-50664, Name: "Judy"; 1st Pilot: 1st Lt. MacDonald; Casualties: 8 KIA, 1 POW; Reason For Loss: Shot down by German jet fighter on bomb run.
 - MACR #13729; Aircraft: 42-51544, Name: Un-named; 1st Pilot: 2nd Lt. Van Delinder; Casualties: 3 KIA, 7 POW; Reason For Loss: Shot down by German jet fighter on bomb run.

Target Data: © Luftwaffe Airfields 1935 – 1945 database, used with permission of Henry L. deZeng IV.

Perleberg (GER)

(53 04 20 N - 11 49 10 E)

General: airfield (Fliegerhorst) 119 km NW of Berlin in Brandenburg and 33 km SE of Ludwigslust; airfield 2.5 km WSW of Perleberg.

History: 1927 listed as an emergency landing ground (Notlandeplatz). Taken over by the Luftwaffe in 1934 and developed into a elementary flight school. Inaugurated a Luftwaffe Fliegerhorstkommandantur by October 1935. Used briefly by bomber units in spring 1940. From June 1940, also a factory airfield (Industriehafen) for Dornier/Wismar. In spring 1942 it became a major training base for long-range reconnaissance crews.

Dimensions: approx. 1650 x 1235 meters (1800 x 1350 yards).

Surface and Runways: sandy grass surface. No paved runway. Equipped with boundary and obstruction lighting, a flare path, a beam approach system, and a visual Lorenz system for night operations.

Fuel and Ammunition: refueling points were located at the SE corner and inside the S boundary. A small ammunition dump was in a wooded area off the S boundary.

Infrastructure: had 1 very large, 2 large and 1 small hangar at the SE corner, and 1 large and 1 small hangar on the S boundary for a total of 6. All of the hangars were fronted with paved aprons. A group of small buildings including the control tower projected into the landing area between the two groups of hangars, and probably included workshops. The motor pool and garages were off the SE corner. Station admin offices, barracks, messes, etc., were in a compact group in the woods off the SE corner and numbered about 30 buildings in all. A branch spur off the Perleberg-Wittenberg rail line served the SE corner and the S, W and N boundaries.

Dispersal: there were 3 dispersal areas – North (along boundary), Southeast corner and Southwest corner with a total of 3 large open aircraft shelters, 12 medium open plus at least 8 parking bays that had been cut into the woods.

Defenses: unknown.

Remarks:

- 18 Apr 44: bombed by B-17 Fortresses and strafed 1 x Bf 108 B-1, 8 x Bf 110s, 2 x Do 17Ps, 1 x Do 217M, 1 x Fi 156C, 1 x Fw 44J, 1 x Fw 58C and 5 x Ju 88As/Ds from II./Fernaufklärungsgeschwader 101 destroyed or damaged on the ground.
- 04 Apr 45: airfield bombed by 29 B-24 Liberators. (445th Bomb Group Mission #267 11 of 44 B-24's dropped 88x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs and 44x500 lb. AN-M17 Aimable Incendiary Cluster bombs).

Operational Units: Zerstörerstaffel/KG 30 (Feb-Mar 40); I./KG 4 (Mar-May 40); II./KG 30 (Jun-Jul 40); III./KG 30 (Oct 40); Stab, 1./KGr.506 (Feb-Apr 41); KGr. z.b.V. 104 (Mar 41); 1.(F)/Aufkl.Gr. 33 (Oct 44); Stab, I./JG 6 (Oct-Dec 44); 12.(Pz.)/SG 9 (Dec 44); elements of I.(Pz)/SG 9 (Jan-Apr 45); 13.(Pz.)/SG 9 (Feb-Apr 45); 1./Tiefangriffsgruppe Bücker 181 (Apr 45).


School Units: elementary flight school then twin-engined conversion school Perleberg (Jun 35 – Oct 39); Arbeitsplatz for Schule/FAR 22 (Neustadt-Glewe) (1939-40); Aufklärungsschule 3 (May – Oct 42); Fernaufklärungsschule 3 (Oct 42 – Feb 43); Stab and Fernaufklärungsgeschwader 101 (Feb 43 – Feb 45); I./Aufklärungsgeschwader 103 (Feb – Mar 45).

Reserve Training & Replacement Units: Erg.KGr. 6 (Nov 40 – May 41); 3./Erg.JG 2 (and 4./Erg.JG 2?) (Nov 44 – Mar 45).

Station Commands: as Fl.H.Kdtr. Perleberg (to 1943); Fl.Pl.Kdo. A 40/III (1943-44); Fl.H.Kdtr. A(o) 26/III (1944-45).

Kommandant (mainly prior to the establishment of numbered station commands – not complete): Obstlt. Veit Fischer (1 Jun 35 - ?); Gen.Maj. Oskar Freiherr von Boenigk (? - Oct 39).

Station Units (on various dates – not complete): Koflug 17/XI (c.Dec 41 – Feb 43)?; Werft-Abt. 31/III (1944-45); 12.(Flum.Res.)/Luftgau-Nachr.Rgt. 11 (Mar 41); 3.(Fspr.u.Fschr.Betr.)/Luftgau-Nachr.Abt. 3 (c.Oct 44 – Feb 45)?; Fluko Perleberg.



Perleberg Airfield Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	22					
Date:	06 Apr 45					
Mission #:	268					
Position #:	1					
Acft Type:	B-24JSH-5 FO					
Tail No:	42-51480					
Call Letter:	D-Dog (MK- <u>D</u> +)					
Acft Name:	Sweet Sue					
Target Type:	German Army Headqu	arters				
Target City:	Halle, Germany				Sent: 33	Lost: 0
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position	
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		Capt	1st Pilot	
McAnely	Robert	С		1st Lt	Co-Pilot	
Freeman	George	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Navigator	
Pohner	William	Н		2nd Lt	Pilotage Navigat	or
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier	
Curran	William	J		2nd Lt	Radar Navigator	
Durant	Merlin	(nmi)		T/Sgt	Engineer	
Cobb	Richard	М		S/Sgt	Radio Operator	
Scourby	James	(nmi)		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	er
Pajakowski	Joe	Α		S/Sgt	Right Waist Gun	ner
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret G	unner
Franz	Anthony	R		S/Sgt	Top Turret Gunr	er

FRIDAY, 6 APRIL 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

Mission 930:

659 bombers hit rail targets in the Leipzig, Germany area using H2X radar; 4 B-17s and 1 P-51 are lost:

183 of 207 B-24s hit the marshalling yard at Halle; 22 others hit Eisleben, a target of opportunity; 2 B-24s are lost, 3 B-24s are damaged. Escorting are 201 P-47s and P-51s.

430 of 452 B-17s hit secondary targets, the main station and marshalling yard at Leipzig (321) and hit Gera (109); 11 others hit the marshalling yard at Halle; 4 B-17s are lost and 2 damaged beyond repair; 17 airmen are KIA, 1 WIA and 33 MIA. The escort is 392 of 410 P-51s; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA).

Individual Mission Notes:

```
Twenty-First Mission , Halle, Germany
Gas load:2700
Time: 8:30
TWENTY-FIRST MISSION,HALLE,GERMANY
April 7, 1945
We hit Halle again, It was
10/10 ths coverage so the flak
was very inaccurate but fairly
intence. They shot up more rockets
at this target than at any other
we ever went to before, there were
at least 30 at this one place.
We didn't lose any ships
today so I felt pretty good for
we expected it to be pretty rough.
```

Personal note on mission #22 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 12x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

SUBJECT: Tactical Analysis of Mission 6 April 1945 - F. 0. 650.

To : Commanding Generals, All Combat Bomb Wings, This Division, APO 558.

This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem necessary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of mission reports and information obtained from Combat Wings and Groups.

BATTLE ORDER	1ST PRIORITY	2ND PRIORITY	SCRTIES	EFFECTIVE SORTIES
96th CBW 2nd CBW 20th CBW 14th CBW	Halle M/Y (Vis) Halle Army Hq. (Vis) Staszfurt (Oil) " " " "	Halle M/Y (H2X) H H H H H H H H H H ZAD	47 54 54 <u>52</u> 207	46 54 53 <u>52</u> 205

1. Takeoffs. Assemblies, and DAL

a. Continental assembly was in effect. Takeoffs were normal except for the 458th Group, whose runway was blocked by an 4/C with a blown tire, causing some 4/C to become airborne as much as forty-five minutes late. Group and Combat Wing assemblies were from good to excellent, except for the 458th Group whose assembly was slow because of 4/C arriving late in the assembly area. All units were on time and in good order on the DAL.

Combat Ning	<u>First Actual</u> <u>Takcoff</u>	<u>Assembly</u> Altitudes	Briefed Time For CP 1	<u>Assembly</u> <u>Time</u>
96th	0604	12,000	0802	1:58
2nd	0515	12,000	0804	2:49
20th	0539	12,000	0806	2:27
14 th	0515	12,000	8080	2:53

2. <u>Nevigation - Penetration</u>

a. Landfall at enemy coast was made according to each Wing's route to its respective buncher for a Continental assembly.

b. The route in to the IP was flown well in spite of 10/10 cloud coverage.

c. Maneuver at the IP was normal. All units effected their maneuvers to make runs on the H2X target because of 10/10 cloud coverage over the assigned visual targets.

d. Bomb runs were good and made on H2X.

3. Bombing Analysis

a. All units (93rd Group excepted) bombed the Halle M/Y by H2X with unobserved results - cloud cover was 10/10. Bombing was performed by Squadrons.

(1) The lead Mickey operator 93rd Group (which flow two Squadrons, the Load and HR) made an error in target identification when switching from the fifty mile scan to the twenty mile scan. The deputy lead identified the target and a fix at tombs dway showed that the bombs hit at 5138N-1130E near Hettstedt (20 miles NN of Halle). The HR Squadron dropped on flares of the lead Squadron.

.b. PRU indicates poor results on this mission.

Tactical Analysis of Mission 6 April 1945

4. Nevigation . Withdrawal

a. Rallies were normal w all units wore in good order.

by Route out to enemy coast was flown within five miles of course by all units.

e. Landfall out was excellent. The Division column was eleven minutes long at this point.

5. Fighter Support

a. Five Fightor Groups supported 24D Bombers on this mission. The 56th Group covered the Screening Force and the 96th Combat Wing. The 4th, 355th and 479th Groups covered the 2nd, 20th and 14th Combat Wings respectively. The entire force was also covered by the 361st Group.

6. Enemy Action Encountered

a. There was no enony aircraft reaction to 2AD Bombers.

b. Flak at the target ranged from nil to measur to moderate and was generally insecurate.

7. 108508

a. There were no losses.

8. Scouting Force

a. Planning - To P-51's work to be in the Continental assembly area, reporting weather find any recommendations for changes in assembly altitudes to Combat Hing leaders prior to arrival of Benkers and during assembly. Also a route force reporting weather thirty minutes ahead of the lead Combat Hing and the normal target force reporting target weather twenty minutes before TOT. These forces were planned because of expected frontal cloud in the assembly and target areas.

10 A. 10

b. Execution = Weather reporting was normal; =. expected weather did not materialize. Only low clouds with tops from 8 = 10,000 feet wore encountered.

9. Screening Force

a. Planning - Four Mesquitees were to act as a chaff dispensing force on the target at Hallo, pulling to one minute cheed and 400 feet above the Bombers at the IP and using the normal maneuver going through the target area ahead of the Bombers.

b. Execution - The chaff force functioned normally, doing an excellent job. The lead Combat Wing over the target had no flak at all - this is attributed directly to the screening performed.

10. Radar

e. H2X Anelysis

Group	<u>4/C</u> Dispatched	4/C Over Targot	<u>OK For</u> icvization	<u>OK For</u> Eorbing	Remarks
445th 453rd 389th	4 4 Did not	4 4 perticipato	3 4	3 4	l equipment malfunction
44th 392nd 491st	3 1 3	3 1 3	3 1 3	3 1 3	

Tactical	<u>knalvsis</u>	of Mission 6 Ap	ril 1945		
93rd 446th 448th	3 3 2	3 3 2	3 3 1	3 3 1	1 oquipmont malfunction
458th 466th	4 D14 m	4 ot participate	4	4	
467th	_3 30	_3 30	<u>_3</u> 28	728	

(1) H2X performance on this mission is considered satisfactory. Malfunctions, which occurred, could not be remedied in the air.

11. Comments

a. There is no apparent reason for the difference in length of time necessary to assemble five Squadrons of the 96th Combat Ving and five Squadrons of the 14th Combat Wing. All Combat Wing Commanding Officers must, for the sake of operating officiency, ondeavor to reduce the time required for assembly.

By command of Major General KEPMER:

FRANCIS H. GRISUOLD Erigadier General USA Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

1 H I i Le ROEERT H. TERF.ILL GSC Coloncl Dep C of S for Operations

Image courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©



German Army Headquarters near Halle Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	23					
Date:	08 Apr 45					
Mission #:	270					
Position #:	25					
Acft Type:	B-24JSH-5 FO					
Tail No:	42-51547					
Call Letter:	B-Baker (MK- <u>B</u> +)					
Acft Name:	Un-named					
Target Type:	Fürth Blumenthal Me 2	262 Jet A	ircraft Fa	ictory		
Target City:	Fürth, Germany				Sent: 33	Lost: 0
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position	
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		Capt	1st Pilot	
McAnely	Robert	С		1st Lt	Co-Pilot	
Freeman	George	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Navigator	
Pohner	William	Н		2nd Lt	Pilotage Navigat	or
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier	
Curran	William	J		2nd Lt	Radar Navigator	
Durant	Merlin	(nmi)		T/Sgt	Engineer	
Cobb	Richard	М		S/Sgt	Radio Operator	
Scourby	James	(nmi)		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunne	er
Pajakowski	Joe	А		S/Sgt	Right Waist Gun	ner
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret G	unner
Franz	Anthony	R		S/Sgt	Top Turret Gunr	ier

SUNDAY, 8 APRIL 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

3 missions are flown.

Mission 932:

1,173 bombers and 794 fighters attack various targets in Germany; 9 bombers and 1 fighter are lost:

339 B-17s are dispatched to hit the Derben oil depot (31) and Schafstadt Airfield (73); secondary targets hit are the Stendal marshalling yard workshops (73) and the marshalling yard at Halberstadt (218);

Derben is hit visually and the others targets visually and with H2X radar; 4 B-17s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 55 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 5 WIA and 35 MIA. Escorting are 239 of 252 P-51s.

522 B-17s are dispatched to hit the marshalling yards at Plauen (86), Hof (101) and Eger (111) and an ordnance depot at Grafenwohr (203); the attacks are made visually and with H2X radar; 5 B-17s are lost and 58 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 1 WIA and 43 MIA. 235 of 246 P-51s escort.

302 **B-24s are sent to hit** the munitions depot at Bayreuth (51), **the Blumenthal jet aircraft factory at Fürth (89)** and the Unterschlauersbach (57) and Roth (91) Airfields visually; 39 B-24s are damaged. The escort is 245 P-47s and P-51s; 1 P-47 is lost (pilot MIA).

Mission 933:

11 B-24s drop leaflets in France, the Netherlands and Germany during the night.

Mission 934:

12 B-24s bomb the Travemunde port area using PFF methods during the night.

Individual Mission Notes:

Twenty-SECOND Mission, Nurenberg, Germany Gas load: 2700 Time : 7:45 TWENTY-SECOND MISSION, NURENBERG .. GER. April 8, 1945 We hit Nurenberg Germany today. We had a visual target and the target was an Air Field. Our bombardier was really on the ball. He really hit it. His bombs were incendiary and they hit smack on top of the lead squadrons demo's. The flak was moderate and we got 5 holes in our ship. There were bandits in the area again but they didn't hit our group. They got hit yesterday and lost 2 more ships from our feild. They shot down 3 jets and 9 Me-109's. The gunner are really on the ball. We have been commanded by Gen. Arnold and the base officers.

> Personal note on mission #23 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- The Lead Squadron aircraft each carried 6x1,000 lb. AN-M44 General Purpose bombs, the High Right Squadron each carried 11x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs and the Low Left Squadron each carried 12x500 lb. AN-M17 Aimable Incendiary Cluster bombs.

DRONS	SQUADRO	LEAD			821µJ-PFF 562 Q	ARGET H	ION OVER THE TA IL 1945: <u>FURTH</u>	POSITIO 8 April
				821J-PFF		82L		
				015 J		811 E		
	عليط	824					821 ₁ M	
	F	506			82W		105 - 0	
в24н 759 м		لىپۇ ر	82), 896	<mark>вецы</mark> Цб1 к	753 8	<mark>821µ)</mark> 657 D	·	82Цн Ц91 L
ON s	QUADRON :	RITE SQ	HE –R	82lui	821µ-PFF 5 60 V	Beind		:
				525 8		509 M		•
	•	821µJ		~~ ~			لبا82 520 F	
	0	639			веци . 015 г		700 F	
82ju	8:	ul	821	Balan		824	•	لبز28
722 N						921 C		7 3 2 D
•	· ,	ա ¥	824 البة	8882 K		•		

Tactical Mission Report:

LO-LEFT SQUADRON: B2JUM-PFF 547 8 e 24 824 619 L 227 Y Balu Balin 985 N لسلحم 252 743 82Ju BSTH BELLH Belu 710 6 020 F 319 ' T **L66** n PNT V MHI TIB NR 7 D D FROMS TIE 08/1814B APRIL -45-TO & CG, 2ND AIR DIVISION & CG, 2ND COMBAT WING INFOS COMAF S (ATTN: A+3 SECTION) (ATTN: A+3 SECTION) (ATTN: A+3 SECTION) CONFIDENTIAL 445TH BOMB GROUP P - 85 - E BT MULTIPLE ADDRESS "LEAD SOMEARDIER'S AND NAVIGATOR'S TELETYPE REPORT 2ND COMBAT WING, 445TH BOMB GROUP" DATE OF MISSION: APRIL 8, 1945 OBJECTIVE: FURTH, GERMANY LD. SQ. LEAD BOMBARDIER LT. HURD (26 - 11) LD. SQ. LEAD MICKEY OPERATOR MORRIS (49 - 16) LD. SQ. LEAD DR. NAVIGATOR BLAIR (25 13) HI RIGHT SQ. LEAD BOMBARDIER LT. MUSSER (22 - 8) HI RIGHT SQ. LEAD MICKEY OPERATOR LIVINGSTONE (12 - 6) HI RIGHT SQ. LEAD DR. NAVIGATOR CONRAD (28 - 2) LOW LEFT SQ. LEAD BOMBARDIER LT. HAMRICK (22 - 12) LOW LEFT SQ. LEAD MICKEY OPERATOR CURRANY (16 - 12) LOW LEFT SQ. LEAD DR. NAVIGATOR FREEMAN (22 - 1) A. (1) LEAD (2) YES B, (1) SQUADRONS (2) LEAD - HE RIGHT - LOW LEFT (3) X X X

(1) PRIMARY ATTACKED (2) X X X (3) LD - 11 HR - 11 LL - 10 \mathtt{D}_{\bullet} (1) LD -13 HR - 11 LL - 10 (2) LEAD- SQUADRON: 5 X 1999 LB GP 1/15 1/109 11 X 590 LB GP 12 X M-17 IB 1/40 SQUADRON: 1/19 IR LL SQUADRONI (3) LEAD - MINIMUM HI RIGHT - MINIMUM LO LEFT - 59 FEET (4) LEAD SQUADRON ONE (5) PERSONEL ERROR (6) NONE E. (1) NONE (2) X X Z F. (1) (A) VISUAL TRUE ALTITUDES (2) IND. ALTITUDE: LD. SQUADRON: 21160 20908 HR. SQUADRON: 21699 20554 LL. SQUADRON: 20500 19455 TRUE COURSE! (3) MAG. HEADING: -58 LD. SQUADRON: 71 HR. SQUADRON: 65 55 LL. SQUADRON: 72 65 (A) LENGTH OF RUN: LD. SQUADRON: 6 MINUTES HR. SQUADRON: 6 MINUTES LL. SQUADRON: 4 MINUTES HR - NORDEN LL - NORDEN 5) LD - HORDEN HR - ONE AND NONE LL - ONE AND NONE 6) LD - ONE AND HONE (7) LD - C-1 HR - C-1 LL - C-1 HR - 1212 LL - 1213 (8) LD - 1211 9) ASSIGNED BY ALL SQUADRONS BLDG. NO. 1 ILLISTRATION NO. 8 GY4756 10) X X X 11) 173 168 168 12) 50 55 66 13) 387 090 Ø95 G. (1) LD - NONE HR - NOME LL - NOME (2) 1/13 CLOUDS 20 MILES VISIBILITY (3) LD - NONE HR - NONE LL - NONE HR - NONE LL - NORE (4) LD - NONE (5) FLAT AT BOMBS AWAY (6) NONE (7) LD - NONE HR - NONE LL - NONE

LOL HIG (2) LEA HIG (3) LEA LOL HIG (3) LEA LOL HIG	D - NONE LEFT - NONE H RIGHT - NONE D - GOOD LEFT - GOOD H RIGHT - GOOD LEFT - NO H RIGHT - NO FRIGHT - NO ROX. GROUND SPEED AND	DRIFT SUPPLI	ED BY D.R. NAVIGATOR.
I. DOES	NOT APPLY		· · · ·
J. HR L	EADER HIT DY FLAK BEF	ORE BOMBS REI	LEASED
NAVIO	GATION NOTES:		÷ .
TIME	COORDINATES	ALTITUDE	COMMENTS
Ø829	311. 6	6000	1ST TIME THRU BN. 6 1 MINUTE EARLY
Ø 84 .3	BN. 6	6000	2ND TIME THRU BN. 6 2 MINUTES EARLY
0857 1/2 0907	C.P. 1 5242-0142 5233-0208	6999 6999	6 1/2 MIN. LATE (BN. 24) CUT C.P.A. TO MAKE UP TIME
0942	5122 1/2 -0325	13935	C.P. 1
1004 1135	5044-0416 4940-0912 1/2	12000 21000	T.P. 1 C.V.I.P.
1153	4936-1038	21000	GR. I.P.
1211 3/4	4925-1058	21000	TARGET (T.H. Ø66 DEG - 160 MPH
1218	4940-1344	18000	G.R.P.
1234	4944-0911	18000	C.P. NO. 4
1332 1/2	5344-0415	19999	C.P. NO. 5 - 11 MINUTES LATE.
1349 1/2	5121-0315	9500	T.P. 2
1423 1/2	5237 - 0144	2000	ENGLISH CST.
1434	BASE	2000	BASE

Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission.

Target Data:

© Luftwaffe Airfields 1935 - 1945 database, used with permission of Henry L. deZeng IV.

Fürth-Industrie (GER)

(a.k.a. Fürth-Hardhöhe) (49 28 55 N – 10 57 30 E) General: factory airfield (*Industriehafen*) located 2 km WNW of Fürth town center in Bavaria.

History: the airfield dates from 1919-20 when Gothaer Waggon-und Flugzeugfabrik established an aircraft manufacturing plant there. Gothaer was later renamed Bachmann, Blumenthal & Co. but continued producing aircraft and components. During the war years, those components were for the Ju 87, Bf 110, and the Me 262, while overhaul and repair work was carried out on Bf 110s.

Dimensions: approx. 960 x 730 meters (1050 x 800 yards) with an oval shape.

Surface and Runway: extensive work was underway in late 1943 to improve the landing area around the runway. Had one approx. 1190 meter (1300 yards) concrete runway aligned ESE/WNW that was completed in Sep 43.

Infrastructure: factory assembly shop, offices, major components shop, transformer house, flight hangar with a paved hangar apron, boiler house, metal treatment shops, machine shop, forge, stores, and light machine shops formed a compact group at the E boundary. An additional group of stores huts was off the N boundary. A special branch rail line served the factory buildings.

Dispersal: no organized dispersals.

Defenses: protected by 4 heavy Flak positions (three of them with 6 guns each) and 10 light Flak positions.

Satellites and Decoys:

Fürth-Veitsbronn (GER)

(49 31 00 N - 10 54 15 E).

Dummy 5.7 km NW of Fürth factory airfield, 4.5 km WNW of Fürth airfield and 1.2 km NE of the village of Veitsbronn. Mock-up included a group of stage-prop buildings simulating a factory airfield with dummy aircraft parked nearby.

Remarks:

- 25 Feb 44: Fürth aircraft components plant bombed by 172 B-24 Liberators. Post raid photos showed extensive damage and destruction to the factory buildings along the E boundary of the airfield.
- 10 Sep 44: 60 B-17s bombed the Fürth aircraft components factory.
- 08 Apr 45: 89 B-24s bombed the Blumenthal factory airfield thereby rendering the airfield heavily damaged, largely bombed out and no longer usable. (445th Bomb Group Mission #270 31 B-24s dropped 39x1,000 lb. An-M44 General Purpose, 116x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose, and 112x500 lb. AN-M17 Aimable Incendiary Cluster bombs).

Operational Units: none identified.

Station Commands: Flugplatzkdo. of Fl.H.Kdtr. A(o) 16/XII Fürth (Apr-Jun 44); Flugplatzkdo. of Fl.H.Kdtr. A(o) 32/VII Fürth (1944-45).

Station Units (on various dates – not complete): see under Fürth- Atzenhof airfield.



Fürth Blumenthal Me 262 Jet Aircraft Factory Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	24						
Date:	11 Apr 45						
Mission #:	273						
Position #:	25						
Acft Type:	B-24HSH-25 DT						
Tail No:	42-51123						
Call Letter:	K-King (MK- <u>K</u> +)						
Acft Name:	Smelly Nelly						
Target Type:	Amberg Railroad Mars	halling Ya	ards				
Target City:	Amberg, Germany				Sent: 33	Lost: 0	
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position		
McAnelly	Robert	С		1st Lt	1st Pilot		
Davis	Frank	(nmi)		Capt	Co-Pilot/Command Pilot		
Freeman	George	Ν		2nd Lt	Navigator		
Pohner	William	Н		2nd Lt	Pilotage Navigator		
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier		
Curran	William	J		2nd Lt	Radar Navigator		
Durant	Merlin	D		T/Sgt	Engineer		
Cobb	Richard	Н		S/Sgt	Radio Operator		
Kaufmann	Charles	F		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunner		
Medlock	Leslie	Ι		S/Sgt	Right Waist Gunner		
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret G	unner	
Franz	Anthony	R		S/Sgt	Top Turret Gunr	ier	

WEDNESDAY, 11 APRIL 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 941:

1,303 bombers and 913 fighters are dispatched to hit a variety of targets in Germany; 1 B-17 is lost:

445 B-17s are sent to hit the Freiham oil depot (300) and Kraiburg munitions plant (133); secondary targets hit are the munitions depot at Landshut (1) and the marshalling yard at Treuchtlingen (1); 1 B-

17 is lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 15 damaged; 1 airman is WIA and 10 MIA. Escorting are 273 of 294 P-51s.

509 B-17s are sent to hit the munitions depot (28) and marshalling yard (82) at Landshut; the airfield (131) and marshalling yard (79) at Ingolstadt; and the marshalling yards at Treuchtlingen (70) and Donauworth (108); no losses or casualties. The escort is 281 of 294 P-51s.

346 **B-24s are dispatched to hit** Obertraubling Airfield (79), a munitions depot (31) and an oil depot (80) at Regensburg, and **the marshalling yards at** Neumarkt (71) and **Amberg (73)**; 2 B-24s are damaged beyond repair and 5 damaged; 22 airmen are KIA. 211 P-47s and P-51s escort.

Mission 942:

9 B-24s drop leaflets in Germany during the night and 11 B-24s fly CARPETBAGGER missions in Denmark.

Individual Mission Notes:


Twenty-Third Mission , Amberg, Ger. Gas Load: 2700 Time::8:45 TWENTY-THIRD MISSION, AMBERG, GER. April 11, 1945 We hit Amberg Germany today. There was no flak at the target and no fighters.. I saw some flak but it was way off to the left hitting another group. On our bomb run we flew over Cz echošlovakia. This was my 23 mission so I only have 7 more to go. I got some propaganda that they threw down on the Jerry.

> Personal note on mission #24 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 6x1,000 lb. AN-M44 General Purpose bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:




PNT V KHI TIB NR 5/11 D D FROM: TIB 11/21068 APR. 45 TO : (1) 2AD (2) 2CW INFO: (3) COMAF 8 CONFIDENTIAL 445BG P-114-E MULTIPLE ADDRESS ----------LEAD BOMBARDIERS AND NAVIGATORS TELETYPE REPORT 2ND COMBAT WING 445TH GROUP ----------DATE OF MISSION: 11 APRIL 1945. **OBJECTIVE: AMBERG, GERMANY** LD. SQ. LEAD BOMBARDIER: LT. SPRAGUE (23-15) LD. SQ. LEAD MICKEY OPERATOR: LT. SPEISEL (17-14) LD. SQ. LEAD DR. NAVIGATOR: LT. SCHNITZER (23-8) HI RIGHT SQ. LEAD BOMBARDIER: LT. MITCHEL (27-13) SQ. LEAD MICKEY OPERATOR: LT. KEEN (18-14) SQ. LEAD DR. NAVIGATOR: LT. JACOBS (19-0) SQ. LEAD BOMBARDIER: LT. HAMRICK (22-12) LO LEFT SQ. LEAD MICKEY OPERATOR: LT. CURRAN (18-13) SQ. LEAD DR. NAVIGATOR: LT. FREEMAN (23-1) (1) LEAD (2) YES Α. B. (1) SQUADRONS (2) LEAD - HI RIGHT - LO LEFT (3) X X X C. (1) PRIMARY ATTACKED (2) X X X (3) LD - 11 HR - 11 LL - 11 . HR - 11 D. (1) LD - 11LL - 11 (2) 5 X 1000 GP 1/10 1/40 1/10 1/40 1/10 1/40 (3) MINIMUM, ELECTRIC SALVO PLUS R.B.R. (4) LEAD SQUADRON: O HE SQUADRON: O LL SQUADRON: 0

```
D.
    (1) LD - 11
                     HR - 11
                                  LL - 11
    (2) 5 X 1000 GP
                          1/10
                                 1/40
                          1/10
         5 X 1000 GP
                                 1/40
         5 X 1000 GP
                          1/10
                               1/40

    (3) MINIMUM, ELECTRIC SALVO PLUS R.B.R.
    (4) LEAD SQUADRON: O HR SQUADRON: O LL SQUADRON: O


    (5) X X X
    (6) X X X
    (1) X X X
(2) X X X
E.
    (1) (A) VISUAL
F.
    (2) IND. ALTITUDE:
                                 TRUE ALTITUDE:
          LD. SQUADRON: 19000
                                               18230
          HR. SQUADRON: 19500
LL. SQUADRON: 18500
                                               18790
                                               17700
Q(3) MAG. HEADING
                             TRUE COURSE:
          LD. SQUADRON: 299
                                               301
          HR. SQUADRON: 299
                                               301
          LL. SQUADRON: 294
                                               291
    (4) LENGTH OF RUN:
          LD. SQUADRON: 8 MINUTES
          HR. SQUADRON: 8 MINUTES
          LL. SQUADRON: 5 MINUTES
    (5) LD - NORDEN HR - NORDEN LL - SPERRY
(6) LD - ONE AND NONE HR - ONE AND NONE LL - ONE AND NONE
    (7) LD - C-1 HR - C-1 LL - A-5
(8) LD - 1347 HR - 1347 PLUS LL - 1348
    (9) NORTHERN CHOKE POINT OF M/Y - AMBERG GERMANY
    10) X X X
    11) 212
                 200
                            195
    12) 33
                  38
                             40
    13) 225
                 250
                            285
    (1) LD - NONE HR - C-1 FUNCTIONED IMPROPERLY
LL - TELESCOPE NOTOR STUCK
G.
    (2) 1/10 CLOUDS 10 MILE VISIBILITY
    (3) LD - NONE HR - NONE LL - NONE
(4) LD - NONE HR - NONE LL - NONE
    (5) NONE
    (6) NONE
    (7) LD - GROUND HAZE
                               HR - NONE
                                             LL - NONE
                                       LL - NONE
I LL - SET OUT
    (1) LD - NONE
                         HR - NONE
H.
                         HR - SET OUT
    (2) LD - GOOD
    (3) LD - GAVE APPROX. COURSE AND RANGE HR - NO
                                                               LL - NO
    (4) LOW LEFT AND HIGH RIGHT SETS OUT PRESUMABLY DUE TO A BLOWN
         INTERNAL FUZE.
         DOES NOT APPLY.
I.
J.
         LEAD SQUADRON BROTHERED BY HAZE. HI RIGHT SQUADRON HAD C-1
         WORKING IMPROPERLY ON TURNS. LO LEFT SQUADRON RATE MOTOR
         STUCK. TARGET MATERIAL INADEQUATE - DATA ON TELETYPE INSUFFICIENT
```



Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency ©

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission



Amberg Railroad Marshalling Yard Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Indv Msn #:	25						
Date:	16 Apr 45						
Mission #:	276						
Position #:	25						
Acft Type:	B-24HSH-25 DT						
Tail No:	42-51123						
Call Letter:	K-King (MK- <u>K</u> +)						
Acft Name:	Smelly Nelly						
Target Type:	Landshut Railroad Mai	rshalling `	Yard				
Target City:	Landshut, Germany				Sent: 33	Lost: 0	
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position		
McAnelly	Robert	С		1st Lt	1st Pilot		
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot		
Freeman	George	Ν		2nd Lt	Navigator		
Pohner	William	Н		2nd Lt	Pilotage Navigator		
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier		
Curran	William	J		2nd Lt	Radar Navigator		
Durant	Merlin	D		T/Sgt	Engineer		
Cobb	Richard	Н		T/Sgt	Radio Operator		
Kaufmann	Charles	F		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunner		
Rausch	Karl	Н		S/Sgt	Right Waist Gunner		
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret G	unner	
Franz	Anthony	R		S/Sgt	Top Turret Gunr	er	

MONDAY, 16 APRIL 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

3 missions are flown.

Mission 954:

In the afternoon, 1,252 bombers and 913 fighters are dispatched to attack rail targets in Germany; they claim 727-0-373 Luftwaffe aircraft; 1 B-24 and 31 fighters are lost.

273 of 306 B-24s bomb the marshalling yard at Landshut; 1 B-24 is lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 8 damaged; 7 airmen are MIA. Escorting are 299 P-47s and P-51s; they claim 228-0-109 aircraft on the ground; 1 P-47 and 16 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).

454 B-17s are sent to hit the marshalling yard (148), East rail bridge (72) and West rail bridge (74) at Regensburg, the Platting marshalling yard (77) and rail bridge at Straubing (76); 2 B-17s are damaged. The escort is 240 of 262 P-51s; they claim 2-0-0 aircraft in the air and 86-0-66 on the ground; 3 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).

286 of 298 P-51s fly a freelance mission in support of the bombers attacking 40+ landing grounds in Germany and Czechoslovakia; they claim 1-0-1 aircraft in the air and 410-0-198 on the ground; 9 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).

19 of 22 P-51s fly a scouting mission.

16 P-51s escort 10 F-5s on photo reconnaissance missions over Germany; 2 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).

Mission 955:

During the morning, 485 of 489 B-17s bomb the tank ditch defense line at Pointe de Grave on the S side of the Gironde estuary in the Bordeaux area in support of the ground assault in that area; 14 B-17s are damaged.

Mission 956:

During the night, 11 of 12 B-24s drop leaflets in France, the Netherlands and Germany.

Individual Mission Notes:

Twenty-Fourth Mission, Landshut Germany Gas load : 2700 Time : 9:10 TWENTY-FOURTH MISSION, LANDSHUT, GERMANY April 16, 1945 We hit Landshut Germany. It was near Munich. There was very little flak and rockets. A couple groups got out of bomber stream and they lost two ships. There were reported bandits but the fighters drove them off before they got into us. They were jets, this area of Germany is known as the home of the Jetty.

> Personal note on mission #25 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 12x500 lb. AN-M43 General Purpose bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

EJECT: Tactical Analysis of Mission 16 April 1945 - F. C. 659. C : Commanding Generals, All Combat Wings, This Division, APC 558. This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem scessary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of ission reports and information obtained from Combat Wings and Groups. EFFLICTIVE TTLE ORDER 1ST PRIORITY 2ND PRIORITY* SORTIES SCRTIES with CES (9 Sqdns) Traunstoin (Vis.) Rosenh im M/Y (Vis.) 93 88 Juh CBW (6 Sqdns) 15 Ħ 54 51 nd CBW (6 Scdns) Rosenhein M/Y " Traunstein 64 62 +th CBVI (9 Sqdns) . 11 95 72 21.D 273 306 3rd Priority - all Forces - Landshut H/Y - H2X a. Timos Combet First Lotual Erisfed Time issembly Lssembly <u>Trkcoii</u> <u> Nirg</u> <u>iltimidos</u> For UP 1 Tine 95in 09:13 8,000 1122 1:39 20th 0959 8,000 1124 1:25 2nd 1010 8,000 1135 1:25 14th 0955 9,000 1115 1:20 Takooffs were without incident. Ъ. c. Assorblies were good - units departed from $1\frac{1}{2}$ minutes early to 3 mintes late - all vere visual. 2. Navigation - Ponetration e. Lendfell at the French ceast was made as briefed. The Division column res twelve minutes in longth at this point. b. All units fler the briefed route up to ten degrees erst. They were otified by the worther scouting force that priority 1 targets were covered by moken clouds and neve advised to proceed to the priority 3 target at Landshut. his advice was followed and units turned onto the route to the priority 3 terget. c. The IP was made good by all Groups and bomb runs were made on the riefod headings. The 392nd Group overshot the IP by six miles and the bomberdier ailed to pick up the EPI on the first run. 4 360 degree turn was made to the left nd a second run accomplished. 3. Bombing Analysis a. All units which performed sighting operations boubed the third priority arget, Landshut M/Y. Most bombing was done visually with H2X assistance. Cloud over during the attack varied from one to five tenths. is the attacks progressed, .nits had increasing difficulty with boub smoke. b. This target had been bonted a few days before and was known to be inperative when essigned by Eighth Lir Force. Bombardiers selected MPI's and did oor to excellent damage to the remaining facilities.

Actical Analysis of Mission 16 April 1945 - F. C. 659

c. In the 458th Group, there was interference between the 2nd and 3rd gradrons on the run. However, these Squadrons got 60% and 100% respectively of ar petterns within 2000 feet of their MPI's.

d. The Lord and High Right Squadrons of the 44th Group had interference ith B-17's and abandoned the bomb run. Both units jettisoned by individual 4/Cin open areas approximately ten miles north of sugsburg.

. . . The attack was generally successful as far as bombing accuracy is oncorned.

4. Navigation .. "Tithdravel

c. Rallies were made good and no trouble was encountered by the 2nd, 96th, if 14th Combat Wings. The 392nd Group, after making a second run on the target, it short its rally point to rejoin the rest of the Wing.

(1) The 20th Combat Ting made good its relly point. at this time the navigator called the pilot and gave him a new hording. The pilot did not fly his heading and as a result, the Jing flew over Lugsburg end one L/C was lost to lak. The command pilot was tuned in on WHF and did not hear the discussion beween pilot and navigator. This was definitely pilot error and a decided lack of hear work.

b. The route from rally to the coest cut was flown generally as briefed. ressing out, the Division column was twenty-one minutes long.

5. Fighter Support

a. On this mission five Groups from the 65th Fighter Wing supported 24D tembers. Four Fighter Groups gave close support to the four Combat Wings in the ollowing order: 361st on the 96th Combat Wing, 355th on the 20th Combat Wing, th on the 2nd Combat Wing, and the 56th on the 14th Combat Wing. The other Fightforce gave area support, sweeping five to ten minutes ahead of the Bonbers. The tighters escorted through the target area and upon withdrawal.


6. Enemy Action Encountered

- a. There was no enemy aircraft reaction.
- b. Flak at the target was nil measur to heavy and accurate at Lugsburg.
- 7. Losses
 - a. One eircreft, 448th Group Hit by anti-eircraft near Lugsburg.
- 8. Scouting Force

a. Plan - No operational difficulties were anticipated, so only one force as called for. Target weather was to be reported at TOT minus thirty-five minutes u order to enable units to attack the H2X target by a more direct route if the ther targets were cloud covered.

b. Execution - as planned - Combat Wirgs reported receiving good informaon. The Scouting Force reported peer communications.


- 9. Screening Force
 - a. Targets were flak free and no Screening Force was necessary.



Images courtesy of the Air Force Historical Research Agency $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission.



 $453^{\rm rd}$ Group dropping on Landshut Railroad Marshalling Yards Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration \odot

Indv Msn #:	26	7					
Date:	25 Apr 45						
Mission #:	280						
Position #:	25						
Acft Type:	B-24HSH-25 DT						
Tail No:	42-51123						
Call Letter:	K-King (MK- <u>K</u> +)						
Acft Name:	Smelly Nelly						
Target Type:	Salzburg Railroad Mar	shalling \	/ard				
Target City:	Salzburg, Austria				Sent: 19	Lost: 0	
Name	First Name	MI	Succ	Rank	Position		
McAnelly	Robert	С		1st Lt	1st Pilot		
Milo	Chester	(nmi)		2nd Lt	Co-Pilot		
Freeman	George	Ν		1st Lt	Navigator		
Pohner	William	н		1st Lt	Pilotage Navigator		
Hamrick	Harold	Т		1st Lt	Bombardier		
Curran	William	J		1st Lt	Radar Navigator		
Durant	Merlin	D		T/Sgt	Engineer		
Cobb	Richard	Н		T/Sgt	Radio Operator		
Kaufmann	Charles	F		S/Sgt	Left Waist Gunner		
Rausch	Karl	Н		S/Sgt	Right Waist Gunner		
Yagley	Anthony	J	Jr	S/Sgt	Tail Turret G	unner	
Franz	Anthony	R		S/Sgt	Top Turret Gunr	ner	

WEDNESDAY, 25 APRIL 1945 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO) STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

2 missions are flown.

Mission 968:

589 bombers and **486** fighters fly the final heavy bomber mission against an industrial target, airfields and rail targets in SE Germany and Czechoslovakia; they claim 1-1-0 Luftwaffe aircraft (including an Ar 234 jet); 6 bombers and 1 fighter are lost:

307 B-17s are sent to hit the airfield (78) and Skokda armament works at Pilsen, Czechoslovakia; 6 B-17s are lost, 4 damaged beyond repair and 180 damaged; 8 airmen are WIA and 42 MIA. Escorting are 188 of 206 P-51s.

282 **B-24s are sent to hit marshalling yards at Salzburg (109)**, Bad Reichenhall (56) and Hallein (57) and electrical transformers at Traunstein (56); 20 B-24s are damaged; 1 airman is WIA. The escort is 203 of 216 P-51s; they claim 1-0-0 aircraft in the air.

Mission 969:

During the night of 25/26 Apr, 11 B-24s drop leaflets in France, the Netherlands and Germany.

12 B-24s and 1 A-26 are dispatched on CARPETBAGGER missions to Norway; 7 aircraft complete the mission.

Individual Mission Notes:

Twenty-Fifth Mission, Salzberg, Ger. Gas Load: 2700 Time : 8:15 TWENTY-FIFTH MISSION, SALZBURG; AUSTRIA April 25, 1945 We hit Salzberg Austria. We hit an excellant and really clobbered the target. It was a marshalling yard, and this was the first time it was hit in this war. The flak was moderate but inaccurate They were reported fighters in the area but they did hit the bomber stream. We didn't lose any ships. They also had a lot of rockets.

> Personal note on mission #26 Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Bomb Load:

- Each aircraft carried 20x250 lb. AN-M57 General Purpose bombs and 4x500 lb. AN-M17 Aimable Incendiary Cluster bombs.

Tactical Mission Report:

SUBLECT: Tactical malysis of Mission 25 April 1945 - F. 0. 666. TO : Commading Generals, all Compatings, This Division. 10 553. This information is submitted for your consideration and any action you deem necessary. The deductions and remarks made below are the results of the study of mission reports and information obtained from Combat ...ings and Groups. **EFIECTIVE** BATTL ORDER 1ST FRICRITY 2D IRIGHTY SORTIES SORTIES 96th CB. (6 Sqdns; Traunstein (Vis.) Sclzourg 1/1 (12X) 61 80 " " (5 Sqdas, L4th CH. (5 Sqdas) " " (6 Sqdas) Bad Reichenhall (Vis.) 11 11 53 öl 79 18 .1 đ Hallein (Vis.) 20th UEI (o Squns, Salzburg " 1 11 1 72 71 18 .: æ ... 2nu CB. (4 Sodns, 11 <u>36</u> 270 36 2.0 266 1. Takeoff, assembly, and Dal a. Takeoffs were normal. Group and Joubut hing assemblies were from good to very good. All units were on course on time and at the wriefed altitude at the Dil. ...ssembly Compet mie ed ino First ...ctuol ...sse⊡bly .ltitudes .ing For i 1 Takeoft Time .96tu 0545 1:43. 6,000 0728 14t.. 0550 6,000 U731 1:41 20th0545 6,000 0735 1:50 2nd 0615 6,000 07**3**0 1:23 2. Navigation - remetration a. Landfall in at the energy coast was very good - nevigators were aidod by visual conditions - the Division column was meelven minutes long at this point. b. The route in to the IF was fair. Units were flying poor ling Foractions at times, resulting in over-randing, croading, and s-ing enroute. Weather was visual with 1/10 low cloud. c. Lineuver at the II's was normal. d. Somb runs were made visually and were good to excellent. 3. Bombing melysis e. Units of 20 .ir Division based visually 1st priority targets at Selzhurg, Treunstein, Red Reichenhell and Hellein. Good results were obtained by most units. b. There is still evidence or poor spacing on bomb runs. The lead Squadron of the 467th Group reported .../U of 3rd Squasron of the 466th Group almost underneath at bombs away. Bombs were released together and individual bonb plots were unobtainable; however, results were fair to good. c. The lead Squadron of the 455th Group reported a mulfunction of the boabsight trigger. Boabs were released after the relaced point when indices

Tactical Analysis of Mission 25 April 1945

were ten degrees apart. Seventy per cent of the bombs fell within 2000 feet of MPI. The hilly terrain saved the API assigned to 3rd Squadron of the 458th Group from destruction. A normal sighting operation could not be made because of a mountain just prior to the target.

c. The lead Squadron of the 491st Group was troubled with bomb smoke until the last sixty seconds of the run; one hundred per cent of the bombs were within 2000 feet; however, the pattern was in open area left of the target and results were poor. Offset aiming might have been used had there been sufficient target material; however, identification of Bad Reichenhall was made from a Geodetical Survey Map. The MR Squadron experienced an RER malfunction and had to salvo - a loose, stringy pattern resulted.

(1) The HR Squadron of the 392nd Group, bombing the 1/Y at Hallein, experienced a C-1 malfunction and bombed off the lead squadron; lack of time prevented further corrections. Lombs fell right of the target.

d. The low Squadron of the 445th Group was over-run by the HR of the 448th. In effort was made to clear; however, in so doing, it left the bomb run and failed to get squared away in time for a synchronized run. This Squadron scored a gross error.

e. The 2nd Combit wing was composed of only four Squarons. The overall results of this wing were very good. The Ha Squadron, 309th Group, had to choose another HPI due to bomb smoke - damage results were very good.

4. Navigation - Withdrawal

a. Rallies were normal and effected in good order.

b. The route out was fair. Immediately after the rolly point, the 14th Combat ding cut the briefed route short and encountered light flak. Units remained within ten miles of course upon withdrwal.

c. Landfall out was very good and made visually. The Division column was twenty-two minutes long due to the difference in targets.

5. Fighter Support

a. 24D Bombers had four Fighter Groups as close support and one Fighter Group giving area support. Fighter support was assigned as follows: 479th A and B on 96th Ming, 56th A and B on 14th Ming, 355th A and B on 20th Ming, and the 361st ... and B on 2nd Ming. The 4th Fighter Group was giving area support. Before takeoff, the 56th and the 361st Groups called Headquarters, Eighth Air Force and announced that they would be unable to take off because of weather. Headquarters, Eighth Air Force assigned the 364th Fighter Group of the 67th Ming to escort the 14th Ming and 357th Fighter Group of the 66th Ming to escort the 2nd Wing. Fighter Groups escorted through the targets and upon withdrawal.

6. Enemy Action Encountered

a. There was no enony aircraft reaction.

b. Flak at Dad Reichenhell was nil to weager, inaccurate - at Salzburg, meager to moderate, fairly accurate - nil at Traunstein and Hallein.


7. Losses

a. There were no losses.

8. Scouting Force

a. Planning - A normal force reporting wet ther twenty minutes before target time.

•					ct - weither was G.VU.
9.	Screening	Force			
defende	a. No Ser	eening Forc	e was planned	as target	s were not heavily flak
der chut					
10.	Redar				
	c. H2X ma	lysis ·			
Group	A/C	A/C Over	OK for	OK For	Remarks
	Dispatched	Target	Navigation	Bombing	
389th	3	3	3 1	3 1	
445th	3	. 3	1	1	2 equipment malfunctions
44th	4	4	3	3	1 equipment malfunction
392nd 491st	3 L	34	3 3 3	3 3 3	1 equipment malfunction
-	_		-	-	
93rd 446th	3 4	3 4	2 3	2 3	1 equipment malfunction 1 equipment malfunction
44oth	4	4	4	4	r eduriment merrunetron
458th	5	5	4	3	2 equipment malfunctions
466th	4	4	4	4	
467th	5 4 <u>4</u> 41	<u>4</u> 41	4	3 4 <u>4</u> 33	•
		• –	/4		
					nsidered unsatisfactory.
	By comme	and of Hajor	General KIP.	ER:	



Losses:

- There were no losses on this mission



Salzburg Railroad Marshalling Yard Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration C



The following images are extracts from the copies of official military records obtained from the National Archives and Records Administration. The pencil notations on the images were placed there to indicate the radio call letter for the aircraft if not shown in the original list. The number shown was the formation position number for the aircraft. That indicated the aircraft's position in the formation when they assembled.

You will see the names of the crew members in their assigned position. Often the gunners would change positions with one another in flight. An example would be if a person were assigned to fly in the ball turret, he could swap positions with another gunner. More often than not they would fly in a position where they were the most comfortable.


You will notice the format for the load lists changed over the course of the war. Early on they only listed names and positions, no rank indicated. "W Gun" indicated waist gun positions. The Left Waist Gunner position comes first, followed by the Right Waist Gunner. "B Gun" indicates the Ball Turret Gunner and "T Gun" indicates the Tail Turret Gunner. Later on it was decided that not every plane flew with a bombardier as the formations would drop on the lead aircraft. The bombardier was replaced with a Nose Turret Gunner who would actually toggle the bomb release when he saw the lead plane drop. Some load lists included the serial numbers for the crew members.

701ST SQUADRON SHIP 12 McAnelly, Robert C. lst Lt. Р Milo, Chetter 2nd Lt. CP Freeman, George N. N lst Lt. NT Pohner, William H. B Hamrick, Harold T. H2X Curran, William J. E Durant, Merlin D. RO Cobb, Richard M. lst Lt. lst Lt. lst Lt. T/Sgt. T/Sgt. WG Kaufmann, Charles F. WG Rausch, Karl H. S/Sgt. S/Sgt. Yagley, Anthony J. Franz, Anthony R. S/Sg TG TT S/Sgt.

Mission #1 - 27 Nov 44 – Offenburg, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration \bigcirc


SHIP Ρ HINES, B. E. 之间的 CP WILD, C. 2100 L M UPHER, H. M. F/C 3 tor LT. HA CK. H. DURANT, M. s/set. R POSNER, A. A. \$67 a V C088, R. M. 36T. 14 WILSON, P sor. As 8 VAGLEY, A. J. ser. T Simon, To So ser.

Mission #2 - 30 Nov 44 - Homburg, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ©



Mission #3 - 04 Dec 44 - Bebra, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration \bigcirc

According to the personal log of S/Sgt Anthony Yagley, he flew as an extra gunner on Lt. Hill's crew on the 04 Dec 44 mission to Bebra.



Mission #4 – 05 Dec 44 - Münster, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

SO DATE SHIP Teah and LT 20 SAD LT. and LT. 취공 差鐘 曹 1.0 P. 1ST LT. E ser. DURAN 調査 Ð R: T/86T. CAU LAGHAN 11 CO88, ser. 我。 褒 W ser. SIMON. S. 1 . В T TAGLEY, A. J. SGY .


Mission #5 - 10 Dec 44 – Bingen, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration \bigcirc

Sr DA TE CP 國意識了在許 N R E ΟU R CALLAGHI 101. W 已经运送 W 尊和冠母词。 TRFFE 25 B T


Mission #6 – 11 Dec 44 – Hanau, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

P MINES, HOWARD E.	SHIP END IT
CP MILO, CHESTER	end LT
LUPHER, HARRY M. ME-MAURICK, HAROLO T. B SCHUMAKER, JACK E.	569 UT 187 UT
E DURANT, MARLIN D. R CALLACHAN JOHN G.	t/sgt t/sgt
W COBB, RICHARD H.	SCT SCT
B T VAGLEY, ANTHONY J., JR	s/ser

Mission #7 – 24 Dec 44 - Bitburg/Mayan/Pelm, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$



Mission #8 - 29 Dec 44 - Zülpich, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ©




Mission #9 – 02 Jan 45 - Köblenz, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration \mathbbm{C}

1


Mission #10 - 28 Jan 45 – Kaisersthul, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration \bigcirc

ALRCRAFT SUL-B Qe. 10 FRANK S. JAMES 51 GEO 18 a 14 . E WEI 10 4 MAY 15 -T R COBG. RICHAR RAUSCH, KARL n. s KAUFMANN, CHARLES YAGLEY, ANTHONY TG 81 XG FRANZ, ANTHONY S/SGT. R.

 $\label{eq:mission} \begin{array}{l} \mbox{Mission $\#$11-25 Feb 45-Giebelstadt, Germany} \\ \mbox{Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $$ \end{center} \end{center} \end{center}$







Mission #13 - 28 Feb 45 – Arnsberg, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration \bigcirc

	7 March,	, 1945.
701 si	, ಶದ್ವ.	
SHIP	# <u>547-B</u>	
P CP NH2X NT B E MO WG WG TC XG	Davis, F. 3 Milo, C. Freeman, G.N. Curran, W.J. Pohner, W.H. Hamrick, H.T. Durant, M.D. Cobb, H.M. Rausch, K.M. Kaufmenn, C.F. Yagley, A.S. Franz, A.K.	1st Lt. 2nd Lt. 2nd Lt. 2nd Lt. 2nd Lt. 2nd Lt. 1st Lt. 1st Lt. 1/Sgt. 5/Sgt. 5/Sgt. 5/Sgt. 5/Sgt. 5/Sgt. 5/Sgt. 5/Sgt. 5/Sgt.

Mission #14 - 07 Mar 45 – Soest, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration \bigcirc

701.59	SQ11 March 450ATE	47-B SHIP
Ρ	Davis, F. 25	lst Lt.
CP	Milo, C.	2nd Lt.
Ν·	Freeman, G.N.	2nd Lt.
В	Hamriky, H.T.	lst Lt.
E.	Durant, M.D.	T/Sgt.
R	Cobb, R.M.	S/Sgt.
W	Rausch, K.M.	S/Sgt.
W	Kaufmann, C.F.	S/Sgt.
DT	Franz, A.R.	s/Sgt.
T	Yagley, A.J.	S/Sgt.
NT	Pohner, W.H.	2nd Lt.
H2X	Curran, W.J.	2nd Lt.

Mission #15 - 11 Mar 45 -

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ©

701ST SQ18 Mar.45 DATE 851-GHLP-		
P P		Sist Lt.
CP	Milo, C.	2nd Lt.
N	Freeman, G.N.	2nd Lt.
В	Hamrick, H.T.	lst Lt.
E	Durant, M.D.	T/Sgt.
R	Cobb, R.M.	T/Sgt.
W	Volk, A.L.	S/Sgt.
W ·	Bergstrand, R.H.	S/Sgt.
TB	Franz, A.R.	S/Sgt.
T NT H2X		S/Sgt. 2nd Lt. ~2nd Lt.

Mission #16 – 18 Mar 45 – Henningsdorf, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ${\rm C}$

P CP N B H2X	Milo, C. Freeman, G.N. Hamrick, H.T. Curran, W.J.	lst Lt. 2nd Lt. 2nd Lt. 2nd Lt. 1st Lt. 2nd Lt. 2nd Lt.
NT E RO WG WG TG TT	Pohner, W.H. Durant, M.D. Cobb, R.M. Kaufmann, C.F. Rausch, K.H. Yagley, A.J. Franz, A.R.	2nd Lt. T/Sgt. T/Sgt. S/Sgt. S/Sgt. S/Sgt. S/Sgt. S/Sgt.

Mission #17 – 21 Mar 45 – Achmer, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

SHIP # 547-B	
P Davis, F. 23 CP Milo, C. N Freeman, G.N. B Hamrick, H.T. H2X Curran, W.J. NT Pohner, W.H. E Durant, M.D. RO Cobb, R.M. WG Kaufmann, C.F. WG Rausch, K.H. TG Yagley, A.J. TT Franz, A.R.	lst Lt. 2nd Lt. 2nd Lt. 2nd Lt. 1st Lt. 2nd Lt. 2nd Lt. 7/Sgt. 7/Sgt. 5/Sgt. 5/Sgt. 5/Sgt. 5/Sgt.

Mission #18 – 22 Mar 45 – Giebelstadt, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ${\rm C}$

SHIP # 811-8 (703rd) Р lst CP 2nľŗ. seman, 11 Barris Hamrick. 8 Pohner, 2ndĔ Durant. 1.D. RO Coob. R.M Rausch, NO. ĥ. TO Yagley, A. J TT Franz, A.R.

Mission #19 - 24 Mar 45 - Wesel, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration \bigcirc

SHII	? # <u>547-B</u>	, in the second s
P	Davis, F. 25 Milo, C.	lst Lt. 2nd Lt.
and New Side	Freeman, G.N.	2nd Lt. 2nd Lt.
B	Pohner, W.H. Hamrick, H.T.	lst Lt.
E	Curran, W.J. Durant, M.D.	2nd Lt. T/Sgt.
RO WG	Cobb, R.M. Kaufmann, C.F.	T/Sgt. S/Sgt.
WG	Rausch, K.H. Yagley, A.J.	S/Sgt. S/Sgt.
TT	Franz, A.R.	S/Sgt.
CA	Kniaz, W.M.	Capt.

Mission #20 – 30 Mar 45 – Wilhelmshaven, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

701ST SQUADRON SHIP Frank Capt. S Chester 2nd CP Lite eeman, George N. N 2nd Lt. öner, William H; 2nd Lt. T. lst Lt. Hamrick, Harold в H2X 2nd Lt. Curran, W11 liam J. Durant, Merlin D. T/Sgt. E Cobb, Richard M. RO S/ Sgt. WG Kaufman, Charles F. Rausch, Karl WG H. S/ Anthony J. TG Yugley, Franz, Anthony R. TT S,

 $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Mission $\#21-04$ Apr 45-Perleberg, Germany} \\ \mbox{Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $$ \end{tabular} \label{eq:mage} \end{array}$

701ST	SQ 6 April 45 DA TE	SHLP
P	Davis, Frank	Capt.
СР	Milo, Chester	2nd Lt.
N	Freeman, George N.	2nd Lt.
. В'	Hamrick, Harold T.	lst Lt.
E E	Durant, Merlin	T/Sgt.
R	Cobb, Richard M.	s/Sgt.
W	Kaufman, Charles F.	S/Sgt.
Ŵ.	Rausch, Karl H.	S/Sgt.
T	Franz, Anthony P.	^S /Sgt.
T	Yagley, Anthony P.	S/Sgt.
NT	Pohner, William H.	2nd Lt.
H2X CA:	Curran, William J. Tracey, Ford P.	2nd Lt. Capt.

Mission #22 – 06 Apr 45 – Halle, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

701ST SUULDRON	
SIN 2 547-B	5
P Davie, Frenk	Capt.
OF Monaly, Robert C.	195 Lt. (790th
N Greenal, George N.	2nd Lt.
NT Polmer, Million H.	2nd Lt.
B - Hamrick, Harold I.	
HILLAN J.	2nd Lt.
Alter of the state	2/3gt.
E Burent, Morlin D.	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RO Cobb, Richard M.	8/3gt.
W Scourby, James	s/Sgt.
HC Pelakorski, Jos A.	8/500.
TO Jagley, Anchony J.	S/Egt.
TT Fronz, Sathesy R.	S/Sgt.

Mission #23 – 08 Apr 45 - Fürth, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$

701ST SQUADRON SHIP # 123-K P MCanelly, Robert C. lst Lt. CA Davis, Frank Capt. Freeman / George N. Pohner, William H. N 2nd Lt. MT 2nd Lt. Hamrick, Harold T. Β. lst Lt. Curran, William J. Durant, Merlin D. H2X 2nd Lt. E T/Sgt. RO Cobb, Richard M. S/Sgt. WG. Kaufman, Charles F. S/Sgt. Medlock, Lesley I. WG S/Sg TG Yagley, Anthony J. S/Sg TT Franz, Anthony R. S/Sgt.

Mission #24 – 11 Apr 45 – Amberg, Germany

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ©

701ST SQUADRON SHIP # 123-K 1012-P McAnelly, Robert Milo, Chester CP Freeman, George N. N Will MT Pohner, Η. iam Hamrick B Harold H2X Curran, William Ε Durant. Merlin D. Copb, Richard M. RO WG Kaufmann, Charles F. Rausch, Karl H. WG TG Yagley, Anthony J. Franz, Anthony R. TT

Mission #25 – 16 Apr 45 – Landshut, Germany Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration C

701ST SQUADRON SHIP McAnelly, Robert C. lst Lt. P Milo, Chetter 2nd Lt. CP Freeman, George N. N lst Lt. Pohner, William H. Hamrick, Harold T. lst Lt. NT 1st Lt. B H2X Gurran, William J. E Durant, Merlin D. lst Lt. T/Sgt. RO Cobb, Richard M. T/Sgt. Kaufmann, Charles F. WG S/Sgt. WG Rausch, Karl H. S/Sgt. Yagley, Anthony J. Franz, Anthony R. TG S/Sgt. TT S/Sgt.

Mission #26 – 25 Apr 45 – Salzburg, Austria

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ©



Many people believed that the crews flew their "own" plane for all of their missions. In the case of the 445th Bomb Group, for their very first mission a lot of the crews flew a plane other that what they had flown across the Atlantic Ocean enroute to England. After the mission to Kiel Germany's submarine works, the crews requested that they fly the planes they were familiar with. This critique was made during the post-mission debriefing and was approved by the Group CO, Col Robert H. Terrill.

If a plane suffered significate battle damage on a previous mission, then the crews would fly whatever aircraft was available for the day's mission.

The following images are collections of photographs provided by former members of the 445th Bomb Group (H), Dan Stockton's most excellent B-24 Best Web website, from the records of the National Archives and Records Administration, and from the 445th museum at the airfield in Tibenham England.



B-24J-1 FO, 42-50565, 700th BS (IS-Q+), "Ole King Cole" Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration ©



B-24J-5 FO, 42-50811, 703rd BS (RN-E), "Patty Girl" Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$




B-24HSH-25 DT, 42-51123, 701st BS (MK-<u>K</u>+), "Smelly Nelly" Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration C




The following pages represent a "current view" of the targets this individual flew against. Thanks to today's satellite imagery, we can now show you precise locations of targets that were hit. In many cases, even though three-quarters of a century has passed since those bombing missions have been flown, there is clear proof of the level of destruction that was wrought upon the enemy. Bomb craters can still be seen and airfields in Germany and those countries occupied by the Germans can still be recognized.


In Germany many of the Luftwaffe airfields with paved runways, aprons, and factory facilities are now host to a large number of solar array farms which service the surrounding communities.




 $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Mission } \#1-27 \mbox{ Nov } 44-\mbox{Offenburg Marshalling Yard} \\ \mbox{Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro } \ensuremath{\mathbb{C}} \end{array}$



Mission #2 – 30 Nov 44 – Homburg Marshalling Yard Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro C



Mission #3 – 04 Dec 44 – Bebra Marshalling Yard Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro™



Mission #4 – 05 Dec 44 - Münster Marshalling Yard Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro ©




 $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Mission $\#5-10$ Dec $44-Bingen Marshalling Yard} \\ \mbox{Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro $$$ C$} \end{array}$



Mission #6 – 11 Dec 44 – Hanau Marshalling Yard Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro C




Mission #7 – 24 Dec 44 – Bitburg Communication Center Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro C




Mission #5 – 29 Dec 44 – Zülpich Communications Center Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro C




Mission #9 – 02 Jan 45 - Köblenz/Güls Railroad Bridge Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$




Mission #10 – 28 Jan 45 – Dortmund/ Kaisersthul Benzol Refinery Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro C



 $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Mission } \#11-25 \mbox{ Feb 45-Giebelstadt Me 262 Jet Airfield} \\ \mbox{Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro } \end{tabular}$




 $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Mission } \#12-27 \ \mbox{Feb 45}-\mbox{Halle Marshalling Yard} \\ \mbox{Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro } \end{tabular}$




 $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Mission $\#13-28$ Feb 45-Arnsberg Railroad Viaduct} \\ \mbox{Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro $$$ \end{tabular}$




Mission #14 – 07 Mar 45 – Soest Marshalling Yard Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro™




Mission #15 – 11 Mar 45 – Kiel Submarine Pen Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro™



 $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Mission $\#16-18$ Mar 45-Henningsdorf Tank Factory} \\ \mbox{Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro } \end{tabular}$




Mission #17 – 21 Mar 45 – Achmer Me 262 Jet Airfield Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro C



 $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Mission $\#18-22$ Mar 45-Giebelstadt Me 262 Jet Airfield} \\ \mbox{Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro } \end{tabular}$



Mission #19 – 24 Mar 45 – Operation VARSITY – Jump Across the Rhine River Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro



Mission #20 – 30 Mar 45 – Wilhelmshaven Sub Pen, Docks and Shipyard Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro C



 $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Mission } \#21-04 \mbox{ Apr } 45-\mbox{Perleberg Me } 262 \mbox{ Jet Airfield} \\ \mbox{Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro } \end{tabular}$




Mission #22 – 07 Apr 45 – Ha;;e German Army Headquarters Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro™




Mission #23 – 08 Apr 45 - Fürth Blumenthal Me 262 Jet Aircraft Factory Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro C




Mission #24 – 11 Apr 45 – Amberg Marshalling Yard Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro C




Mission #25 - 16 Apr 45 - Landshut marshalling Yard Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro C



Mission #26 – 25 Apr 45 – Salzburg, Austria Image courtesy of Google Earth Pro C



Awards of the Air Medal to S/Sgt Anthony Yagley Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$



HEADQUARTERS DAVIS-MONTHAN FIELD OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER

In Depty Refer To:

Turson, Arlsons 24 Sept. 1944

Mr. and Mrs. Anthony J. Yagley Sr. 20182 Concord Setroit, Mich.

Doar Mr. and Mrs. Yagley:

Your son has recently been graduated here as a qualified combat crew member of a B-24 Liberator bomber and, as you perhaps know, will seen be on his way to actual combat duty.

I am calling this to your attention because I, too, am proud of his accomplishment and an vitally interested in his future activities. His leaving here was probably our last official word of him, but my interest certainly doesn't stop there, and any further information regarding his combat experiences that you can pass on to me will be sincerely appreciated.

The training course here is a strenuous one--one designed of necessity to fill urgent wartime needs and to mold together as quickly and efficiently as possible ten-man aerial crews into individual teams who work as one. As commanding officer it is my privilege to have a most responsible part in the training of these fine, young, patriotic Americans and it is meedless to say that I am more than pleased with the outstanding and heroic records they have made and are now making in the field of battle.

I wish it were possible to write a more personal, intimate letter to you but limited time will not permit. However, in spite of this I want you to feel that all of us here at Davis-Monthan Field have your son's interest at heart. To have successfully graduated here and to carry on the fight in the air for our country is no small accomplichment, and our confidence in his ability and record in the future is unlimited.


 Kay he have Godspeed and guidance in a safe and triumphant return to you and to his own country.

Sincerely

R. B. WALKER

Colonel, Air Corpe Commanding

Letter graduating from crew selection training Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



Stopover enroute to England Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

reetings

TRANSIENT PERSONNEL

Welcome to Labrador, the "Heaven in the North" It is with regret that we inform you that no one knows how long you will be here . . . not even the Weather Busters. Sack time is highly recommended. Remember the trip ahead of you.

During your stay in "Heaven in the North" . . . you can be assured of three delicious meals, and comfortable guarters, with running water during the thawing season.

You are asked not to leave the Base unless on an organized recreational trip, sponsored by the Special Services. You may be sure that neighboring villages (the closest

one 32 miles from here) can offer you no amusement.

Don't be a pickle-puss . . . Wear a smile . . . We grin and bear it.

On the back page of this folder, is a picture of "Heaven in the North", showing the various buildings, which you might have occasion to visit.

Read on MacDUFF . . .

OFFICIAL POST TIME IS GMT * SUN TIME IS THREE HOURS LESS

P

BILLETING: Billeting and Transient Service Office is located in the terminal building. Officers' billeted in Barracks No. 2 and 5. Enlisted Man in Barracks No. 5, No. 6, No. 7 and No. 8.

MESS: Officers' Mess open 24 hours a day. Breakfest 25c, Dinner 25c, Supper 50c. Enlisted personnel furnished free meals 24 hours a day. If you prefer something super-special in the way of food, visit our Snack Bar in the terminal building - also open 24 hours a day.

OFFICERS' CLUB: All transient officers are cordially welcome. Club open from 13:30 to 02:00. Pool, ping-pong, cards, chess, checkers, old magazines and papers. Bar open 20:00 to 21:00.

THEATRE: See your favorite stars in the picture you have seen before. Shows start at 17:00, 21:30 and 00:30.

RECREATION HALL: Open to all. Modern fully equipped gym, showers, up-to-date library, beautiful reading rooms, hobby shop, Red Cross office, bowling, ping-pong and Special Services. **SKIING:** Not recommended. Hospital facilities do not warrant such activities.

SKIING: Not recommended. Hospital facilities do not warrant such activities, FISHING: Organized trips by Special Services. Unlimited fishing for all, License not required.

POST EXCHANGE: Stores open 12:30 to 20:00. We have the things you have missed. Cigarettes 5c, ration two packs, no ration card needed. Coffee Shop open 12:00 to 20:00: Coffee, sandwiches, snacks, etc. available during the day. **MEDICAL:** Sick call for transients 16:00.

P


CHAPEL

Protestant Services: Catholic Mass: Sunday 13:00 and 22:00. Everyday 20:00. Wednesday 22:00. Confessions prior to each mass

Jewish Service: Friday Night. See Bulletin Board for Hours.

REGULATIONS: Quiet is required at 02:00. Let the other fellow sleep. (Military courtesy, customs, etc.) **LOUNGES:** Attractive lounges for all personnel in Briefing Building, ettended by Red Cross girls. **HUNTING:** None.


Info card Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



Goose Bay Facilities Map Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



Collection of aerial gunners Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



42-51480 with radar jamming antennas on the bottom of the fuselage Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



Taken outside squadron office Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



Taken outside barracks after transfer to 701st Squadron Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



Formation of 445th B-24's overhead Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family

Rail-Hitting HeaviesTear Into Munich

The aerial sledgehammer fashioned by bombers of the 8th and 15th Air Forces and the RAF fell on German communications and fuel supplies for

communications and fuel supplies for the fourth day in a row yesterday as 1,150 Fortresses and Liberators of the 8th hit railyards, airfields, an oil storage depot and a tank plant while Lancasters of the RAF bombed a synthetic oil plant near Dortmund and the 15th's heavies attacked communications at Linz, Austria. The big target for the 8th yesterday was Munich, a focal point in the German railway system, where Fortresses rumbled over in two waves to hit the terminal rail station and marshalling yards in the eastern and western parts of the city. Other formations of Fortresses pounded yards at Ulm while Liberators bombed the yards and a tank assembly plan at Aschaffenburg, and airfields at Giebel-stadt and Schwebisch-Hall, west of Nuremburg. Fortresses also hammered an underground oil storage depot hidden in the woods outside Neuberg, between Munich and Nuremburg. Fighters in Strafing Action

Fighters in Strafing Action

More than 700 Mustangs and Thunder-More than 700 Mustangs and Thunder-bolts of the 8th were out yesterday, 560 of them shielding the bombers, while a separate force of 200 Mustangs went on a strafing sweep over north central Ger-many, riddling locomotives and other roli-ing stock and shooting up airfields. The 55th Mustang Group caught eight jet-propelled Me262s taking off from a field near Giebelstadt, knocking down seven of them.

The fighters got 21 enemy craft in the

The fighters got 21 enemy craft in the air all told, eight of them jets, and de-stroyed another 20 on the ground. No Lufiwaffe planes attacked the bombers, but the fighters, who ranged over wide areas, ran into several scattered forma-tions of Nazi planes. It was the fifth consecutive day that the 8th had dispatched more than 1,000 bombers. Over 1,100 Fortresses and Liberators, escorted by 500 Mustangs, were out Saturday, attacking oil refineries at Misburg, Hamburg and Harburg, rail targets in northwest Germany and sub-marine construction yards at Bremen and Hamburg. This followed a night in which Hamburg. This followed a night in which RAF Bomber Command sent out more than 1,100 planes to batter communica-tions, industrial and aviation targets.

Tenth Mission , Giebelstadt, Germany

Gas load-2700

Time: 9:00

TENTH MISSION, GIEBELSTADT ?, GERMANY

Feb. 25, 1945

We hit a Jet Air Base. It was at Giebelstadt, Germany..

Our bombing altitude was on 16,600 ft. and the target was visual, so we really knocked it out. I saw the bombs hit and ours landed on the barracks and hangers. We were flying lead so the credit goes to our bombadier.

There were a lot of enemy fighters up but they couldn't get into us due to our fighter protection. Flak was light but they got four holes in our ship. I saw the town of Ulm and there was a column of smoke about 3000' high .. Some of the fellows in the other ships saw the jets trying to land about the time we hit and some of them cracked up. It may have been due to some damage done by our fighters that he never saw. The mission was 9 hours and 30 minutes long.






Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



Actual strike photo of Achmer Germany Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



8th Pummels Luftwaffe's Airfields

AIPIICIAS In a savage blow aimed at cripping the Lutwalle, which had appeared to be orming for a correleact in the past few reeks, U.S. heavy bombers and fighters resterday thundered out to hammer 11 infields, many of thesis bases for jet-wopeled lighters and fighter-bombers, in outhwest Germany, the Rubr and outhern Germany, the Borth of the deliver this trip-hammer parch. The th had some 2,200 planes out, nearly 1000 of which figured in the drive on air-fromes, while the 15th dispatched a evalue force of Liberators to lash at the Scaburg droome, jet base 30 miles north Mamich. The bombers and fighters carried out heir assault under excellent conditions -ceiling visibility was unlimited. In the greaters blow of the whole operation, provimately 1,100 bombers of the 8th

RAF Sees-and Hits-Through Camouflage


Through Cannou Jiage Typhoon pilots of the 2nd Tactical Air Force yesterday reported that the Nazis, in a desperate effort to pre-serve their battered supply lines, have taken to paincing rails, the and even bolts along the top of side rail cars to make them blend with the real tacks. The pilots came fow enough to see through the tack cameuflage pob, how-ever, and detorate it with a bit of cannon and rocket fire,

cannon and rocket fire, and most of its 800 fighters zoomed in over nine fields in northwest Germany to wield a three-ply blow. First the bombers came in for their run, followed by fighters which laid other vital spots on the fields. Fighters carried out the third pluse of the attack by sweeping in to usrade the decenes. In a later operation, approximately 100 Liberators, covered by 100 Mostangs, struck an additional blow, pounding the Mathem airfield between Dunburg and Essen. The remainder of the Rch's bomber force maard deep into faishers demonstruct on the most of the Rch's plant - at - Plan

Leipzig, which had been attacked Monday is poor weather. The bombers at Plasen were tackled by some 15 jet-propelled Me252, but excerting Mustangs drove them off and abot down two. In the whole operation material with other fighter were about yesterday, nine enemy lighters w

down and 43 more were destroyed on 'he ground. RAF hombers also hit the Reich with a tremendous salvo yesterday. In the morning, while Lancasters were on their way back from blassing oil refineries in easien and northwest Germany, more Lancs took off to bomb another oil target, the refinery at Bermen. Later, Lancasters carrying 114on a bombs, dropped their crushing loads on a railway bridge across the Weser near Remen while other bravies struck at the railway yards at Manster, a blow simed at communications running from the Ruhe to Ocasbruck. Mosquitos took just three misutes to wipe out Gestapo headquarters in Copen-hagen yesterday, the United Press re-ported from 21st Army Group Ha. The fast hombers shot through heavy flat to blast the five-story building to the ground.

Newspaper writeup of Achmer mission Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family





War's over – getting ready to go home Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



Yagley, Cobb & Mills Images cou



Mills Van Sant, Yagley, Freeman, unk, Ozanick, Cobb & unk Images courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



Flight line in Iceland



Another shot of the flight line



The opposite direction of the flight line Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



Stroll on the flight line



Mills




Ozanick, Yagley, Van Sant, & Milo Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



Engineer – Collinger Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family






Mills & pup in Iceland Milo & Yagley Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



Crew & passengers in Newfoundland



Limo service in Newfoundland Image courtesy of Anthony J. Yagley Jr. family



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